

LABOR FACT BOOK

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LABOR FACT BOOK 10

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FOREWORD

Tenth in this series of volumes, issued every two years since 1931, this book contains information that is entirely new. Only in a few instances are any items included that have appeared in previous Fact Books.

This volume covers mainly the years 1949 and 1950, but it has been possible to include in some sections facts from the early months of 1951, in order to bring the record as near to the publication date as possible.

To show the trend over a longer span of years, a few tables include earlier figures. In listing corporation profits and dividends, the industrial production index, and the federal budget for war years in Chapter I, for example, we have given earlier data for comparison with the last two years.

As in other volumes of this series, we have for the most part omitted cross references, in view of the unusually full indexing of separate items. In order to save space we have been sparing in citation of sources. We are always ready, however, to give the interested reader, on request, the source for any fact or statement in the book. Also to save space, we have abbreviated the names of most labor unions.

In view of the war situation, we have included for the first time a special chapter on the fight for world peace. The movement to outlaw atomic weapons, and the new organizations that have arisen out of the struggle for peace, are of particular significance today.

We have included an especially full discussion of health problems, with data on discrimination in medical care of the Negro people, industrial hygiene developments, and the major causes of disability and death.

A larger section of the book than usual has been devoted to civil rights and the many "contempt of Congress" cases growing out of the continued assault on the constitutional rights of the people by the Committee on Un-American Activities and the Department of Justice. This chapter includes data on provisions of the McCarran Act and its significance, the effect of war hysteria, the trial of Communist leaders, and the special discrimination and oppression suffered by the Negro people.

In addition to these special subjects, we have covered as in previous volumes the main facts on economic trends, working conditions, and the trade union movement. These chapters all show the effect of the war

and intervention in Korea on economic and political developments in this country.

Preparation of this book has been more than ever a co-operative task. Several able volunteer research workers have given of their time and specialized knowledge in the writing of many sections. We are indebted also to a number of trade union officers who have sent us facts on particular subjects. We have also been aided by many agencies that have answered our questions and given us advice and assistance.

Our bulletin, Economic Notes, now in its 19th year, discusses from month to month many of the topics covered in this book. We also issue Railroad Notes, a monthly bulletin now in its 15th year. In connection with these bulletins and for possible use in future Fact Books, we would appreciate it if unions and other organizations would put us on their mailing list for their publications, proceedings, releases, and other material.

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I. ECONOMIC TRENDS

Capital expenditures for plant and equipment and also the output of consumers goods dropped sharply during the first half of 1949. But production began to increase in the summer, and by June, 1950, it had risen nearly one-fourth above the level of July, 1949. The new developments connected with the Korean intervention led to a widespread "scare" buying spree by consumers, and industry placed huge orders for raw materials, machinery and equipment. The rising trend of production was accelerated in the fall of 1950.

Production: The index of industrial production of the Federal Reserve Board, which reflects the trend in physical output of durable and non-durable manufactures and mining, had by December, 1950, reached 216, a level slightly above that of the last war year, 1945, although the average for the year 1950 as a whole was only 200.

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX

(Monthly average. 1935-39 = 100)

1941	162	1946	170
1942	199	1947	187
1943	239	1948	192
1944	235	1949	176
1945	203	1950	200

The production index averaged 189 for the first six months of 1950 and 213 for the last six months. Between the low of 161 in July, 1949, and the 216 registered for December, 1950, the index advanced about 34%, largely because of forward buying in anticipation of the possible shortages from the war preparations program. By February, 1951, the index had reached 221, having risen 11% since the Korean war began.

Gross National Product: As a result of the recovery in business in the fall of 1949 and the stimulation in 1950 from the expected war "emergency" program, gross national product rose by 18%, from an annual rate of \$254 billion in the fourth quarter of 1949 to \$300 billion a year later. During this period production for civilian use increased (in annual rate) from \$235 billion to \$282 billion, or by 20%, a little more than the increase in total gross national production.

DISPOSITION OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
(Annual rate in billions of dollars)

		<i>Total gross national product</i>	<i>Export surplus of goods and services</i>	<i>Gov't. war or "national defense" expenditures</i>	<i>Production for domestic civilian use</i>
1949:	Quarter				
	1st	258.8	6.2	12.2	240.4
	2nd	255.2	6.2	12.2	236.8
	3rd	254.4	6.2	12.2	236.0
	4th	253.8	6.2	12.2	235.4
1950:	1st	263.4	2.8	12.0	248.5
	2nd	271.6	3.2	12.0	256.4
	3rd	283.9	0.3	12.8	270.8
	4th	300.3	0.9	17.3	282.1

Export surplus of goods and services dropped sharply from 1949 to 1950, as financing through the Marshall Plan and other foreign-aid schemes was gradually eliminated and the United States became a large buyer of raw materials from abroad in anticipation of military program requirements. (See below.)

The biggest rise took place in government "national defense" expenditures. Even though the war preparations' program was only beginning toward the end of 1950, the annual rate of such expenditures in the fourth quarter of 1950 was 42% larger than in the fourth quarter of 1949, rising from an annual rate of \$12 billion to over \$17 billion. They were expected to run at least double this amount in 1951.

When allowance is made for the rise in prices during this period, volume of gross national product in 1950 increased by only 7% over 1949. During the last part of 1950 prices rose rapidly, so that the percentage increase in gross national product, after allowing for increased prices, was not as large as for the year as a whole.

National Income: The national income (which is total net income earned by individuals as well as business concerns) rose by 16% from the first quarter of 1949 to the final quarter of 1950, when it reached an annual rate of \$255 billion. Compensation of employees, even including the high-salaried executives of corporations, rose 15%, or less than the average; income of farm proprietors actually declined 6%; net interest rose less than the average, by 9%; while corporate profits, before taxes, rose 70%, or over four times as rapidly as the total national average. It is estimated that corporate profits, after taxes, rose by at least 35%. Business and professional income was up 25%, while rental incomes of individuals rose 3%. Thus corporate profits and business and

professional income during this two-year period went up very much more sharply than the income of employees or farmers.

Total personal income, after taxes, available for consumption expenditures or savings is known as "disposable income." This rose by 7% from an annual rate of \$197.4 billion in the first quarter of 1949 to \$211.6 billion in the fourth quarter of 1950. During the same period the annual rate of personal consumption expenditures rose 11%, from an annual rate of \$177 billion in the first quarter of 1949 to \$197 billion in the fourth quarter of 1950.

Savings and Low Incomes: During 1949 when production dropped, personal consumption expenditures were not reduced even though personal incomes declined. As a result, the rate of personal net savings was cut from a rate of over \$12 billion a year in the first quarter of 1949 to a rate of a little more than \$6 billion a year in the third and fourth quarters.

During 1950 personal savings rose to an annual rate of \$14.8 billion in the first quarter, but after the Korean intervention the frantic buying spree reduced savings to a rate of around \$5.7 billion in the third quarter. In the fourth quarter, with rising personal incomes and more moderation in buying, the annual rate of personal savings rose to \$15.8 billion. In the third quarter, during the buying splurge, consumer installment credit mounted rapidly, savings accounts were drawn down and the redemption of government "E" savings bonds ran considerably in excess of sales.

The Economic Report of the President (Jan., 1951) said:

"There was an increase of 2 million spending units receiving money incomes of less than \$2,000 from 1948 to 1949, despite the fact that total personal income declined only about 1½%. Higher unemployment, a substantial drop in farm income, and greater frequency of farm and business losses were mainly accountable for the increase in the number of spending units with very low incomes. . . .

"In 1950, as in previous years, the expenditures of the two-fifths of the population with lowest incomes probably exceeded their incomes."

Consumer Credit: Total consumer credit outstanding increased during 1949 and 1950. At the end of December, 1950, it had reached a level of \$20 billion as against \$14.4 billion at the end of 1948. Much of this rise of 39% was due to the large increase in credit for automobile purchases, which more than doubled, and in other installment credit, including repair and modernization loans insured by the Federal Housing

Administration, which rose by 40%. The Economic Report of the President (Jan., 1951) pointed out: "In the second half of 1950, the growth of credit was subjected to several restraints. . . . Selective controls on consumer and real estate credit were [also] imposed. In September, the Federal Reserve Board applied regulations to consumer installment credit. . . . In October, terms were substantially tightened. As a result of the regulation, and the subsidence of late summer buying which began before the regulation was put into effect, total installment credit increased less than 2% during the fourth quarter of 1950, compared to 10% during the same period of 1949."

Capital Investment: Total gross private domestic investment, including inventories, declined by 23%, from a peak of \$43.1 billion in 1948 to \$33 billion in 1949. This was one of the chief reasons for the general business decline in 1949. Principal cause of this recession was the net change in business inventories which rose \$5.5 billion in 1948 and declined \$3.7 billion in 1949, a net change of \$9.2 billion.

As business started to improve toward the end of 1949 and in early 1950 and as industry increased its pace with the Korean intervention, total gross private domestic investment rose to an all-time new high of \$48.5 billion in 1950. Importance of the Korean war in relation to American business is shown by the increase in total gross private domestic investment from an annual rate of \$31.2 billion in the fourth quarter of 1949 to an annual rate of \$57 billion in the fourth quarter of 1950, or a rise of 83%. The biggest increase was shown by expenditures for capital goods, including all types of machinery and heavy equipment. Residential construction also rose sharply, and inventories, which declined in the fourth quarter of 1949, increased in every quarter of 1950 except the third when public buying reduced inventories in stores as well as those in the hands of manufacturers.

Total new construction increased by 22%, from \$22.6 billion in 1949 to \$27.7 billion in 1950. The biggest rise was in residential building, but non-residential building and public construction were also rising.

Retail Trade: During 1950, under the stimulus of war fears, scarcity of goods and higher prices, retail trade reached a new peak in the third quarter. Expenditures for durable consumer goods rose from an annual rate of \$22.4 billion in the first quarter of 1949 to \$34.0 billion in the third quarter of 1950. Following this peak they declined, but even in the fourth quarter expenditures for durable goods were at an annual rate of \$30 billion.

The increase in consumer outlays for non-durable goods was from an annual rate of \$99.4 billion in the first quarter of 1949 to a new peak of \$104.3 billion in the fourth quarter of 1950. This increase of only 5%, compared with the 50% increase in expenditures for durable goods, shows the effect of the Korean war on consumer spending. The demand was mainly for goods that might not be produced in case the war should spread. The rise in consumer expenditures for non-durable goods during the period was just about the same as the increase in prices, so that the physical volume of non-durable goods consumption did not expand.

Price Movements: Prices declined moderately during 1949 in contrast with the inflationary upswing under way from the end of World War II through the late summer of 1948. Wholesale prices continued down until December, 1949, when a slow rise started as a result of the upturn in business. This increase in wholesale prices was greatly accelerated by the outbreak of the Korean war which stimulated an inflationary trend throughout the whole economy. During the second half of 1950, wholesale prices rose 11%, the sharpest rise for any six months since World War I except for the period following price decontrol in 1946. For 1950 as a whole, wholesale prices as measured by the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics advanced 16% while its consumer price index rose by 6.5%.

The consumer price index of the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics by no means reflects the true increase in living costs. But even this inadequate official index by February, 1951, had risen about 9.5% above January, 1950, 38.2% since June, 1946 (end of price control) and 87% since August, 1939 (before World War II). The food component of the index had risen even more—15% above January, 1950, 55% above June, 1946, and 142% above August, 1939.

Direct control of prices was instituted early in 1951, but it was insufficient to halt the rising trend. Price control officials were predicting further price advances in the first half of the year.

Extent of Unemployment: When production declined during 1949, unemployment increased and by February, 1950, the U. S. Census Bureau estimated that 4,700,000 were jobless. This was about 1,500,000 more than in February of the previous year. The outbreak of war in Korea, which stimulated business so markedly, led to some reduction in the number of unemployed who were estimated at 2,200,000 in December, 1950, or about 3.6% of the civilian labor force, as against 6.2% (3,900,000 jobless) in the first half of 1950.

Total civilian employment in 1950, according to the same source, averaged about 60 million, or more than 1.2 million over 1949 and almost 600 thousand over the previous peak in 1948. Civilian employment exceeded the top war year 1944 by almost 6 million persons.

Economists of the Electrical Workers (independent) have for several years challenged the Census Bureau estimates of employment and unemployment and indicate the points on which they think the official estimates understate the general level of unemployment.

The Census Bureau estimates do not count as unemployed those workers laid off "temporarily" or waiting to start new jobs. Nor do they consider involuntary part-time workers as involving any unemployment even though they may work as little as one hour a week. The Bureau excludes also from the labor force, and therefore from the count of unemployed, a large number of jobless persons able and willing to work.

When all these corrections are made in the Census Bureau's estimates, the UE economists find that total unemployment actually averaged around 3.1 million in 1947, 3 million in 1948, rising to an average of nearly 5 million in 1949 when a cyclical recession began to develop. This UE estimate of the unemployed found a peak of 6.6 million in February, 1950, with numbers falling thereafter to 5.1 million in April, 4.9 million in June, 3.5 million in August and to 3.3 million in November. In this month, for example, the Census Bureau total estimate was only 2,240,000, but the UE estimated 142,000 then on temporary lay-offs, etc., 360,000 involved in the involuntary part-time correction, and 540,000 in the labor force "fringe" not counted as jobless by the Census Bureau. The UE estimate for that month was hence over a million above that of the government agency.

CORPORATE PROFITS IN THE UNITED STATES

After the high profits of the previous year the trend of corporate profits leveled off in 1949, a year of business decline. But profits of all private corporations, estimated by the U. S. Department of Commerce, although below the peak records of 1948, were higher than most economists had expected.

The decline in 1949 was followed by a sharp upturn in 1950 to an all-time peak. The following table contains revised figures and brings up to date the profit data given in Labor Fact Book 9. It compares profits of certain recent years with those of 1929 and 1939:

PROFITS BEFORE AND AFTER TAXES
(Billions of dollars)

Period	Corporate profits before taxes ¹	Corporate tax liability	Total	Corporate profits after taxes	
				Dividend payments	Undistributed profits
1929	9.8	1.4	8.4	5.8	2.6
1939	6.5	1.5	5.0	3.8	1.2
1944	24.3	13.5	10.8	4.7	6.1
1946	23.5	9.6	13.9	5.8	8.1
1947	30.5	11.9	18.5	6.6	12.0
1948	33.9	13.0	20.9	7.5	13.4
1949	27.6	10.6	17.0	7.8	9.2
1950 ²	40.2	17.9	22.4	9.4	13.0

¹ Federal and state corporate income and excess profits tax.

² Preliminary estimates.

NOTE: Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.

Dividends paid to stockholders also reached an all-time peak in 1950 at \$9.4 billion, or about double the annual average for the wartime years 1942-1945.

As shown in the figures above, the recession of 1949 halted the rising tide of profits slightly as corporate net slipped back to \$17 billion. This was still more than double the 1929 total.

In 1950, however, this temporary drop was reversed, especially after the Korean intervention. Profits after taxes in the first quarter were at an annual rate of \$16.0 billion, \$20.9 billion by the second quarter; an estimated \$25.8 billion by the third quarter, and an estimated \$26.7 billion by the fourth quarter. For the year as a whole 1950 profits before taxes were over four times the total for 1929; after taxes, they were well over twice the total estimated for 1929.

Profit Rate Higher: Not only have the total profits of corporations been rising over the last decade, but also the rate of return on the invested capital. The net profits related to the net worth of a corporation (representing its stock plus its accumulated surplus) measures the profitability of the investment.

In 1940 the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission in a survey of all manufacturing industries reported that the rate of return for such corporations as a whole in that year was 10.2%. In other words, for every dollar that stockholders had invested in the business in that year the companies made a profit, after taxes, of 10.2 cents.

By 1948 similar reports by the same government agencies showed

that the rate of profit, after taxes, on "stockholders' equity" in all manufacturing had risen to a little over 16%, a rate about 60% above that reported for 1940. By the third quarter of 1950 the annual rate had risen to 17.6%. These higher rates were achieved in recent years despite the fact that since 1940 the total investment had greatly increased.

The largest corporations, according to these government surveys, showed the highest profit rates. Those corporations with total assets under \$250 thousand showed a profit rate of 9.6%, for example, in the second quarter of 1950. Those in the groups with larger total assets showed higher rates, with the rate of the top group—those with assets of over \$100 million—rising to 17.2% of stockholders' equity.

U. S. FOREIGN TRADE

Export trade of the United States slipped badly in 1950. The decline was most pronounced before the artificial trade stimulus resulting from the Korean intervention in June.

Exports are defined by the U. S. Department of Commerce (in *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, March 5, 1951) as "covering all merchandise shipped from the U. S. Customs Area with the exception of supplies destined to U. S. Armed Forces abroad for their own use." In 1950, U. S. exports, including a very small amount of re-exports, totaled \$10,275 million. This was a decline of 17.3% from the \$12,051 million total in 1949, and a significant drop of 33% from the postwar high of \$15,340 million in 1947.

The decline in 1950 would have been even more substantial had not the whole trend of decreasing shipments been reversed in the last quarter. Then exports turned upwards because of war-scare buying abroad and also because of the increase in dollars available in foreign countries for purchases in the U. S. These dollars were derived from the enormously increased U. S. purchases of raw materials throughout the world.

Making allowance for price increases, U. S. exports in 1950 remained far above prewar figures. The annual average in 1936-38 was \$2,966 million, less than a third of the 1950 total. In 1950, U. S. general imports totaled \$8,842 million, an increase of 33.5% over the \$6,622 million in 1949 and 53.6% over the \$5,756 million in 1947.

The large excess of U. S. exports over imports, which characterized the postwar years 1946-49, almost disappeared in 1950, as imports increased and exports declined.

Imports are highly unstable and reflect the general fluctuations in

U.S. economic conditions. For instance, in 1948 they totaled \$7,124 million. They dropped to \$6,622 million in 1949 (a decline of 7%) as a result of the economic slump in that year.

The shift in trade with rising U.S. imports in 1950 relieved temporarily the "dollar shortage" that extended over the whole capitalist world. Elimination of the export surplus resulted from U.S. intervention in Korea and American war preparations. Huge stockpiling of raw materials enormously increased imports. U.S. purchases abroad gave dollars to the Western European capitalists who own the plantations, estates and mining corporations which produce the tin, rubber, wool, uranium, etc., that the U.S. is stockpiling. These dollars were returning to the U.S. as Europeans purchased U.S. goods, thereby stimulating American export trade.

No basic problems of the capitalist world were solved by the artificial trade boom arising from the Korean war and American munitions production. Skyrocketing prices of raw materials, which reflected U.S. stockpiling, made it increasingly difficult for the Western European industrialized countries to obtain needed raw materials for themselves. In addition, U. S. demand that Western Europe divert production from peace goods to war supplies was expected to cut into Western European exports of manufactured goods in 1951.

U. S. Embargo: In 1950 the U. S. imposed a virtual total embargo on exports to the Soviet Union. U. S. exports to the U.S.S.R. in 1950 totaled only \$752,000, in contrast to \$6,617,000 in 1949 and \$27,879,000 in 1948. The prewar average (1936-38) of U.S. exports to the U.S.S.R. was \$48,670,000. In comparing prewar U.S. exports to the U.S.S.R. with postwar figures, it will be noted that, although total U. S. exports to all countries in 1948 were over four times as large as the 1936-38 average of exports, U.S. exports to the U.S.S.R. in 1948 were only a little more than half of that prewar average.

Similar trade embargoes were directed against all the other Peoples' Democracies in Eastern Europe. However, a very different treatment was given to America's new Balkan ally. U.S. exports to Yugoslavia in 1950 totaled \$42,038,000. In 1949 they had been \$20,928,000, and in 1948 they were only \$8,017,000.

While the U. S. was enforcing an embargo against the Soviet Union and other countries engaged in building socialism, the Soviet Union maintained its peaceful trade policy. Soviet exports to the U.S. remained practically unchanged at \$38,242,000 in 1950, a negligible de-

cline from the \$39,193,000 in 1949. Soviet exports to the U. S. in 1948 had been substantially higher, totaling \$86,825,000. But this high level could not be maintained in the face of U. S. export restrictions, without creating a frozen dollar balance which the U.S.S.R. would not be permitted to spend.

Divergent Trends: Although total U. S. exports in 1950 were 17.3% less than in 1949, the decline was not evenly distributed. Exports to some countries actually increased. In other areas they remained relatively stable in comparison with the preceding year. The areas of increase, stability and decline of U. S. exports, reflect to a large extent the position of U. S. imperialism in different parts of the world.

The U. S. further strengthened its economic hold over Canada in 1950. Exports to that country rose slightly from \$1,959 million in 1949 to \$2,016 million in the following year. The U. S. economic position in Central and South America was consolidated in 1950. Total exports to all the American countries in 1950 totaled \$2,668 million—only a minor decline from the \$2,721 million of 1949.

The strength of U. S. imperialism is based largely on its dominant economic position in the Americas. Almost 47% of total U. S. exports in 1950 were shipped to Canada, Central and South America.

By 1951, the Central and South American countries supplying raw materials were faced with a repetition of the same situation they met during 1941-45 in their trade relations with the U. S. Now, as then, the U. S. is buying large quantities of raw materials in all the Central and South American countries, paying dollars, but refusing to ship manufactured goods and necessary commodities in return for the dollars accumulated by the Latin Americans. At the end of the last war, when the Latin Americans finally could buy goods in the U. S. market, rapid increases in the domestic U. S. price level wiped out a large part of their dollar balances.

MARSHALL PLAN TO DATE

The Marshall Plan program began April 3, 1948. As of December 31, 1950, Marshall Plan contract authorizations for purchases totaled \$10,643,900,000.

The pattern of the expenditures reflects one of the key objectives of the Marshall Plan—to dispose of U. S. surpluses and to stimulate lagging U. S. industries and services. Six U. S. "surplus" commodities and ocean freight accounted for over half of the total approved authorizations

through December 31, 1950. Wheat and wheat flour accounted for \$1,401.9 million, or 13.2% of the total authorizations. Cotton accounted for \$1,227.1 million, or 11.5%; petroleum and petroleum products for \$1,081.5 million, or 10.2%; ocean freight (paid to U.S. shipping companies) for \$699.6 million, or 6.6%; tobacco for \$400.7 million, or 3.8%; sugar and sugar products for \$282.9 million, or 2.7%; and coal for \$275.1 million, or 2.6%.

In contrast, the value of all machinery and equipment totaled \$1,259.6 million, or only 11.8% of the total authorizations.

Aid to Rearmament: In 1950 the Marshall Plan was fully revealed as the U.S.-controlled economic instrument for enforcing the rearmament of Western Europe in preparation for war against the Soviet Union and its allies. Some of the techniques used for this purpose by the Economic Cooperation Administration (Marshall Plan Agency) have been:

1. Appropriations of U.S. funds have been approved only for projects of a potential military value. The U.S. Department of Commerce admitted: "It is difficult to find any Marshall Plan projects outside the category of those that could aid rearmament one way or another." (*Foreign Commerce Weekly*, Feb. 26, 1951.)

2. Beginning in 1950, Marshall Plan funds were released only to those Western European countries that diverted their production to rearmament. The N.Y. Times reported, Feb. 23, 1951, "Economic Cooperation Administration aid to Western Germany will henceforth be distributed on the basis of its contribution to the Western defense, Charles Cattier, Marshall Plan mission chief, announced. . . ."

3. Since the U.S. intervention in Korea, raw materials have become increasingly scarce and expensive. The ECA has assumed the job of allocating scarce American raw materials to Western Europe, releasing such materials only to countries that are producing armaments and that have curtailed their trade with the Soviet Union and the new Peoples' Democracies. The N.Y. Herald Tribune reported, Feb. 13, 1951: "The amounts of American raw materials allotted in the future to the countries of Western Europe will depend to a large extent on their contribution to the rearmament of the West, William C. Foster, Economic Cooperation Administrator, said today."

The ECA has been working to curtail East-West trade in Europe for a much longer period. A N.Y. Times report, Sept. 22, 1950, admitted that Paul Hoffman (former ECA chief) "cannot tell how successful the ECA has been in getting Western Europe to restrict shipments of stra-

tegic goods to Russian-controlled Europe because in some countries the facts, if aired, might shake the governments."

4. Loans were made by ECA in 1950 to countries that were not originally included in the Marshall Plan. These loans were extended with the stated purpose of obtaining ground troops for an intended drive against the Soviet Union. An ECA loan to fascist Spain was announced November 15, 1950. The N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, reported: "Behind all these diplomatic and financial moves has been the argument of many in and out of Congress that Spain is strategically important to the defense of Western Europe and that the Franco regime is a confirmed foe of communism and probably would fight with the North Atlantic Treaty powers if it came to a general war with the Soviet Union."

Help to U.S. Monopolies: The Marshall Plan originally included a guarantee to American private investments in Western Europe to the sum of \$300 million. This guarantee has scarcely been utilized. As of September 30, 1950, only \$23 million of U.S. private investments had been covered by it. The continuing political instability has probably been an important factor in discouraging new U.S. private investments in Western Europe.

Big business has been much more actively interested in the raw materials and the trade of the colonial possessions of the Western European countries.

The French sphere of interest in Indo-China, North Africa and Equatorial Africa has received a great deal of attention from ECA. The Belgian Congo and parts of the British Empire have also been treated to special attention from ECA and from the big U.S. mining and trading monopolies. The ECA has used a portion of the counterpart funds (which are set up in local currencies in each country to match the U.S. contribution) to stockpile raw materials. As of September 30, 1950, \$97 million had been used for stockpiling from all the territories included in the Marshall Plan.

THE WAR BUDGET

The federal budget for the fiscal year 1952 (starting July 1, 1951) was presented to Congress by President Truman on January 15, 1951. It called for \$52 billion to be spent on a war and war preparations—military services, international affairs, defense production and atomic research.

Veterans services were cut to \$4.9 billion despite increasing needs as a result of the Korean War. Interest on the federal debt now over \$257 billion was listed in the budget at \$5.8 billion. Veterans services and interest on government debt make up the "aftermath of war" expenditures shown in the table below.

Housing was expected to net the government a profit of over \$500 million. Expenditures for social security, welfare and health were set at only \$2.6 billion while the government will collect \$5 billion from payroll taxes. Labor will cost the government only \$200 million, including unemployment compensation and placement activities.

The figures in parentheses beside the 1941 and 1952 columns in the following table show the percentage of the total spent for each item in these two years.

FISCAL YEARS ENDED JUNE 30

(in billions)

	1941	1950	1951	1952
War and war preparations	\$6.5 (48.5)	\$17.7	\$26.9	\$52.0 (72.6)
Aftermath of war	1.7 (12.7)	12.3	11.4	10.7 (15.0)
Social security	2.5 (18.7)	2.2	2.5	2.6 (3.6)
Housing facilities	0.1 (0.8)	0.3	0.4	-0.5* (-0.7)
Labor	0.2 (1.5)	0.3	0.2	0.2 (0.3)
All other purposes	2.4 (17.8)	7.4	5.8	6.6 (9.2)
Total	\$13.4 (100.0)	\$40.2	\$47.2	\$71.6 (100.0)

*Repayments and collections will exceed expenditures by over \$500 million.

In studying the above table it should be remembered that 1941 was a year of intense war preparations, yet the amount spent for war and war preparations in that year was only one eighth of the amount budgeted for 1952.

WAR TAXES TO SOAK THE POOR

The tax law enacted in September 1950 restored all the cuts in individual rates voted since the end of World War II. It raised the income tax on workers' incomes by over 20%. For example, a married man, with two children, earning between \$3,000 and \$5,000 a year had his income tax increased by 20.5%. But a man with a similar-sized family receiving \$1 million a year had his taxes increased only 11.5%.

The law was full of loopholes to benefit the rich. For example, one loophole permits married couples to split income between themselves, a provision which gives tax relief especially to individuals with incomes

of over \$10,000. This split-income provision was adopted in 1948 and continues in the 1950 law.

Corporate taxes were raised in the first 1950 law, but this had no provision for taxing excess profits. However, the second revenue law of 1950 provided primarily for an excess profits tax on corporations.

This second act was designed to raise about \$3.3 billion a year. The excess profits of corporations were subjected to a 77% tax while regular profits were taxed at 47%. No corporation, however, would be called upon to pay more than 62% of its total net profits. This excess profits tax law, reported financial writer Sylvia F. Porter, "is so full of exemptions, credits, loopholes, that it doesn't even warrant the name." (N.Y. Post, March 3, 1951.)

Various loopholes and special favors were given to corporations. For example, the life insurance companies, which, through a technical error, had paid no income taxes since 1946, were given a \$50 million present through a provision that forgave them all back taxes except those for the year 1949.

The excessive depletion allowances for land containing oil, gas and minerals, which had cost the government some \$400 million in the past, were actually broadened in the 1950 law. Erwin N. Griswold, dean of the Harvard Law School, said the law favors "oil interests and everything that smells of oil." (CIO News, Oct 2, 1950).

Quite aside from these special advantages extended to a few privileged corporations, provisions for accelerated depreciation of special plants and other facilities were calculated to give all large corporations engaged in war work billions of dollars of hidden profits which could escape all taxation.

Tax Burden Increases: The estimated increase in federal taxes since 1941 and the amounts collected in each category in the years 1941, 1945, 1950, and projected for 1951 and 1952, with war spending going full blast, are shown in the table on the following page.

Within a few days after President Truman had released the above estimates for 1951 and 1952, he projected an additional tax increase of \$16.5 billion in order to put the nation on a "pay-as-you-go" basis. The task of planning how this additional amount would be raised was left for the Secretary of the Treasury. In a statement to the House Ways and Means Committee, February 5, 1951, Secretary Snyder called for an increase of \$3 billion in excise taxes which are really sales taxes in disguise; \$3.6 billion in individual income taxes; \$3.1 billion in cor-

poration income taxes; and \$440 million in capital gains taxes. Yet even these drastic "soak the poor" measures were designed to raise only \$10.1 billion out of \$16.5 billion proposed by the President.

TYPES OF FEDERAL TAXES

(Millions of dollars)

<i>Kind of tax</i>	<i>1941</i>	<i>1945</i>	<i>1950</i>	<i>1951*</i>	<i>1952*</i>
Individual income	\$1,824	\$19,789	\$18,115	\$22,309	\$26,780
Corporate income & excess profits	2,211	16,399	10,854	13,560	20,000
Excise	2,390	5,934	7,597	8,240	8,222
Social security	932	1,793	2,892	3,774	4,984
Customs	392	355	423	600	620
Miscellaneous	236	3,480	1,430	1,325	1,333
Total	\$7,985	\$47,750	\$41,311	\$49,808	\$61,939
Deduct appropriations to reserves, refunds and adjustments	758	2,989	4,266	5,296	6,801
Net receipts	\$7,227	\$44,762	\$37,045	\$44,512	\$55,138

*Estimates based on President's budget message, January 15, 1951.

As the tax laws stood in February, 1951, individuals with adjusted gross incomes under \$5,000 a year would have to pay 36% of the total individual income tax burden, while individuals with adjusted gross incomes in excess of \$5,000 would have to pay 64%. If recommendations of the Secretary of the Treasury were adopted by Congress, the burden falling on those with incomes under \$5,000 would increase to 37% while the load on those making over \$5,000, adjusted gross income, would decrease to 63%. Since these figures are based on adjusted gross incomes, and many more "adjustments" are available to individuals in the higher income brackets, the disparity in burden would be much greater than these comparisons suggest. It may be fairly estimated that at least 50% of the individual income tax burden now falls on persons earning less than \$5,000 a year.

The Electrical Workers (independent) estimates that, before the passage of any new tax laws in 1951, the average family, with income of from \$3,000 to \$3,200, pays in direct and indirect taxes to federal, state and local governments around \$600-\$700 a year.

Tax Programs: Proposals offered by the Electrical Workers (independent) in February, 1951, were as follows: Increase personal exemptions to \$1,600 for a single person, \$2,400 for a married couple, and \$600 additional for each dependent. Remove federal excise sales taxes

on common consumption items. Close loopholes available to the wealthy. Increase corporation taxes by \$7 billion. Eliminate income splitting by husband and wife.

Also, eliminate unnecessary allowances to corporations for accelerated amortization of war facilities. Revise estate and gift tax laws to yield an additional \$500 million a year. Eliminate present system of allowing excessive depletion deductions to oil and mineral companies. Increase tax rates on individuals making more than minimum incomes necessary to provide the personal exemptions recommended.

UE's proposals are designed to raise whatever amount of taxes may be needed to finance the government even up to \$15 to \$25 billion more than was suggested by the Secretary of the Treasury. These proposals do, however, demand strict adherence to the principle of ability to pay.

Early in 1951, the CIO proposed changes designed to raise the \$16 billion necessary (at the date the proposals were made) to balance the budget for the 1952 fiscal year. While calling for an increase of corporation taxes by \$8 to \$9 billion, the CIO proposals did not include any suggestions for relieving the oppressive burden which has already been heaped on the shoulders of the average American worker.

Progressive trade unionists point out that there are two basic changes which must be part of every tax bill supported by labor: (a) personal exemptions must be constantly raised; (b) more and more items normally purchased by workers must be freed of excise (sales) taxes. Unless these changes are brought about, labor will automatically be saddled with an ever increasing proportion of the cost of government.

II. THE FIGHT FOR PEACE

PEACE ACTIVITIES

The period 1950-51 saw a developing struggle for peace throughout the world. During the summer of 1950 following the intervention in Korea, there was considerable violence on the part of the police in many parts of the United States against those who worked for peace. Many trade unionists, progressives and other men and women were attacked, beaten, and some imprisoned because they signed the World Peace Appeal or protested against the Korean intervention.

But protests rolled up in the millions and all over the country the real voice of America was heard—demanding a peaceful settlement of the war and the outlawing of atomic weapons.

The World Peace Appeal, known as the Stockholm Appeal, was issued by the Permanent Committee of the World Congress of the Defenders of Peace meeting in Stockholm, Sweden, March 15-19, 1950. Addressed to the United Nations the appeal reads:

"We demand the outlawing of atomic weapons as instruments of intimidation and mass murder of peoples. We demand strict international control to enforce this measure.

"We believe that any government which first uses atomic weapons against any other country whatsoever will be committing a crime against humanity and should be dealt with as a war criminal. We call on all men and women of good will to sign this appeal."

Some 500 million persons all over the world, including scientists, writers, artists, religious and trade union leaders, have signed this petition. But when the United States intervened in the Korean civil war, peace signers in some communities were subjected to extreme brutality.

In Milwaukee, Wis., for example, on July 25, 1950, Roy Webb, 55 years old, who had signed the peace petition, was one of several signers forced to quit work at the plant by pressure from right-wing members of local 75, Auto Workers (CIO). But as peace sentiment developed in the nation the union members changed their minds. They said "Roy was right after all," and elected him an officer of the local.

In Houston, Texas, 11 peace advocates were arrested in July, 1950, while circulating the petitions to ban atomic warfare. Arrests began four days after the peace campaign started. Two veterans among those arrested were beaten in the Houston prison. Newspapers and radio commentators meanwhile advised the people to attack peace petitioners with mops, shovels and other weapons. One leader's house was stoned and the windows broken.

In Philadelphia, Pa., two peace crusaders, Ralph Ditchek and Raymond Stough, were arrested July 25, 1950, because they had peace petitions and pamphlets in their car. They were members of a singing and acting peace caravan. Held in the excessive bail of \$10,000 each, they were imprisoned for a week and then fined for "disorderly conduct."

Despite all the attacks on the World Peace Appeal in newspapers, on the radio, and in many communities, about 2,500,000 Americans had signed the petition by November, 1950. This number helped to swell the world total of some 500 million signers.

Those who have signed have refused to be intimidated and insist upon exercising their civil rights. The Rt. Rev. Benjamin D. Dagwell, Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Oregon, wrote: "I would rather find myself shoulder to shoulder with a group working for peace than in a camp of warmongers who think we can settle the present world difficulties only by bloodshed. . . . I deplore the present tendency to call everyone a Communist who is making a plea for peace."

"Hands Off Korea" Movement: On August 2, 1950, some 15,000 New Yorkers held a peace demonstration in historic Union Square despite brutal attacks by one of the largest police mobilizations ever held in the city. A permit for the gathering had been denied by Mayor William O'Dwyer and Police Commissioner William P. O'Brien.

Negro workers were singled out for special violence at the demonstration. Police rode down unarmed men and women with their horses, trampled, clubbed and kicked those who lay helpless on the street or pavement. One Negro worker who had no part in the demonstration was savagely beaten and then arrested.

William J. McCarthy, a merchant seaman, climbed an electric light pole to display a banner reading "War-mongering, Jim Crow and Anti-Semitism go hand-in-hand." He was dragged down, punched in the face and groin by police and detectives, and taken to the hospital with internal injuries and a serious eye injury. But McCarthy, not the police

attackers, was arrested and found "guilty of disorderly conduct." He was sentenced on September 14 to 30 days in the workhouse. Four other demonstrators were found "guilty."

In Los Angeles, Calif., July 20, 1950, four progressive members of Chrysler local 230, Auto Workers (CIO), were severely beaten by a mob led by Frank Zaffina, a railroad detective and car inspector for the Santa Fe Ry. Zaffina and his gang waited at the plant gates and leaped on each victim as he emerged. The four workers were pummeled, kicked and slugged until they dropped. One was hospitalized with severe head and chest injuries. Zaffina was fined \$200 for assault.

At the General Motors plant in Linden, N. J., two auto workers were attacked by a goon squad on July 31 for handing out leaflets urging "hands off Korea." The violence was incited, reports said, by an article written by the anti-labor columnist Victor Riesel. The two workers attacked and two others were later expelled from the union for protesting against the war. All four had worked at the plant at least 11 years.

Even before the Korean war, peace workers were arrested in some localities. On May 30, 1950, in Brooklyn, N. Y., four young men and a woman, two of them school teachers, were arrested and held in high bail when they painted in white letters the words "Peace" and "No H-bomb" on sidewalk and pillars at the Grand Army Plaza entrance to Prospect Park.

One of the men, a wounded Navy war veteran, was sentenced to a year in the penitentiary. The four others were given six month terms. Although the action occurred more than three weeks before the Korean outbreak, Judge George J. Joyce told the defendants, "You were stabbing our Korean boys in the back." Defense attorneys pointed out that the young people were actually victims of the cold war hysteria.

During the latter part of 1950, however, the people of the United States began to demand an end to the fighting in Korea. In letters and telegrams to congressmen and in letters to the press, they asked the government to "bring our boys home from Korea." As the call for a peace settlement in the Far East swept over this country, the attacks on those who advocated peace subsided.

NEW PEACE ORGANIZATIONS

Local groups of people working for world peace sprang up all over the United States during 1950 as a direct result of the government's

preparations for war, especially after the intervention in Korea. The World Peace Appeal, known as the Stockholm petition to outlaw the atom bomb, was signed by about 2½ million persons in this country and by some 500 million in the world as a whole.

The American Sponsoring Committee for Representation at the Second World Peace Congress sent 52 official delegates and official observers, as well as 13 observers without vote, to the Congress held at Warsaw, Poland, November 16-22, 1950. They came from 18 states and included 18 trade unionists, one farmer, 12 Negro and white Protestant ministers and representatives of local peace committees. Half of the U. S. delegates were women. The Congress brought together 2,065 people of whom 1,756 were delegates or accredited observers, the remainder guests or observers. They came from 80 countries and five continents. The first congress had been held in Stockholm, Sweden, March 15-19, 1950.

Despite great differences of opinion, the delegates at the Warsaw Congress agreed on a program calling for a cessation of the war in Korea and of attempts to sow the seeds of war in Germany and Japan; abolition of atomic weapons, general disarmament and controls to accomplish this; and the outlawing of war propaganda.

The Congress demanded that the problem of Korea "be dealt with by the Security Council in its full composition—that is, including the lawful representatives of the Chinese People's Republic." It declared that no internal conflict in one state could justify armed intervention by any other state. It called for a "law for the protection of peace" in each country. It created a new world organization, the World Peace Council, to which a number of prominent Americans were named. Among these are Paul Robeson, Howard Fast, Dr. W. E. B. DuBois, Rev. Joseph Fletcher, Bishop Arthur Moulton, Charles P. Howard, Fred Stover (Iowa Farmers Union), Theresa Robinson (Daughters of the Elks), Karley Larsen (International Woodworkers CIO), Ernest De Maio (United Electrical Workers), Dr. Clementina Paolone (American Women for Peace), Rev. Willard Uphaus, Rev. Robert Muir, and Rev. John Darr, Jr. Offices of the World Peace Council were established temporarily at Prague, Czechoslovakia.

American Women for Peace: Among American peace groups represented at the Second World Congress was the new organization, American Women for Peace, set up by the peace delegation to Washington, August 8, 1950. On October 24, 1950, some 1,000 women, representing

this association, went to the United Nations to urge delegates of the various nations to mediate the Korean conflict and all causes of international tension. AWP chairman Dr. Clementina Paolone was spokesman for this demonstration for peace.

The organization is "a service center for all women's peace committees and other organizations of women concerned with working for peace." It invites all such groups to join with it in building an American center for women's peace activities. It publishes a monthly bulletin, *The Peacemaker*, issued from its headquarters, 1186 Broadway, New York City 1. (\$1 a year.)

Working with the AWP are many local organizations, including the Chicago Women for Peace, New England Minute Women for Peace, New Jersey Women for Peace, and groups in New York City, Chicago, Cleveland, and Salt Lake City.

National Labor Conference for Peace: The movement to organize the National Labor Conference for Peace grew out of an Open Letter for peace from a group of trade union leaders, headed by the late Bernard J. McGroarty, a leader of the Stereotypists Union (AFL) in Cleveland. The letter was sent to President Truman on the anniversary of Franklin D. Roosevelt's death, April 12, 1949. Many of those who signed this Open Letter later became sponsors of the first national conference to set up the NLCP as a peace organization.

The NLCP was organized in October, 1949, in Chicago at a conference of 1,200 rank-and-file delegates from many local unions. Representing AFL, CIO, railroad brotherhoods, United Mine Workers and independents from all parts of the country, the conference aimed to organize labor's efforts for peace and to ensure a voice for peace from the ranks of labor. It was set up "to act as a stimulus for peace actions in the unions and in the shops around the basic ideas of banning atomic warfare, peaceful negotiations between the big powers to settle all differences, strengthening the United Nations, and promoting friendly trade relations among the nations of the world."

Around local union representatives and committees in unions and shops, Labor Peace Committees have been set up in a number of important industrial cities, including Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Boston, New York, Newark, Upper Peninsula in Michigan, Milwaukee, Minneapolis and St. Paul. The two main centers at the 1950 year-end were in Chicago and New York, with national headquarters at 80 East 11th St., New York City 3.

Peace Information Center: In 1950, the Peace Information Center was organized with national headquarters in New York City, to make available the news of peace activities throughout the world. It was active in organizing in this country the World Peace Appeal. It also cooperated in arranging for delegations from the United States to attend peace conferences abroad. Its work was discontinued at the end of 1950.

But on February 9, 1951, Dr. W. E. B. DuBois, noted 83-year-old Negro scholar, who had been chairman of the Center during its existence, was indicted by a federal grand jury for "failing to register as a foreign agent" under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Indicted with him were Kyrle Elkin, Abbott Simon and Sylvia Soloff, all of New York, who had also been officers of the Center. Elizabeth Moos was later indicted when she voluntarily returned from Europe to face the charges against the Center and its officers.

National Committee for Peaceful Alternatives: In May, 1950, a Mid-Century Conference for Peace called by the National Committee for Peaceful Alternatives was held in Chicago. Some 650 delegates from 31 states went on record against the cold war policies of the U. S. government.

By February, 1951, the NCPA reported that it had 110 divisions in 35 states. Its leadership is composed in large part of ministers of various religious denominations. It has urged support of the Wherry resolution restoring to Congress the right to decide on the use of American troops overseas. This committee was one of many organizations sponsoring the Peace Crusade to Washington on March 15, 1951.

American Peace Crusade. Sponsored by the American Peace Crusade, an American People's Congress and Exposition for Peace was called June 29, 30, and July 1, 1951, in Chicago. In its call, the Peace Crusade listed the following points as a basis for "a foreign policy that spells peace":

"Negotiations and settlement among the Big Five. An end to the tragic horror in Korea. Withdrawal of all non-Korean troops. Reduction and control of atomic weapons and all other weapons. A fundamental American-Russian settlement which opens up a period of friendly trade. An economy for peace and useful construction, not a mad armaments race."

III. LABOR AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS

DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME

"A noticeable decline in the average amount of consumer income per spending unit" was revealed by the Federal Reserve Board in its annual (1950) Survey of Consumer Finances, showing distribution of consumer income in 1949. "For the first time since the end of the war, there was an increase in the proportion of the population with incomes of less than \$2,000."

After having fallen from 40% in 1946 to 30% in 1948, the proportion of units with incomes of less than \$2,000 rose to 33% in 1949. The number with "negative incomes" (i.e., with no money income or in debt) due to business or farm losses rose from negligible frequencies in previous years to about 1% of the consumer units in 1949.

Here are the figures from this authoritative survey of consumer incomes as distributed among some 52 million spending units in 1949. The "spending unit" is defined as "all persons living in the same dwelling and belonging to the same family who pool their incomes to meet their major expenses." This survey does not include those living in institutions, members of the armed forces, nor the "floating population." Half of all the spending units received less than \$2,700 in 1949:

7,280,000 spending units (14%)	received less than \$1,000
17,160,000 spending units (33%)	received less than \$2,000
28,080,000 spending units (54%)	received less than \$3,000
37,960,000 spending units (73%)	received less than \$4,000
43,680,000 spending units (84%)	received less than \$5,000
8,320,000 spending units (16%)	received \$5,000 and over
2,600,000 spending units (5%)	received \$7,500 and over
1,560,000 spending units (3%)	received \$10,000 and over

By occupation, the group headed by managerial and self-employed persons showed the highest average income, with a median of \$4,500; i.e., half received less and half more than that amount. Professional and semi-skilled professional persons came next, with a median of \$4,000. Skilled and semi-skilled workers showed a median of \$3,200; clerical

and sales personnel, \$2,800. The lowest incomes, on the average, were received by unskilled and service workers, \$2,100, and farm operators, \$1,500.

Ranked according to size of income, the spending units in this FRB survey were divided into tenths, to show the share of the income received by each tenth. The top tenth received 30% of the total money income in 1949.

The highest 30% of the units received 58% of all the money income. The highest 60% received 85% of the income.

But at the other end of the scale, the lowest 30% received only 9% of the income. The lowest 10% received only 1% of the money income.

Low-Income Families: In its annual survey of family income, the U.S. Bureau of the Census reported in February, 1951, that 4,700,000 families had incomes of less than \$1,000 in the year 1949. These families included some 16,800,000 persons. In all, a total of 10.5 million families, including some 40 million persons, had incomes of less than \$2,000 in that year.

Income of Negro Families: Half of the non-white, mostly Negro, families and individuals in the United States received less than \$1,364 in 1949, the Bureau of the Census reported. This was the median income of non-white families and individuals—less than one-half the median income of white families and individuals.

For the non-white families and individuals living on farms the median income was only \$600, while for the white population on farms it was \$1,600.

Incomes in 1948: A special study by the Congressional Joint Committee on the Economic Report was issued in 1949 under the title Low-Income Families and Economic Stability, assembling materials on the problem of low-income families. Based on data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, it covers families as distinct from spending units and shows income distribution among 38.5 million families and 8 million single individuals not in families in the United States in 1948.

"Some low-income families," the study reported, "live at levels below even the most conservative estimate of the minimum necessary for health and decency." About 4 million families (10.6% of the total) had incomes of less than \$1,000 in 1948. Another 5.6 million (14.5%) had more than \$1,000 but less than \$2,000 of income.

If we add to these 9.6 million families the 4 million and more of "individuals not in families" whose personal incomes were under \$1,000

in 1948 we have at least a third living in a poverty sharply contrasted to the wealth enjoyed by many thousands at the other end of the social scale.

About one in three of the low-income families were living on farms. The low-income groups thus reflect, in part, the poverty of small farmers, but no less important are the families of underpaid and irregularly employed wage workers.

Of the nonfarm families with incomes below \$2,000 in 1948, more than one-fourth (or 1.7 million) were headed by persons over 65 years of age, the congressional report showed. One-half of all families in this age group were facing the problem of poverty.

At least 800,000 Negro or other "non-white" families were in the low-income group. Cautiously the report says that "broadening education and vocational opportunities for the Negro may be a constructive method of attacking the low-income problem." It makes no direct reference to discrimination in wages and job opportunities or to the anti-Negro policy encouraged by some labor unions.

"While about 44% of white farm families receive less than \$2,000 in annual money income, over 80% of the Negro farm families are in this income group," the report stated. In some areas "more important than this statistic is the fact that the rapid mechanization of southern agriculture is now displacing the Negro cotton farmer."

As one reason for low incomes the congressional report refers to industries paying wages of less than \$1 an hour, or less than \$2,000 per year of full employment. It lists sections of the men's clothing industry where workers are unorganized; fertilizer factories; wood furniture factories; a considerable number of workers in men's shoe factories; and much of the working force in department stores.

Many workers receiving a better rate of hourly wages are subject to great irregularity of employment, the report notes. It admits that the scale of payment for unemployment benefits is far below that required for anything but the barest minimum of existence.

Who has the Savings?: In its 1950 Survey of Consumer Finances, the Federal Reserve Board included a study of what it called the family's "net worth." It defined net worth as showing not only the family's ownership of government bonds, bank deposits, and corporate stocks (if any) but also its ownership of an automobile, a home, farm and crops. Totaling these assets, the survey then subtracts the family's debts to get its net worth.

This survey of "net worth" although more representative of well-to-do than of low-income families nevertheless revealed that one-third of all the families spent more than their income in 1949. For all families the median liquid assets declined from \$470 in 1947 and \$300 in 1949, to \$250 at the beginning of 1950.

"Liquid assets" are listed as bank accounts, postal savings, holdings of government bonds, savings and loan and credit union shares. They are what people really have available to pay necessary expenses or to buy things for a higher standard of living. Yet the proportion of all families having no liquid assets of any kind increased from 24% in 1947, and 29% in 1949, to 31% in 1950.

WAGE INCREASE MOVEMENTS 1949-1950

Throughout 1949 and the early months of 1950, the right wing trade union leadership failed to stress wage increases in collective bargaining with employers. But as a result of U.S. intervention in Korea and the development of the U.S. war mobilization drive, living costs advanced steadily during the second half of 1950. Pressure from rank-and-file union members changed labor's program to demands for more substantial wage gains in the so-called "fifth round" of increases.

Federal income taxes were increased by 18-20% on October 1, 1950. Workers found that small wage gains were already cancelled out by increases in withholding tax deductions. Requests for wage increases which had previously been for 5-10¢ an hour were stepped up to demands for larger gains.

Fearing demands for higher increases and encouraged by new peaks in profits, corporations began to grant "voluntary" wage boosts. These were partly on a cost-of-living basis, but they were intended to forestall further increases by contracts that would freeze living standards for a long period of time. Such a "voluntary" move was made by Chrysler Corp. in August, 1950, when it unexpectedly offered a wage hike of 10¢ an hour for unskilled and 15¢ for skilled workers. Chrysler had a three-year contract with the Auto Workers (CIO) which did not permit new wage talks until July, 1951. But despite the previous contract the company and the union agreed to the increases for 90,000 workers.

Other auto companies fell into the wage-increase line. Packard Motor Co. on August 28, 1950 reached a settlement with the union on a five-year contract tying wages to living costs. This contract is patterned on

the General Motors formula for an increase of 4¢ an hour, with proviso that if the price index declines, basic wage rates will also decline but not below the figure prevailing when the agreement was signed. It thus gives the workers "only the same loaf of bread year after year," as one labor leader put it.

Rank-and-file workers employed by the Ford Motor Co. were able to force wage increases of 8¢ an hour for 110,000 workers in a five-year contract signed by the Auto Workers (CIO) on September 4, 1950.

Led by the Farm Equipment Council of the United Electrical Workers (independent), some 30,000 workers employed by International Harvester won in September, 1950 increases of 10¢ to 32¢ an hour. This gain ended a three-week strike of FE workers against 19 plants in five states.

United Electrical Workers on September 17, 1950, signed a two-year contract for increases of 10¢ an hour covering over 40,000 workers employed by General Electric Co. This agreement also provided minimum pensions of \$125 a month, including social security and other benefits. In three months (Aug., Sept., Oct.) UE won increases of 5-25¢ per hour for 141,900 workers in 243 plants of 183 companies.

Aluminum Co. of America in September offered a pay boost of 10%, accepted by the Steelworkers (CIO) for some 20,000 workers. Increases amounted to an average gain of about 15¢ an hour. In October, Good-year Tire & Rubber Co. signed a contract with the Rubber Workers (CIO) for an average raise of 12¢ an hour for 25,000 workers in 10 cities. This agreement providing a general increase of 10½¢ an hour, plus 1½¢ an hour for correcting geographical differentials, became the pattern for the rubber industry. Men's clothing firms in eastern areas in October granted a pay raise of 12½¢ an hour to the Clothing Workers (CIO), the first increase in this industry since November, 1947.

The wage settlement between U.S. Steel Corp. and the Steelworkers (CIO) in early December, 1950, gave pay raises averaging 16¢ an hour, the first increase for steelworkers since 1948. This set the final pattern of the "fifth round," and was followed by increases in various industries where lesser demands had already been won.

During the year of 1950, some two million workers gained wage increases, totaling more than \$2 billion. But rising living costs and taxes ate up much of the gain, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported. The AFL reported in Labor's Monthly Survey (Sept.-Oct., 1950):

"We have many reports of increases of 10¢ to 20¢ per hour since Korea. . . . Consumer price rises have wiped out the entire increase of 5¢ per hour in workers' wages during 1950. Since April, the price rise has been so rapid that the average hourly real wage has declined by 2¢ in four months. Unions are preparing for next year by negotiating wage increases. . . . With the outlook for production improving, employers can pay larger wage increases than last year."

Wage Freeze Opposed: The formula for "freezing" wages announced by the Wage Stabilization Board in February, 1951, was called "unworkable and unfair" by the 14-man United Labor Policy Committee, including top officers of AFL, CIO and Railway Labor Executives Association. The three labor members of the WSB resigned in protest against the freeze and against the lack of labor representation in the war mobilization and inflation control set-up.

The basic formula limits wage increases to 10% above the level of January 15, 1950. Labor officials had already agreed to a 12% freeze. All branches of organized labor pointed out that the 10% formula is a serious blow to living standards and security, as there is no effective control of prices and living costs and limitations on wage gains are therefore manifestly unjust.

Forced by labor protests to modify the regulations, Economic Stabilization Administrator Eric Johnston agreed to exempt cost-of-living contracts from the 10% ceiling if they were signed before the January 25, 1951, freeze.

REAL WAGES TREND

The consumer's dollar has declined in purchasing power by over 43% in the period from before World War II to the end of 1950. The index of purchasing power as measured by the inadequate consumer price index of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics was at 56.9 in November, 1950, compared with an average 1935-1939 level of 100.

Taking account of the decline in purchasing power, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics shows the trend of real wages in manufacturing industries as a whole. It gives the "gross average weekly earnings" of production workers expressed in 1939 dollars, allowing for the rise in consumer prices during the decade of the 1940's. This BLS series shows that the worker in October, 1950, was worse off than he was in January, 1945.

Gross average weekly earnings of production workers in manufac-

turing in January, 1945, when expressed in 1939 dollars, amounted to \$37.15. But by October, 1950, this average had declined to \$35.25—a drop of about \$1.90 a week.

Net Spendable Earnings: To show how much the worker actually “takes home” for current living expenses, the BLS deducts from gross average weekly earnings the amount the worker is taxed for social security and income taxes. The resulting figure is called “net spendable average weekly earnings.” Of course, the amount of income-tax liability depends not only on the level of income but also on the number of dependents supported by the worker. The BLS computes net spendable earnings for (1) a worker with no dependents; (2) a worker with three dependents.

Here are the figures showing the net spendable average weekly earnings of production workers, expressed in 1939 dollars:

	Year 1949		
	January, 1945	(annual average)	October, 1950
Worker with no dependents	\$30.81	\$28.27	\$29.66
Worker with 3 dependents	35.33	31.64	33.66

Thus, when money wages are corrected by the rise in consumer prices and the amount required for regular taxes, the worker with no dependents had \$2.54 less in weekly take-home pay in 1949 than he had in January, 1945. The worker with three dependents had \$3.69 less in take-home pay. By mid-1950, his weekly net spendable earnings were only slightly higher than in 1949 and consumer prices were continuing to rise. Then on October 1, 1950, the federal income tax (withholding tax) went up by 18-20%. Unless the workers were able to gain immediate and substantial wage increases, their take-home pay was thus still further reduced.

CONTRASTS IN COMPENSATION

Officers of big monopoly corporations receive pay, including salary and bonus, that ranges from \$150,000 to over \$500,000 a year. They are in a little group at the top income level, representing only a fraction of 1% of the U.S. population.

These executives vote themselves more income in one week than wage-earners receive in a year. Some of them, in fact, take from the corporate treasury more than a hundred times the average wage paid in the industry. And this does not include the income they derive from the stocks and bonds they own in their own and other companies.

Here are a few comparative figures showing the company, the amount paid to one or more top officers in salary and bonus in 1949, and the average weekly wage of the workers in that industry in the same year. (The big-salary figures are merely a few samples. In some companies there are more vice-presidents receiving as much as the ones here listed.)

<i>Company and executive</i>	<i>Salary and bonus received</i>		<i>Average weekly wage of workers</i>
	<i>Annual</i>	<i>Weekly</i>	
American Telephone & Telegraph Co.			
Walter S. Gifford, ch.	\$209,450	\$4,028	\$51.78
Leroy A. Wilson, p.	159,861	3,074	
American Tobacco Co.			
Vincent Riggio, p.	460,748	8,860	46.33
Anaconda Copper Mining Co.			
Cornelius F. Kelley, ch.	201,732	3,879	63.96
Bethlehem Steel Corp.			
Eugene G. Grace, ch.	333,996	6,423	63.04
Chrysler Corp.			
K. T. Keller, p.	250,800	4,823	65.97
B. E. Hutchinson, v.p.	225,700	4,340	
E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co.			
C. H. Greenewalt, p.	438,550	8,434	58.63
A. B. Echols, v.p.	313,350	6,026	
General Electric Co.			
C. E. Wilson, p.	201,000	3,865	56.96
General Motors Corp.			
Charles E. Wilson, p.	586,100	11,271	65.97
B. F. Goodrich Co.			
John L. Collyer, p.	215,000	4,135	57.79
Gulf Oil Corp.			
J. F. Drake, ch.	343,000	6,596	71.48
International Business Machines Corp.			
Thomas J. Watson, ch.	335,178	6,445	62.53
Loew's Inc.			
Louis B. Mayer, v.p.	454,266	8,734	92.17
Nicholas M. Schenck, p.	224,768	4,322	
Procter & Gamble Co.			
Richard R. Deupree, ch.	214,622	4,127	66.54
Radio Corp. of America			
David Sarnoff, ch.	211,901	4,075	50.68
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.			
James A. Gray, ch.	217,500	4,182	46.33
Standard Oil Co. (N.J.)			
Eugene Holman, p.	168,246	3,235	71.48
U.S. Steel Corp.			
Benjamin F. Fairless, p.	211,000	4,057	63.04
Westinghouse Electric Corp.			
Gwilym A. Price, p.	199,987	3,845	56.96

Source: Company reports to stockholders. p=president, v.p.=vice-president, ch=chairman

Tobacco workers have always had notoriously low wages, below the average in most other industries. Pres. Vincent Riggio (now chairman) of the American Tobacco Co., as shown above, received \$1,289 a day. Wage earners in his industry averaged just \$6.62 a day.

COST OF FAMILY BUDGETS

To meet the recognized standard budget prepared by the Heller Committee for Research in Social Economics, a wage-earner's family of four needed about \$82 a week or \$4,276 a year by the end of 1950.

Priced every year for many years, as of September, by the Heller Committee at the University of California, this budget called for \$4,040 or about \$77 a week for a wage-earner's family in San Francisco in 1949. The committee now reports that it is "undertaking an income and expenditures study in order to revise some of the quantities and costs of our budgets. Pricing of our annual budgets will probably be resumed in 1952." Its budget was not priced therefore as of September, 1950.

Using the consumers' price index of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics for San Francisco, Labor Research Association has estimated the cost of the Heller budget for a wage-earner's family as of December, 1950. By applying the increase in each component part of the budget, we see what the approximate cost was in December, 1950, for a family of four—husband, wife, boy of 13 and girl of eight.

The size of family chosen as typical is explained by the committee: "Of U.S. urban families containing husband, wife and at least one child under 18, the group for whom these budgets are designed, 55% contained two or more children under 18 in April, 1948, and the median number of children was 1.6."

Although priced only for San Francisco, this budget is now recognized as a standard family budget for the country as a whole. Costs of goods, rents, and services in San Francisco are found to be very close to those of Birmingham, Ala., chosen by the BLS as a typical city because its costs are in the middle range of the group of 34 cities.

The very small amount of less than \$40 a month allowed for housing is obviously less than many wage-earners' families had to pay in rent in 1950. The Heller Committee in 1949 priced housing costs only where rents were controlled. The committee itself cautions against using this figure as typical: "If the controlled rent is considered to be the housing cost, it must be recognized that this is not typical of all renters. . . .

The committee fully recognizes that this allowance would prove inadequate for families in dwelling exempt from rent control."

Here are the figures showing the Heller Committee's yearly budget for a wage-earner's family as of September, 1949, and the estimated cost of each item on a yearly basis as of December, 1950:

YEARLY BUDGET FOR A FOUR-PERSON FAMILY OF A WAGE-EARNER

Item	Annual cost (including sales taxes)	
	As of September, 1949	As of December, 1950*
Food	\$1,321.27	\$1,437.54
Clothing	407.78	429.80
Housing	456.00	469.68
House operation	132.06	138.66
Furnishings	135.44	151.69
Miscellaneous	1,324.99	1,338.24
Taxes	263.00	310.34
Total	\$4,040.54	\$4,275.95

*Estimated on basis of BLS consumers' price index.

Modest Standard of Living: This standard budget is still beyond the reach of most wage-earners' families in the United States. Yet in reality it represents a very modest standard of living. For savings it allows only \$2.20 a week, or \$115 a year for a life insurance policy.

For medical and dental care the wage earner's budget allows about \$290 or a little over \$5 a week, on the theory that the family can take advantage of group practice plans. But in many communities no such plan is available. The committee itself points out: "It is obvious that to attempt to provide a sum adequate for individual private-practice medical care would involve an expenditure so large as to be unrealistic and impractical for families at moderate income levels."

The wage-earner's budget does not include any provision for a vacation. The mother does all the work of the house, including laundry and all cleaning.

Deficit of \$20 a Week: To meet the wage-earner's budget of \$4,276 a year in 1950 required about \$82 a week. Trying to meet this modest standard of living on a factory worker's average weekly earnings of \$62 as of October, 1950, meant that the family was actually operating at a deficit of about \$20 a week.

City Worker's Family Budget: A far less adequate family budget has now been priced again by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. As

of October, 1950, the bureau reported, a city worker's family of four in San Francisco needed \$3,808 a year or about \$73.23 a week even to meet this low standard of living. For 34 cities the annual cost of this BLS budget ranged upward from \$3,453 (\$66.40 a week) in New Orleans, to \$3,649 (\$70.20 a week) in New York City, and \$3,933 (\$75.63 a week) in Milwaukee, Wis., the highest in cost.

Since weekly earnings of workers in manufacturing averaged only \$61.99 in October, 1950, it is clear that a wage-earner's family trying to meet even the BLS budget on average wages would run up a deficit ranging from \$4.40 up to \$13.64 a week. For a year this deficit would range from \$229 up to more than \$700.

HOURS OF WORK

Wage-earners in manufacturing averaged 41.3 hours of work a week in October, 1950. This was two hours a week longer than the average of 39.2 for the year 1949 but considerably below the 45.2 hour average of 1944 at the peak of wartime activity.

Workers averaging the longest weekly hours in October, 1950 included those on local railways and bus lines (44.6); in telegraph (44.7); and in hotels (43.9).

About one million railroad workers in the "non-operating" groups won the five-day, 40-hour week effective as of September, 1949. Efforts to extend this basic 40-hour week to the operating rail workers have so far not succeeded.

In an interpretative bulletin (January, 1950) on overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the U.S. Department of Labor restates the law that a worker employed for longer than 40 hours a week must be paid at a rate not less than time-and-a-half the regular rate of pay. This law applies to those engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce unless they are specifically exempted under the act.

President Truman in proclaiming a state of "national emergency" December 18, 1950, said: "Workers will be called upon to work more hours." And the Council of Economic Advisers, in its January, 1951, report, said that, "Some selective increases in the work week are needed immediately. . . . Longer hours will be required in order to produce essential goods."

At the National Association of Manufacturers' annual gathering in December, 1950, Lewis H. Brown, chairman of Johns-Manville Corp.,

outlined NAM's labor policy as including a 48-hour week with no overtime pay. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett (a partner in Brown Brothers, Harriman) later in December called for amendment of the wage-hour law to provide for the 48-hour week at straight-time rates.

The AFL, after years of talking about a 30-hour week, with formal endorsement at some previous conventions, decided at its 1950 convention to postpone all action for shorter working hours. International Woodworkers (CIO) has won the six-hour day for part of the lumber industry and urges its extension to the entire industry. Packinghouse Workers (CIO) at its 1950 convention started a campaign for a 30-hour week at 40 hours' pay.

SOCIAL SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS

The Social Security Act was amended in 1950 to bring some 10 million more workers under old age and survivors insurance and to increase benefits by an average of 77½%. The measure signed on August 28 was the first comprehensive revision of the system since it was established in 1935.

Pressure for amendments had been exerted by employers who have signed contracts with unions for private minimum pension plans, including social security. Under these plans the company has agreed to supplement the federal retirement benefit to provide a minimum pension, usually of at least \$100 a month. The more the government pays, therefore, the less the private employer must pay to bring the amount up to the minimum in the union contract.

Benefits were so low under the old system that local and state welfare agencies were forced to supplement social security with payments from the old-age assistance (relief) program. This relief supplement subjected the recipients in many states to the degrading "means test" denying aid to anyone who had even a tiny minimum of savings.

While the 1950 amendments raise benefits and extend coverage to many previously excluded, they still fall far short of the amendments proposed by labor and progressive groups. Major weaknesses of the new law are summarized below.

Employers and employees will each continue to pay the payroll tax of 1½% each for old-age and survivors insurance for the next three years until January 1, 1954. This tax will rise to 2% on each in 1954; 2½% in 1960; 3% in 1965; and a maximum of 3¼% in 1970. Although

the rate is not raised until 1954, the insurance fund will be larger from January 1, 1951, because the tax is now on the first \$3,600 of pay instead of the first \$3,000 as previously.

Wider Coverage: Newly covered wage-earners started paying the social security tax of $1\frac{1}{2}\%$ on January 1, 1951, through payroll deductions. Employers pay the same amount.

Included among the newly covered are about 4,700,000 non-farm self-employed persons. Self-employed earning more than \$400 a year are eligible—except such professionals as physicians, dentists, lawyers, ministers, architects, accountants, and engineers. The self-employed person will pay $2\frac{1}{4}\%$ on the first \$3,600 of his net earnings. While the self-employed will thus pay more than either the employer or the employee separately, they will pay less than the two combined.

Also included among the newly covered are about 1,000,000 domestic workers who pay a payroll tax of $1\frac{1}{2}\%$, matched by the employer. To be eligible a domestic worker must earn at least \$50 in a quarter from the same employer and must work at least 24 days a quarter, i.e., at least two days a week for the same employer.

Some 850,000 newly covered farm workers pay $1\frac{1}{2}\%$ of wages, a payroll tax matched by the employer. To be eligible a farm wage-earner must work continuously for one employer over a period of three months, and in the next quarter must work 60 days or more, earning at least \$50 in cash in each quarter. In all, he must work at least five or six months for one employer. The duration provision, however, allows for time off, due to weather or other work obstacles. Farm operators are not eligible for social security. Migratory farm workers are outside the system unless they put in five months or more of work for one farm operator.

Those newly covered include also certain groups of salesmen, commission drivers, life insurance salesmen, full-time traveling salesmen, and industrial homeworkers. Government employees, including short-term federal employees who are not covered under any federal retirement system, are now brought under the social security system. Employees of state and local governments and workers in non-profit agencies (religious, educational and philanthropic) may be covered on a voluntary basis. State and municipal workers already under pension programs are specifically excluded.

Veterans who served in World War II now receive wage credits of \$160 for each month of service, toward a social security pension.

Benefits Increased: Under the 1950 revisions in the social security law, retirement benefits are increased by an average of 77½%. They range from about 50% for the highest benefit groups to 100% for the lowest. Minimum monthly benefit is raised from \$10 to \$20. Maximum benefit for a retired single man with 30 years coverage is raised from \$52 to \$80 a month; for a retired man and wife from \$78.20 to \$120 a month.

If a widow has been covered for five years and has one dependent child, her monthly benefit is raised from \$52 to \$120; if she has three children, the benefit goes up from \$84 to \$150, the maximum to be paid any one family.

For future beneficiaries and for those who have at least six quarters or 1½ years coverage after January 1, 1951, a new benefit formula was adopted. The new formula is 50% of the first \$100 of average monthly wage, plus 15% of the next \$200. (It sets a maximum wage base of \$3,600 a year.)

As before, the wife over 65 years old receives an amount equal to half the husband's monthly benefit. A widow receives three-quarters of the worker's primary benefit. But the benefit for surviving parents is increased from one-half to three-quarters of the primary benefit.

One of the gains under the new law is the more liberal provision on the amount a beneficiary may earn without loss of benefits. Formerly, he lost the benefit if he earned more than \$14.99 a month. The amount he may earn is now raised to \$50 a month and after age 75 benefits are payable regardless of the amount of his earnings.

To qualify for benefits is easier now than formerly. The old system required 40 quarters of coverage before a worker was fully insured. Under the new amendments, a worker is fully insured to draw a pension at age 65 if he (or she) has had at least six quarters or 1½ years of coverage at any time, either before or after January 1, 1950.

Weaknesses of New Law: Workers must still wait until the age of 65 to receive any benefit from social security payments. Yet in many industries wage-earners are considered old at 40 and many lose their jobs in covered employment long before they are 65.

The widow gets a lump sum death payment of a small amount but nothing more until she is 65. Only if she has minor children is she entitled to a monthly pension. When the last child reaches 18, all pensions end until the widow reaches 65. The Advisory Council on Social Security had recommended in 1948 that retirement age for women

employees, widows and wives should be reduced from 65 to 60 years. But the 1950 revisions did not include this important provision.

The 10 million persons newly covered under the 1950 amendments are only about one-half the 20 million recommended for coverage by the Advisory Council on Social Security in its 1948 report.

Still excluded from the system are about six million farmers, some 2.5 million farm workers and over one million domestic workers who are not eligible under the new law. In non-profit organizations the choice whether or not to accept the social security system rests with the employing agency. On this voluntary basis, unless the employer is willing to pay his share, the employees of such agencies have no social security protection.

Unemployment Insurance: The 81st Congress not only made no improvements in the unemployment sections of the Social Security Act, but greatly weakened the system by passing the Knowland amendment. This measure was pushed through Congress by reactionary Republicans, including Sen. Robert A. Taft (R., Ohio).

Original standards required of the states, before they could receive federal funds, included the following: "Compensation shall not be denied in such states to any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under any of the following conditions: (a) If the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lock-out, or other labor dispute; (b) if the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered are substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work in the locality; (c) if as condition of being employed the individual would be required to join a company union or to resign from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor organization."

The Knowland amendment did away with this requirement. States may now violate these standards and the U.S. government must still furnish them with federal funds. The states are now permitted to use their systems as strike-breaking, union-busting implements by threatening to cut off benefits if unemployed workers refuse to take scab jobs or other substandard employment.

No improvements have been made in the unemployment insurance system during the past two years, either to expand its coverage, to extend the duration of benefits (now limited to 26 weeks even in the best state laws), or to increase the benefits.

Compensation Still Low: For total unemployment the weekly benefit

averaged \$20.48 in the country as a whole in 1949. This compared with \$19.03 in 1948. But behind this national average are wide differences among the states.

Average weekly benefits for total unemployment ranged in 1949 from a low of \$13.85 in Florida up to a high of \$23.75 in Utah. (Social Security Bulletin, Sept., 1950.) Labor and progressive groups have long advocated an adequate national system of unemployment insurance to establish higher benefits, longer duration, and expanded coverage in all states.

HOUSING NEEDS

Over five million urban families in 1950 were still living in dilapidated dwellings without baths or indoor toilets, the National Housing Conference reported in its pamphlet, *The Truth About Public Housing*. Especially bad are the housing conditions in cities where Negroes have been crowded into old dwellings never intended for apartment living. But even much of the new housing built for low-income families is below standard and unsuitable.

Price of New Houses: Federal housing activities do not meet the workers' need for better housing. The average apartment in Federal Housing Administration projects rents at just over \$80 a month. But it is estimated that at least 75% of all families have incomes too small for these typical FHA units. Only 27% of the FHA projects approved in 1949 had unit rentals under \$70 a month.

Workers earning less than \$80-\$85 a week could not afford to move into most of the new houses and apartments built in 1949. The average factory worker then earning about \$55 a week could not take advantage of these new dwellings. For he would have to spend for rent considerably more than one-fourth of his income, the maximum proportion of the family budget normally devoted to housing. Workers who do stretch their incomes to move into these dwellings must go without some of the other necessities of life—adequate food and clothing or medical care.

Rents Decontrolled: Such federal rent control as was effective until June 30, 1951, was weak, partial and temporary. By early 1951, rent controls had already been removed from six million rental units. Where units had been decontrolled, rents had risen as much as 100% or more. New rental units suitable for families with children were renting for \$85 a month and up.

The 1950 Housing Census showed that median rents for non-farm dwellings had risen by nearly 70% between 1940 and 1950. (The Housing Situation—1950, Housing & Home Finance Agency, Feb. 1951.)

Slum Clearance Slow: Interdependence of slum clearance and low-rent housing has been recognized in housing legislation. "It is apparent that slums cannot be cleared without supplying houses into which low-income families may be removed," says the National Housing Conference.

The Housing Act of 1949 required that low-income families housed in projects developed under that Act must have lived in slums. Also required is periodical re-examination of families' net incomes. One exemption to this requirement is a five-year preference to low-income veterans with urgent housing need.

By the end of June, 1949, the federal housing program had eliminated only 142,583 slum dwellings in the entire nation. This is an average of less than 4,200 dwellings for each of the 34 leading cities in the country. By November, 1950, it was estimated that in the whole country only about 10,000 low-rent public housing homes had actually been started under the 1949 Act. ("Housing: a 1950 Tragedy," by Lee F. Johnson, Survey, Dec., 1950.)

Farm Housing: In rural areas, the housing problem is as acute as in cities. The Bureau of the Census, in its housing survey in April, 1947, found that 67.3% of rural farm dwellings lacked running water, while only 4.5% of urban lacked this facility. While about 84% of urban dwellings had private bath and flush toilet, only 20% of farm dwellings were thus equipped. About 10% of occupied rural farm dwellings were overcrowded in contrast to less than 5% overcrowding in urban dwellings. Whereas 85% of the urban housing units had such facilities as lights, running water, bath and flush toilet, only 19% of farm dwellings were as well equipped.

In its report accompanying the 1949 Housing Act, the Senate Banking & Currency Committee said that "after nearly a decade of unparalleled farm prosperity, a much higher proportion of farm than urban dwellings are in bad physical condition, and the majority of farm families lack in their homes many of the amenities now considered essential in urban dwellings."

Cutbacks in 1950: Congress in 1950 voted only \$8,750,000 for the Public Housing Administration while giving nearly \$1 billion to the Atomic Energy Commission's bomb building and experimental pro-

grams. In July, 1950, President Truman ordered a sharp reduction in federal housing expenditures because of the enormously increased outlay for the Korean war.

Reductions put into effect during the second half of 1950 meant a cut of more than 50% in the public housing that had been authorized by the Housing Act of 1949. Housing construction was set back also by Regulation X of the Federal Reserve Board in October, 1950. This regulation increased down payments required from home-buyers, reduced the maturity period for paying off mortgage loans, and set a minimum annual rate for mortgage amortization. These new controls covered one and two-family houses sold after October 12 with FHA or Veterans Administration financing, and also all one and two-family houses started after August 3, 1950, regardless of how their building is financed.

This regulation was supposedly intended to conserve materials needed for war production. "Construction of all kinds has taken about 14% of steel output. . . . That's enough to make upwards of 350,000 tanks"; and the amount of aluminum currently used in construction "would build about 470 of the Air Force's huge B-36 bombers." (Wall Street Journal, Oct. 2, 1950.)

Labor spokesmen pointed out that Regulation X would hit hardest the families in low and middle income groups. Before the Korean war, if a veteran of World War II wanted to buy a house in the \$9,000 class, no down payment was required, and he was given 30 years to complete his payments on principal. After the new regulation for the same priced house, he had to pay \$1,000 down and the balance within 20 years.

Programs Proposed: Still largely neglected in all housing plans are the great majority of middle-income families having \$2,500 to \$4,000 a year, and including most American workers. They are not eligible for public housing and cannot afford the new housing under construction. Cut out entirely from the federal housing act signed in April, 1950, was the program for federal loans to non-profit housing cooperatives.

American Federation of Labor in its executive council report of September, 1950, called again for a 10-year housing program: "The AFL has maintained ever since the war that we would have to build a minimum of 1,500,000 units each year for at least a 10-year period if we were to meet the acute housing shortage which had been accumulated during the war and postwar years."

Similar proposals have been made from time to time by the Congress of Industrial Organizations. But little has been done by either labor body to push these public housing programs which had been bitterly opposed by such organizations as the National Association of Real Estate Boards, the National Association of Home Builders, the United States Savings and Loan League and the National Retail Lumber Dealers Association. These private business associations have used all kinds of lying propaganda in their campaigns against public low rent housing and slum clearance.

In contrast to programs proposed by labor and tenants councils, it was expected that the number of housing "starts" in 1951 would be much lower than the 800,000 estimated under the government ruling and might fall as low as 500,000. The present housing shortage would thus be worsened by the impact of war preparations.

WORK INJURIES AND DEATHS

As employment expanded in 1950 and the average workweek was lengthened, industrial injuries increased. Work-injury rates in manufacturing rose by about 4% during the year, to top those of the past seven years, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported. The upswing is a reversal of the trend of the past three years.

The increase reflected not only rising employment and longer hours, the BLS said, but also "intensified industrial operations," in other words, speed-up.

A total of 15,500 workers died as a result of occupational accidents, the BLS reported, and about 1,952,000 were injured—an increase of 82,000 over 1949. If allowance is made for the future effects of the deaths and permanent physical impairments, the total economic time loss would amount to about 212,000,000 man-days—or a year's full-time employment for about 706,000 workers.

Industrial Injuries in 1949: Some 15,000 workers were killed and 1,870,000 were injured in industrial accidents in 1949. These figures compare with a 1948 total of 16,000 deaths and 2,019,900 injuries.

For all manufacturing the average injury-frequency rate per million man-hours was 15.0 in 1949, compared with 17.2 in 1948. Highest injury-frequency rates in manufacturing were shown in the following industries: Logging (92.2), sawmills (55.6), saw and planing mills (47.6), structural clay products (36.8), cut stone and cut-stone products (36.6), and wooden containers (35.6).

In nonmanufacturing the highest frequency rates were shown in the mining industries. Gold-silver mining had the highest rate of any industry recorded for 1949 (93.8). Lead-zinc mines reported a rate of 88.5; anthracite mines, 76.0; miscellaneous metal mines, 71.8; bituminous mines, 55.6.

Among other nonmanufacturing groups, stevedoring had the highest rate (66.7). Structural-steel erection and ornamental iron work showed a rate of 48.6; highway and street construction, 45.5.

That many accidents are preventable is indicated by the fact that manufacture of explosives showed the lowest frequency rate—1.8 per million employee hours—among the 129 industries for which separate figures were given.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS

Workmen's compensation laws have been passed by all the states and by the federal government, but they vary widely and none are really adequate. At least 25% and possibly 50% of all gainfully occupied persons are not covered. Most states exclude agricultural and domestic employment. In some states "non-hazardous" occupations are excluded. In 30 states workers in small concerns are not covered. About two-fifths of all supposedly "covered" workers are in states where the employer is not required to carry compensation insurance.

Only 26 states cover occupational diseases, and eight states cover none at all. The public and the medical profession may recognize that a disease is occupational long before the legislature has included it in the compensable list.

Compensation benefits are almost uniformly inadequate for a decent living standard. Since the first laws were enacted, the rate of payment has not kept pace with the general wage level or the cost of living. It has been estimated that even in 1940 over 50% of the wage loss due to work injuries was borne by the worker. (Arthur H. Reede, *The Adequacy of Workmen's Compensation*.) This figure is even higher today. Compulsory waiting periods cut down total payments. And the more serious the injury the more inadequate the compensation. Young children and middle-aged widows of workers receive the least.

Although every state law provides some medical care, three states out of four limit either the number of weeks or the medical bill, some limits running as low as two weeks and \$50. Almost all laws require the worker to go to the company doctor. Collusion among em-

ployer, company doctor, and insurance company frequently interferes with the provision of proper and adequate medical care. Rehabilitation benefits are being added under a federal-state program, but hardly any compensation laws provide adequately for rehabilitation.

Over half of workmen's compensation benefit payments go through the hands of private insurance companies, which in most states are either allowed to compete with a state fund or have the field to themselves. The ratio of claims paid out to premiums collected is much lower for insurance companies than for state funds. In the 10 years 1939-1948 all private insurance companies paid out only 47 cents of every compensation dollar they collected; the other 53 cents went for excessively high salaries and other expenses and profits. Private companies not only restrict benefits when the worker needs them but also lobby against improved compensation laws.

INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE DEVELOPMENTS

Extent and importance of diseases caused or aggravated by occupational exposures is steadily increasing. With increased knowledge, more conditions than formerly are shown to be caused by occupational factors. For example, while most cancers are still of unknown origin, the industrial materials and processes which can cause cancer are better understood. These include radium and all other types of radioactive materials, X-rays, and other sources of ionizing radiation; many petroleum products; chromates; arsenic; nickel carbonyl; aniline and its derivatives; ultraviolet light.

With expansion of atomic energy, workers are increasingly exposed to radioactive materials which can cause cancer, leukemia, burns and other serious and fatal conditions.

Beryllium, used in manufacture of fluorescent lamps, neon lights, and copper alloys, and in atomic energy projects, causes a fatal lung disease and serious skin ulcers. Several cases have been reported among persons merely living near the plants where smokestacks discharged beryllium into the air. There is no known cure.

Among dust diseases of the lungs silicosis is still the most prevalent, taking its toll among coal miners, foundry workers, and persons employed in clay pottery work. There is still no known cure, and no substitute for prevention through control of dust. In diagnosis of the disease, chest X-ray films are often inadequate and other procedures may be necessary.

Other dust diseases of the lung can be caused by talc, asbestos, tobacco, cotton, chromates, diatomaceous earth, natural graphite, tin dust, and many other materials. All dusts of particles small enough to penetrate the lungs cause irritation. To cause disease they must be breathed over long periods, usually several years.

There is no known specific cure for any dust disease of the lungs. Prevention is fundamental and possible. Primary methods include ventilation, wetting of dusts, and proper respirators, all of which cost the employers money and are hence resisted. Ventilation is the most important.

Many new powerful poisons are being used as agricultural chemicals to kill pests, and to stimulate plant growth. The organic phosphorous group (parathion, TEPP, etc.) have caused about 10 deaths in the past year.

In October, 1948, at Donora, Pa., 20 persons were killed and 6,000 were made ill by industrial air pollution, resulting from the chemically charged smoke of several large steel mills. The official U.S. Public Health Service investigation brought out the relation between poor housing and the severity of the illness, and it cited several previous periods of increased mortality related to air pollution in the community. But the statement failed to emphasize two basic factors in the tragedy: the lack of proper control by the industries, and the bad living conditions of low-paid workers living in shacks near the mills.

Legislation and Enforcement: All occupational diseases are preventable, by one or more of the following fundamental procedures: 1. isolation or enclosure of the dangerous process; 2. substitution of a harmless material for a harmful one; 3. ventilation to remove harmful dusts, gases, fumes; 4. personal protective devices (goggles, gloves, respirators, etc.); 5. periodic physical examinations to detect early signs of poisoning.

Legislation is required to provide effective protection. Only a few legislative advances were made in industrial hygiene or safety during 1949. For example, California prohibited the discharge of an employee for refusing to work in violation of a safety order of the Division of Industrial Safety. Michigan authorized factory inspectors to order installation of first-aid facilities and specific ventilation "where necessary." South Carolina required emergency exits in all textile mills. West Virginia authorized the Board of Health to make "reasonable" rules and regulations to control occupational health hazards and to regulate sanitary conditions at work.

In general, however, public agencies for protecting the worker from occupational disease remained wholly inadequate with little or no power to enforce standards, and failure to work with organized labor.

Bills introduced in the last Congress for developing industrial health programs in the federal and state labor departments failed to come out of committee.

In the field of industrial safety, state labor departments have undisputed jurisdiction but their safety programs are also ineffectual. A 1949 report to a Congressional Committee (81st Congress, Report 850) states that there were only about 800 inspectors in all the states to safeguard the more than forty million workers covered by state labor laws. These inspectors must also enforce other labor laws. Even in states like New York and California, the safety staff was too small to inspect each plant even once a year.

MAJOR CAUSES OF DISABILITY AND DEATH

Communicable diseases (pneumonia, tuberculosis, and diarrhea) were the main causes of death in the United States in 1900. But today the main causes of death are heart disease, cancer, diseases of the blood vessels, accidents and nephritis. The first three now account for more than half of all deaths in the United States. They also result in a vast amount of disability. Certain other conditions, such as rheumatism and diseases of the nervous system, likewise disable millions of persons, though they are rarely fatal. Patients with mental disease occupy about one-half of all the hospital beds in the country.

The greater strain of life today, and especially the more intensive exploitation and speedup in industry, have been implicated as among the important causes of heart disease, high-blood pressure, increased accidents and nephritis. The increase in mental disease is to a large extent the result of strains and tensions arising from economic insecurity, as well as other tensions engendered by our society.

As yet the health programs to combat chronic illness are meager. Conditions in state mental hospitals exposed by Albert Deutsch are no worse than those in hundreds of "county farms" all over the United States. Not only for mental patients, but also for persons with advanced physical disease, provisions for custodial care ("keeping them alive") are minimal. Practically nothing has been done toward an aggressive program of prevention.

It is estimated that one-third of the 200,000 yearly cancer deaths in

the United States could be avoided if all present knowledge were promptly and systematically applied. Many forms of heart disease and other chronic conditions yield to treatment by known techniques. However, in most communities such services are either not available or are too expensive for workers.

HEALTH OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE

The economic status of the Negro people has left its inevitable mark of ill health and disability. At the same time medical services for either prevention or cure are at a totally inadequate level.

Three basic reasons underlie the burden of disease carried by the American Negro—none of which has any relation to the false and unscientific misconceptions concerning “racial” differences. First, 97% of Negroes are in families with incomes under \$2,000 a year (1949). Second, 75% of all Negroes live in the Southeast—where health services are less adequate in general but especially denied to Negroes. Thirdly, segregation and discrimination add a special disadvantage.

As a result, the pattern of Negro health is that of the lowest economic section of the population, and Negroes in addition suffer discrimination in the health professions and services. Malnutrition, slum housing, poor working conditions and unemployment are reflected in high rates of disease and death. Life expectancy is about 10 years shorter than that for whites, the general death rate is 16% higher, and infant death rates are 55% higher. Actually, Negro rates today are as high as general population rates were in 1900.

Certain diseases directly reflect environmental conditions and the inaccessibility of health services. The tuberculosis death rate is three times as high among Negroes as among whites, pneumonia death rates are twice as high, and complications of pregnancy are four times as frequent. A 1949 study of fetal deaths in New York City showed among nonwhites a rate 87% higher than that among whites. It also revealed that the rate was twice as high among Negroes in segregated slum areas as it was among Negroes in good residential sections.

Disabling illness leaves unemployment and poverty in its wake. A 1949 study by the Federal Security Agency showed nonwhites to have 50% higher chronic disability rates than whites.

When the Farm Security Administration studied many farmers in 1940, all of whom were in the same low income group, the incidence of physical defects was about the same. A similar urban study showed

that both Negro and white illness rates vary with economic status; and within the same income group, illness rates were the same for Negroes and whites.

Despite their heavier burden of illness and premature death, the Negro people have less access to every type of health service. Discrimination is severe in the health professions. Only 2% of the physicians in the United States are Negro. Most of them were trained in one of the two Jim Crow medical schools. Only 105 Negro physicians have been able to obtain the graduate training required for certification as specialists and only 10 of these work in the South.

Areas where the Negro population is largest have the fewest doctors, dentists, nurses and clinics. Arkansas, for example, has one nurse per 2,100 people, while the ratio in Connecticut is one to 200. The ratio of doctors to population in rural Mississippi is only one-fourth that of Massachusetts.

Hospital facilities available to Negroes are especially inadequate. The criminal concept of "separate but equal" [sic] facilities has given legal sanction to segregated, sub-standard hospital wards which fail in every respect to meet the needs of Negro patients. As late as 1940, Negroes were excluded from 16% of federal government hospitals. Almost all hospitals deny staff privileges to Negro doctors, who therefore cannot render hospital care to their own patients. In Mississippi, there is only one (sub-standard) hospital bed available to every 2,000 Negro residents, or one-ninth the standard ratio, and the quality of the care is sub-standard.

Public health services, welfare benefits, medical care, special institutions—all are less available to the Negro, as a result of discrimination and his economic conditions.

CONDITION OF MIGRATORY WORKERS

Migratory farm workers and their families in the United States are estimated to number at present at least 2,000,000, including the workers' wives and children. Every child 10 years and over is considered a worker, "but there are many under 10 years who are also workers." (Report of the Subcommittee on Low Income Families, Joint Congressional Committee on the Economic Report, Doc. # 146, 1950.)

About one million of the 5.1 million agricultural workers in the United States are migratory, it is estimated in a recent study of Migratory Farm Workers in 1949 (U.S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics,

Bull. # 25.) The annual average cash earnings of migratory workers amounted in 1949 to only \$514. But the women migratory workers averaged only \$202 in the year while the men averaged \$655. About one-third of all migratory farm workers are "nonwhite," including Negroes and Orientals, but the study showed that "Negroes made up almost all of the non-white farm wage-workers."

A federal commission, appointed on June 3, 1950, to study conditions among migrant workers, held hearings in various parts of the country. Big farmers oppose state or federal legislation to regulate labor contractors and private agents recruiting migrant labor, it was brought out. Under their influence, for example, in 1950 Gov. Dewey of New York vetoed a bill providing for the licensing of contractors who supply farm workers.

For simply recruiting the labor force, contractors receive either \$1 per man per day worked, or 12% of the payroll, or a crop percentage fee. On a 500-acre tomato crop, a typical gross return to the contractor would be \$25,000. Furthermore, the contractor often has a concession for operating mess hall and store, where workers might be charged up to \$2.50 a day for "terrible" food along with exorbitant store prices and further charges for "liquor, women and drugs." (N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1950.)

Workers, on the other hand, finish the season with little or nothing in the way of net earnings after company deductions for food and transportation. One Puerto Rican who had worked in the Michigan beet fields in 1950 reported, for example, that after 10 weeks work he owed the employer \$9.69. Others reported earnings for a five-week period ranging from just over ten dollars to \$16.15.

Especially exploited are the migratory workers imported from Mexico and Puerto Rico. Many of these Mexicans and Puerto Ricans are kept under semi-slave conditions, unable to leave the jobs to which they have been assigned. Their "housing" would not be considered fit for animals on a well-kept farm.

Unlike factory workers, these wage workers in the fields have no unemployment insurance, no sickness or old-age benefits; nor are they covered by state workmen's compensation, minimum wage, wage-payment and wage-collection laws. County records show high death rates from malnutrition among their infants and young children.

In the San Joaquin Valley of California, at least 56 children died of starvation during the winter of 1949-50. County records politely

called it "malnutrition." Unemployment hit the migrant workers early in the winter, after cotton-picking was over for the season. In one county, 11 infants died from malnutrition in November, 1949 and 28 more in December. Later, 17 more deaths from the same cause were recorded in the valley.

Unemployment is much more common among migrant workers than among nonmigrants; government surveys showed that approximately 9% of migrants in the labor force, in April, 1949, were reported as unemployed compared with only 4.7% of nonmigrants.

Migrant workers have nothing which they can call a home. In California, for example, the contractor may charge the family up to \$25 a week for rent for a shack worth about \$2 a month. Housing for these workers usually consists of shacks made of slats, or old army tents or trailers. (See Report of the President's Commission on Migratory Labor, 1951.)

Conditions under which migratory workers are housed by the potato growers of Suffolk County, N. Y., were revealed in the death of two children in a fire in a 12-by-20 foot former chicken coop occupied by 14 persons, of whom 11 were children, near Bridgehampton, L. I. A report on this tragedy to the New York Times (Nov. 26, 1950) said that "conditions here are typical of those encountered in many farming communities on Long Island. Coops that had housed chickens, dilapidated lean-tos, shacks and storage sheds are common living quarters for many of the transients. . . . No electric, gas or sanitary facility is available."

Children of migrant workers have only the most meager opportunity for education. At a National Child Labor Committee conference in April, 1950, it was brought out that there are nearly half a million children of school age among the migrant labor group. They work in the fields because their contribution often makes the difference between survival and starvation for the family. These children often cannot attend school because of lack of clothing and lack of transportation to such rural schools as do exist. The educational problem is intensified by color segregation so that Negro and Mexican children fare even worse than white children. (See section on Child Labor.)

The temporary and transient character of the job has made it difficult to organize such workers, although some headway was made in this direction by the CIO in the 30's. When the CIO was first formed, some of its leaders recognized that the farm workers (migratory and non-

migratory) were in effect the link between city workers and their potential farm allies; but little progress was made toward getting them into unions.

More recently the National Farm Labor Union (AFL) has entered the picture, claiming jurisdiction over all farm workers. This union charges that hundreds of thousands of migratory workers, especially from Mexico, have been brought into the U.S. illegally every year by "selfish corporation farmers" who "have caused laws of the U.S. to be suspended to enable them to secure cheap labor." (Res. No. 77, 1950 AFL convention.)

CHILD LABOR TRENDS

More than three million boys and girls from 14 through 17 years old were at work at some time during 1949, part-time or full-time, in industry or agriculture. The number employed at any one time during the year averaged about 1,717,000 according to estimates of the U.S. Census. The National Child Labor Committee calls this "a matter of continuous concern. . . . It is probable that the number of young workers is now even larger." (Annual Report, 1950.)

Of the total, 882,000 were employed in farm work at some time during 1949, while 2,596,000 were employed in nonfarm work. Since some children worked in both, the total in farm and nonfarm work is estimated as 3,282,000.

Many children under 14 and even under 10 are working in agriculture. (See section on Condition of Migratory Workers.)

The U.S. Census estimated that in October, 1949, about 701,000 children only 14-15 years old were employed in this country. Nearly half (323,000) of these child workers were in agriculture, and about two-thirds of these were unpaid family workers. Among the 16-17 year olds about a third were in agriculture.

Some 67,000 children 14-15 years old were listed as working in manufacturing industries. Most of these were newsboys working in "news-paper publishing" which is considered a manufacturing enterprise.

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 was amended with a broader coverage (effective Jan. 25, 1950). It now includes any employment related to interstate commerce and not merely work in establishments directly producing goods to be shipped in interstate commerce.

This Act sets a general 16-year limit (with 18 years for hazardous jobs) and allows a 14-year limit for a few part-time jobs.

In general, children 14 or 15 years old may be employed only outside of school hours. They may work no more than three hours a day, 18 hours a week when school is in session, and eight hours a day, 40 hours a week when school is not in session.

But the Fair Labor Standards Act still allows important exemptions from child labor restrictions: For actors or performers in motion picture, theatrical, radio and television production; for workers delivering newspapers to consumers' homes; for children working for their parents in non-manufacturing or non-mining jobs reckoned as non-hazardous or in jobs outside school hours.

Many Not In School: No minimum age is set for work on the parent's farm and for other farm employment before or after school or on school holidays and during school vacations.

Of the 272,000 children of 14 and 15 years not enrolled in school in October, 1949, about 60% were employed or seeking jobs. About three-fourths of those out of school and employed were in agricultural work.

"In 1940, half the rural dwellers 20 to 24 years of age had completed but 8 years of schooling as compared with 12 for their urban counterparts. . . . Illiteracy is over twice as great among rural as among urban dwellers," the U.S. Department of Labor reported. (Bulletin #128.)

This problem of rural schooling is especially acute for children in the families of migratory farm workers. It has been estimated that such families in the Middle Atlantic States alone (from New York to Virginia) include some 10,000 children of whom more than half are of an age for attending school.

Enforcement of child labor laws in rural areas is very far from solved even in the relatively advanced state of New York. "Despite a state law forbidding child labor, an increasing number of boys and girls under 14 years of age—children of migratory farm hands—are at work in the fields of New York State." (N. Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1950.)

Low wages paid to seasonal farm labor put added pressure upon the migratory workers to place their children at the disposal of the employer. The National Child Labor Committee reports that school authorities usually pay no attention to working children unless they are year-round residents of the district. (American Child, May, 1950.)

WOMEN WORKERS

In 1950 there were some 18 million women workers in the United States. This number compares with 14 million 10 years earlier, in 1940.

(Labor Day statement, 1950, by Frieda S. Miller, director of U.S. Women's Bureau.)

In 1950, about one half of these women workers were married. This was an increase over 1940, when one third of the women workers were married. The age range of the working woman also shifted in the 10-year period. In 1940 three fifths were under 35 but in 1950 over half were 35 years or over.

The four leading fields in which women were employed remained the same in 1950 as in 1940: clerical, factory operatives, domestic service and professional and semi-professional occupations.

In November, 1950, there were 18,561,000 women employed, the Women's Bureau reported. This was over 30% of the total number of persons employed.

The majority of the women (over 17 million) were employed in non-agricultural industries. Between November, 1949, and November, 1950, the number of women employed in nonagricultural industries rose by over one million.

The Federal Security Administrator late in 1950 predicted that many more women would be needed in 1951 for war or "defense" production than were so employed during World War II.

In manufacturing as a whole, in September, 1949, 3,810,200, or 27% of all workers employed, were women. In the 21 major manufacturing industry groups the proportion of women varied from 75% of the total in apparel and other finished textile products to only 5% in petroleum, coal and primary metal industries. (Monthly Labor Review, Feb., 1950.)

Wages and Salaries: Women wage earners had a median income of a little over \$1,000 in 1948. Men's median income during the same year was 2 1/3 times as high. More than one-fourth of the women earned less than \$500.

The median income of nonwhite women was less than half of the median income of all women. (Handbook of Facts on Women Workers, Women's Bureau Bulletin No. 237.)

In every industry for which separate information is available on women's wages, the women earn less than the men in the same industry. For example, in the men's seamless hosiery industry women averaged 82¢ an hour in October, 1949, while the men averaged \$1.04 an hour. In this industry women constitute two thirds of the workers.

In the women's coats and suits industry where the women form half of the working force, their earnings were considerably less than men's,

the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported. (Facts on Women Workers, Sept. 30, 1950.) Men's earnings averaged at least \$2 an hour in nine of the 12 cities studied, while average hourly earnings of women were \$1.50 or more in seven cities, and did not exceed \$1.95 in any one of the cities.

Although cutting, marking, and pressing are usually considered "men's occupations," in some cities women do this type of work and are paid less than men. In Kansas City, Mo., the men cutters and markers averaged \$1.74 an hour but the women averaged \$.98 an hour. In San Francisco, women hand pressers averaged \$1.68 an hour and the men \$1.96.

As in the 79th and 80th Congresses, bills were introduced in the 81st Congress to provide for equal pay for equal work for women. The bills had the support of labor, progressive and women's organizations, but no action was taken.

Homework: After more than a year of investigation of the letter shops and mailing list houses, the industrial commissioner of New York State signed an order effective September 1, 1950, to limit the number of home workers that may be employed by one concern. It provided that home workers must be paid the same piece rate as shop workers and must be paid transportation if they have to fetch and deliver for themselves. The employer must provide a typewriter, together with its maintenance, or add 3% to the weekly earnings of the home worker.

Single Women's Budget: The minimum budget required by a single working woman, as priced in San Francisco by the Heller Committee for Research in Social Economics, was \$2,235.70, or about \$43 a week, in September, 1949. This was slightly higher than in September, 1948.

The food and housing costs in this budget are based on residence in a boarding house where breakfasts and dinners are served six days a week. Sunday dinners and lunches are eaten in restaurants.

Negro Women Workers: A special study, Postwar Status of Negro Workers in San Francisco Area, revealed that in 1948 a fourth of the Negro women employed were laborers or industrial workers, as compared with 5% in these fields in 1940. But the Negro women were still predominantly in the lower-paid jobs. Only a fifth of the employed Negro women in 1948 were in white-collar or professional jobs although such occupations included almost three fourths of the total number of women employed in the San Francisco-Oakland metropolitan district in 1947. (Monthly Labor Review, June, 1950.)

The study showed that the unemployment rate among Negro women workers was over six times as high as the state-wide rate among all workers. At the time the study was made more than 40% of the Negro women were unemployed compared with only 6% of the California labor force as a whole.

The median income of the woman head of a family was \$2,167 for migrants and \$2,285 for old residents. Since the Heller Budget in San Francisco in September, 1949, called for \$4,000 for a wage-earner's family of four to maintain the "commonly accepted standard of living," the Negro woman and her family were about 45% below this standard.

WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS

White-collar workers have been hit harder by inflation than other groups of workers. For pay increases are less frequent and are usually smaller than for other workers. Employees in retail trade, for example, where white-collar workers are in the majority, had weekly take-home pay of \$23.65 in 1939, and in 1950 only \$2.50 more (in 1939 dollars).

In the second survey by the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics covering salaries of office workers in 11 selected cities during the first half of 1950, Los Angeles had the highest salary level. It was 7% higher than in New York City and 24% higher than in Providence, R. I. Detroit stood second, Chicago third, and New York City fourth.

The general stenographer was the most important job numerically in each city studied. Average salary of women general stenographers ranged from \$39 a week in Providence to \$50.50 in Los Angeles.

Salaries of women in all white-collar categories were lower than for men doing the same work. Thus in New York City men were being paid \$70.50 a week as bookkeepers and women \$65.50; general clerks, \$57.50 and \$48; order clerks, \$57.50 and \$45.50; accounting clerks, \$56 and \$46 respectively.

Compared with White-Collar Budget: How low these salaries are may be seen by comparing them with the standard budget for the family of a white-collar worker. The authoritative Heller Committee for Research in Social Economics found that a white-collar worker's family needed \$5,135 a year in San Francisco in 1949, or about \$98 a week, to meet its modest living standard.

Union Agreements: Of the 2,438 establishments studied in the BLS survey only 260 were covered by union agreement. Of the total office labor force about 15% were covered by union agreement.

Unionization was high in transportation, communication and other public utilities and low in wholesale trade. One person in four was covered by union contract in retail trade, one in five in manufacturing, one in six in finance, insurance and real estate and one in eight in the service industries.

Milwaukee was the highest-ranking city and Los Angeles the second in unionization while Memphis and Providence were the lowest.

Hours of Work: The most common workweek was 40 hours, five days a week. The work week of office workers varies according to industry. In manufacturing, for example, where union organization among the factory workers is strong, most office workers were on the same 40-hour schedule as the factory wage earners; but in the trade and service industries where fewer workers are organized, both office workers and industrial workers commonly work more than 40 hours.

New York City and Boston were the only cities where the majority of the office workers worked less than 40 hours. In New York City 40% worked 35 hours. The shorter workweek was attributed to the fact that of the establishments surveyed the largest group was in finance, insurance and real estate which traditionally have maintained shorter hours.

The only city where more than 10% worked more than 40 hours was Memphis.

Teachers' Salaries: The 960,395 elementary and high school teachers employed in the fall of 1950 received an average annual wage of \$2,867 or about \$55 a week. This was an increase of 23¢ a day over the \$2,785 of the year before. In the academic year, 1950-51, rural teachers averaged only \$2,200 a year or just about \$42 a week. (N.Y. Times, March 12, 1951.)

A nation-wide survey by the New York Times, Jan. 15, 1951, showed that although the average salary of school teachers ranged from a low of \$1,462 in Mississippi to a high of \$4,030 in New York City, many fell far below this average. Five states paid their teachers less than \$2,000 a year and some salaries were as low as \$600 in Mississippi and \$464 in South Carolina.

IV. CIVIL RIGHTS

CONTEMPT-OF-CONGRESS CASES

Many victims of the Committee on Un-American Activities have gone to prison during the past year. Convicted of "contempt of Congress" for refusing to answer the witch-hunting committee's questions, these men and women have served or were serving, at the beginning of 1951, sentences ranging from three months to one year.

Some of these contempt cases developed during the 80th Congress when J. Parnell Thomas (R., N.J.) was chairman of the Un-American Committee. The others developed when the committee was headed by Rep. John S. Wood (D., Ga.) and Rep. John E. Rankin (D., Miss.). Thomas was indicted in November, 1948, for defrauding the government by padding his congressional payroll. He was tried and sentenced to serve 6 to 18 months and to pay a fine of \$10,000, barely enough to cover his illegal take. He was finally forced to resign his Congressional seat, but was paroled after serving nine months of his sentence.

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee: Eleven board members of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee were sent to prison on June 7, 1950, after a contempt citation from the Committee on Un-American Activities. They had worked for aid to Spanish Loyalist refugees who had escaped from Francisco Franco's fascist terror in Spain.

The Un-American Committee had demanded in 1946 that they turn over books and membership records of the JAFRC. They refused because to do so would expose members of the Republican resistance remaining in Spain. The U.S. Supreme Court held the case for two years but finally on May 29, 1950, refused to act—thereby automatically ordering the anti-fascist group to prison. The high court declined to pass on the constitutionality of the Un-American Committee.

Dr. Edward K. Barsky, chairman of the JAFRC board, served six months. Those serving three months each were: Howard Fast, Dr. Lyman R. Bradley, Dr. Jacob Auslander, James Lustig, Harry M. Justiz, Manuel Magana, Dr. Louis Miller, Ruth Leider, Marjorie Chodorov, and Charlotte Stern.

While the anti-fascist eleven were going to jail, Winthrop W. Aldrich,

chairman of Chase National Bank (Rockefeller), and two vice-presidents of this bank were being feted by Franco in Spain. Chase National had already extended a loan of \$30 million to the Franco regime.

In the cases of Helen R. Bryan, executive secretary of the JAFRC, and Ernestina G. Fleischman, a board member, the contempt-of-Congress conviction was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court on May 8, 1950, by a five to two decision. Justice Hugo L. Black, joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter, wrote a dissent in these cases. They warned that the majority opinion placed an unfair burden on persons defending themselves against contempt charges. Justices Douglas and Clark did not participate in the decision.

Each of the women had been sentenced in the Federal District Court in April, 1948, to serve three months in prison and pay a \$500 fine. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals had reversed the conviction. It held that the trial jury had not been allowed to pass on the question whether a quorum of the House committee was present when the women were called before it. The case then went back and forth again in the courts. But in October, 1950, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the women's final appeal in this case and the two began serving sentences on November 13, 1950.

Hollywood Ten: Long prison sentences and fines were imposed by the courts on distinguished screen writers and directors who in 1947 refused to discuss their politics with the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

Two of the Hollywood Ten, John Howard Lawson and Dalton Trumbo, were sent to prison on June 9, 1950, to serve one-year sentences. Each was also fined \$1,000. Federal District Judges, Edward M. Curran and David A. Pine, refused to consider defendants' motions to reduce the sentences or grant probation.

Alvah Bessie, Lester Cole, Ring Lardner, Jr., and Albert Maltz were sentenced on June 29, 1950 and sent to prison to serve sentences of one year each. At the same time the two Hollywood directors, Herbert Biberman and Edward Dmytryk, were sent to prison to serve six months each. Adrian Scott was later sentenced and sent to prison for a year.

Noted writers and scientists all over the world have protested against the sentencing and imprisonment of these men. The Committee to Free the Hollywood Ten received protests signed by George Bernard Shaw, Thomas Mann, Albert Einstein, and many others.

Parole was refused the Hollywood writers, although such offenders

as former Representatives J. Parnell Thomas and Andrew J. May, both convicted of defrauding the government, were granted parole.

Dennis Case: Eugene Dennis, general secretary of the Communist Party of the United States, was sent to prison May 12, 1950, to serve a one-year sentence for refusing to testify before the Un-American Committee. He was also fined \$1,000.

Dennis' immediate imprisonment at that time seriously interfered with his appeal in the case of the 11 Communist leaders (See below). He was acting as his own lawyer in the Communist case but was unable while in prison to work with the other lawyers on the appeal.

Challenging the right of the Un-American Committee to conduct witch-hunts, Dennis was convicted for "contempt of Congress" in the Federal District Court at Washington, D. C., in June, 1947. A number of federal government workers were on the jury that found him "guilty." Dennis' appeal questioned the impartiality of government workers as jurors since they are subject to President Truman's "loyalty" order.

The U. S. Supreme Court, however, on March 27, 1950, declared in a five to two decision that government workers were not necessarily prejudiced as jurymen in cases involving communism. Justices Felix Frankfurter and Hugo Black dissented on the ground that federal workers were influenced by the cold war atmosphere of fear in Washington. Black stated:

"To say that employees of the United States could meet objective tests of complete impartiality in the trial of cases like this is to disregard human nature. Probably at no period of the nation's history has the 'loyalty' of government employees been subjected to such constant scrutiny by so many government agents and secret informers."

In refusing to appear before the un-American committee in 1947, Dennis had charged that the composition of the committee was contrary to law. He challenged the right of Rep. John E. Rankin of Mississippi (then a committee member) to sit in Congress. Negroes in that state are denied the right to vote, Dennis showed. Under the 14th amendment to the U. S. Constitution, Mississippi is entitled to only four not to seven seats in the House, he argued, and the tenure of Rankin was therefore illegal. But the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals in October, 1948, turned down this appeal.

Marshall and Morford: George Marshall, national chairman of the Civil Rights Congress, served a three-month prison term, starting June 2, 1950, for "contempt of Congress." For having refused in 1946 to turn

over to the Committee on Un-American Activities a list of contributors to the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties of which he was chairman, he was sentenced on May 17, 1948, to the prison term and a fine of \$500.

In his appeal, Marshall challenged the constitutionality of the un-American committee and its right to subpoena lists of names to be used as a blacklist. The U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals in June, 1949, upheld the conviction of Marshall. The court admitted that the NFCL literature in question was not "subversive" but said the organization might have been engaged "in the silent diffusion of subversive propaganda." In his later appeal to the U. S. Supreme Court, Marshall contended that federal workers under President Truman's loyalty order should not have served on the jury that tried him. The Supreme Court on April 10, 1950, and again on May 15, 1950, rejected Marshall's appeal from his conviction.

Richard Morford, executive director of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc., and a Presbyterian minister, had refused in 1946 to give the un-American committee the records of his organization and a list of the contributors. He argued that the records were not pertinent to any matter the committee was empowered to investigate. He was sentenced in April, 1948, to serve three months in jail and pay a \$250 fine, for "contempt of Congress."

In June, 1949, the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld his conviction. The U. S. Supreme Court, however, in April, 1950, returned the case to the District Court because of a technical "error in procedure." In July, 1950, the District Court again sentenced him to three months in jail and a \$250 fine, and the U. S. Court of Appeals upheld this second conviction. Morford went to prison on Aug. 29, 1950, before he could take his appeal to the Supreme Court for the second time.

These two cases and the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee case marked the first determined resistance to the un-American committee. They represented a defense of people's organizations against the efforts of the un-American committee to destroy all progressive organizations. The conduct of the resistance and the defense in Marshall's and Morford's cases defended organizations and constitutional principles but did not involve whole boards as did the JAFRC case.

Patterson Case: Another contempt case developed in August, 1950, when William L. Patterson, executive secretary of the Civil Rights Congress, was called to testify before the special House committee in-

vestigating lobbying activities. When he refused to give this committee the CRC records or the names of its supporters, he was cited for "contempt of Congress." During his appearance before the committee Patterson was insulted by Rep. Henderson Lanham (D., Ga.) who was about to attack him physically and was restrained only by the quick action of those nearby. Patterson's trial was declared a mistrial.

New Senate Committee: A so-called Internal Security sub-committee of the Senate Judiciary Committee early in 1951 started a red-baiting campaign similar to that of the House un-American Committee. Sen. Herbert R. O'Connor (D., Md.), a member of the group, said in March, 1951, that its plans so far had "been kept secret." (N.Y. Times, March 11, 1951.)

ATTACKS ON UNIONS

Seven officials of the United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers (unaffiliated) were indicted November 21, 1950, by a federal grand jury on charges of "contempt" of Congress. They had refused to answer questions of the un-American committee concerning their own and others' political opinions.

Charges in the various indictments ranged from one to 68 counts. On each count the maximum penalties are one year in prison and a fine of \$1,000. Those indicted include: Sec.-Treas. Julius Emspak; Organization Dir. James J. Matles; Thomas J. Fitzpatrick, Pittsburgh local steward; Thomas Quinn, Pittsburgh field organizer; Frank Panzino, Pittsburgh local steward; Talmadge Raley, Cincinnati local; and Esther Tice, Cincinnati.

Pres. Albert P. Fitzgerald of the UE pointed out that a federal judge in Hawaii had ruled that a person appearing before a congressional committee has the right to decline to answer any questions under protection of the fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. He was referring to the decision of Federal District Judge Delbert E. Metzger of the District of Hawaii on November 17, 1950, in a case involving 39 persons who refused to answer the un-American committee's questions. The 39 who were members of the Longshoremen's union and of the Hawaii Civil Liberties Committee were acquitted by Judge Metzger in January, 1951.

In the UE cases, Matles, Esther Tice, Fitzpatrick and Raley were acquitted of "contempt." Emspak and Quinn, however, were found "guilty" and their cases have been appealed.

Harold R. Christoffel, former head of the Auto Workers (CIO) in Milwaukee, was sentenced by Federal District Judge F. Dickinson Letts on March 14, 1950, to serve two to six years in prison. He was convicted of "perjury" for telling the House labor committee that he was not a Communist. He was released on bail pending appeal to the higher courts. The U. S. Supreme Court in 1949 had reversed his earlier conviction on the ground that a quorum of the committee was not present when he was questioned. Tried and convicted again, Christoffel has now appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals.

U.S. SUPREME COURT ON CONTEMPT CASES

On December 11, 1950, the U. S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed the conviction of Patricia Blau who had been found guilty in 1948 of contempt of the grand jury in Denver, Colorado. The high court ruled that under the fifth amendment to the U. S. Constitution she had properly invoked "self-incrimination" in her defense, in refusing to answer questions concerning relations with the Communist Party.

In the case of her husband, Irving Blau, the high court in a six to two ruling on January 15, 1951, supported his refusal to answer questions concerning the activities and records of the Communist Party. It also supported his refusal to tell the grand jury where his wife could be served with a summons.

However, on February 26, 1951, the U. S. Supreme Court by a five to three decision upheld the four-month jail sentence for contempt imposed on Mrs. Jane Rogers of Denver. Mrs. Rogers had refused to disclose to the grand jury the name of the person to whom she had given Communist Party records and had then invoked the fifth amendment. In their dissenting opinion in the Rogers case, Justices Hugo L. Black, Felix Frankfurter, and William O. Douglas argued that to adopt the rule laid down by the Supreme Court majority would relegate the Constitutional privilege "to a second-rate position."

McCARRAN ACT

The so-called Internal Security Act of 1950, known as the McCarran Act, was passed by Congress September 23, 1950, over a presidential veto. It requires the registration of all Communist and of "Communist front" organizations when so ordered by a new Subversive Activities Control Board. It permits the Department of Justice, through its Im-

migration & Naturalization Service, to exclude or deport any alien it wishes. (Treatment of foreign-born workers under this act is discussed in a separate section.)

Sponsored by Sen. Patrick McCarran (D., Nev.) the Act embodies both the police-state measure formerly pushed by Sen. Karl E. Mundt (R., S.D.) and Rep. Richard M. Nixon (R., Calif.), now a senator, and the concentration camp bill proposed by Rep. John S. Wood (D., Ga.). It involves an attempt to legalize the Smith Act. The measure has been opposed (as violating the Bill of Rights) by the entire labor movement, by all progressive organizations and many anti-communist groups, and by hundreds of prominent citizens who have called for its repeal. A bill to repeal the Act was introduced in the House, March 29, 1951, by Rep. Adolph J. Sabath (D., Ill.).

"Conspiracy" Provisions: Effective immediately when the Act was passed are certain provisions that can be used against anyone, whether citizen or foreign-born. This section prohibits what it calls "conspiracy to establish totalitarian dictatorship," making it "unlawful for any person knowingly to combine, conspire, or agree with any other person to perform any act which would substantially contribute to the establishment within the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship," considered to be under the control of a foreign government or organization.

Under this sweeping provision any trade unionist in a strike against a company handling war materials could be charged with such a "conspiracy." No overt act is required. The person need only "agree to perform an act," according to the evidence from spies and informers.

Registration Provisions: Title I of this so-called "Subversive Activities Control Act" requires what it calls Communist "action" organizations, Communist "front" organizations, and certain individuals, to register with the Department of Justice and file reports. The Subversive Activities Control Board, appointed by President Truman and sworn in on November 1, 1950, administers the registration provisions.

The Communist Party repeatedly announced it would not register and up to the beginning of 1951 no organization had as yet registered. As provided in the Act, Attorney General J. Howard McGrath on November 22, 1950, asked the control board to order the Communist Party to register as an agent of what he termed the "world Communist movement." The board must hold hearings on the petition. If, after these hearings, it agrees with the Department of Justice, it issues an order directing the Communist Party to register with the government

as a "Communist action" group. The Communists can then appeal to the courts. If the courts sustain the order, the control board then issues a "final order." If the Communists still refuse to sign, and the courts sustain the board, then the Department of Justice can prosecute them.

Final conviction, if sustained, may result in penalties up to \$10,000 in fines and five-year prison terms for **each day** of continued refusal to register. The financial penalties would apply to the organization itself and both penalties would apply to its leaders.

If persons refuse to testify or produce records at hearings before the control board they may be charged with "contempt" which is punishable through the courts by fine or imprisonment or both. A special section protects labor spies, informers or stoolpigeons who testify against progressives in board hearings. They are guaranteed immunity against any suits for damages or libel.

Tests on Organizations: In tests to decide whether or not an organization is Communist, the control board is to be guided by rules which can easily be applied to trade unions if they advocate any part of a program that is also advocated by Communists. One test emphasizes the extent to which positions taken by the organization from time to time "do not deviate from those of any Communist action organization."

If an organization fails to disclose its membership this is to be considered evidence that it is "Communist." Such a test can easily involve any union organizing in an anti-union industry and needing to protect its members until the group is strong enough to meet the company in collective bargaining.

If an organization uses its funds, resources or personnel to further or promote the objectives of any Communist group, this is to be considered evidence that it is "Communist." Thus a trade union working for any policies that are also policies of the Communist movement could be labelled a "Communist front organization."

Meaning of Registration: In registering as "Communist" an organization is required to file with the Department of Justice each year its name and address, names and addresses of its officers, amount and exact source of its income, and amount and purposes of all expenditures. For a trade union, such registration would thus mean a list of dues-paying members—providing a convenient blacklist for employers.

"Communist action" groups must list names and addresses of every member. The Department of Justice is to keep all lists available for public inspection. Such a "Communist organization" must include in

its reports names and addresses of all who have contributed money for its work or who have received money from it. Such a record would obviously provide a blacklist for any who may wish to use it against the interests of the organization or persons involved. Failure to produce the records subjects the officers to charges of "contempt."

No member of any organization defined as "Communist" may seek any government or defense job without disclosing his membership. No member may be employed on any government job. Penalty is a \$10,000 fine or five years in prison or both.

No member of a "Communist organization" may apply for a passport or use one. Even for making an application, the individual may be fined \$10,000 or sentenced to five years in prison, or both.

Any "Communist organization" issuing any publication to be sent by mail, express, or freight, must mark it on the outside, showing that it is "disseminated by _____, a Communist organization." A similar statement must be made in connection with a radio broadcast.

If a "Communist action" organization does not register after the order becomes final, individual members are required to register.

Concentration Camps: Under the title, "Emergency Detention Act of 1950," the McCarran measure provides for a mass round-up and detention as "subversives" of all who are on the blacklist of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. When the President declares a state of "internal security emergency," i.e. war or "insurrection" in the United States, all on this list can be immediately arrested, put into concentration camps, and kept there indefinitely. A nation-wide strike or a strike in a war industry could be considered "insurrection," for this is not defined in the Act.

Those who are thus "detained" will be put in special places or camps, separated from other prisoners. They are assumed to be guilty and must remain there while their appeals are argued. Hearings may be held on their cases, but spies who inform against them are protected from any identification.

DEPORTATION AND FOREIGN BORN CASES

During 1950, the Department of Justice continued its general attack on the rights of foreign born Americans, (Labor Fact Book 9, p. 87), with an intensified drive toward the end of the year on the basis of the deportation provisions of the McCarran Act. The American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born continued in its fight against the

deportation hysteria and scored several important victories in the defense of the constitutional rights of noncitizens.

Deportations: More than 25 noncitizens were arrested during the past year in deportation proceedings based on their political opinions or associations, bringing the total number arrested since 1946 to 165 in 21 states. On October 20, the Justice Department announced that it was prepared to deport more than 3,400 noncitizens under the provisions of the newly-enacted McCarran law.

The most dangerous extension of the government's drive occurred in the initiation of deportation proceedings based solely on past or present membership in a fraternal insurance organization, the International Workers Order.

Bail: Beginning with midnight raids on American homes on Sunday, October 22, the Justice Department arrested and held without bail 48 noncitizens in 11 states. Fourteen Federal District Court judges ruled that denial of bail was an abuse of discretion and 42 noncitizens were released. The U. S. Court of Appeals in San Francisco made a similar decision. Only three Federal District Court judges—in Los Angeles, Duluth and Detroit—sustained the Justice Department's denial of bail and appeals in these cases are pending in the Federal Court of Appeals. Five noncitizens—in Detroit and Los Angeles—were held without bail for more than 150 days while appeals in their cases were still pending in March, 1951.

Deportation Hearings: In February, 1950, the U. S. Supreme Court ruled that the Justice Department must hold deportation hearings in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act and, as a result, more than 14,000 deportation hearings were voided and would have had to be held over again. However, in September, 1950, Congress exempted the Justice Department from the need to hold deportation hearings in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act which provides minimum standards for fair hearings.

During November and December, therefore, the Justice Department held hearings in more than 60 political deportation cases. These hearings were biased and unfair star-chamber proceedings devoid of any dignity and clearly in violation of the noncitizen's right to due process and fair trial.

Denaturalization: During 1950, the Justice Department initiated revocation of citizenship proceedings in ten cases in the Federal courts in Philadelphia, Akron, Detroit, Hartford, and Boston. All of these pro-

ceedings are still in the preliminary stages. During October, the Department announced that it would seek to revoke the American citizenship of more than 1,200 naturalized citizens on political grounds.

McCarran Law: In addition to its provisions for broadening grounds for the deportation of noncitizens and making it impossible for thousands of noncitizens to become American citizens, the McCarran Act contains several provisions seriously infringing on the rights of noncitizens. Many of the provisions of the McCarran Act—for “supervision” of certain noncitizens, for annual reporting by noncitizens, etc.—were to be tested during 1951 as the Justice Department sought to implement these various sections of the new law. The American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born has warned that the McCarran Act deportation provisions, if put into effect and sustained by the courts, would mean the total destruction of the liberties of some 14 million foreign born Americans.

STATE AND LOCAL ANTI-RED LAWS

About 150 cities and towns and a number of states had passed anti-Communist laws or ordinances by February, 1951. An incomplete survey by United Press showed that many of these measures require registration of Communists who have, however, consistently refused to register as “subversives.” Other laws are ordinances requiring non-Communist oaths from city employees.

California had the most widespread anti-Red legislation, involving eight cities and three counties. Cities were Los Angeles, Long Beach, Beverly Hills, Burbank, Santa Monica, Glendale, San Gabriel and Azusa. Counties are: Los Angeles, Riverside and Orange.

In Pennsylvania local “Red-control” laws had been enacted by Berwick, Lancaster, York, Lebanon, Erie, McKeesport, Aliquippa and Port Vue. Similar measures had been passed by four cities in Mississippi: Laurel, Kosciusko, Jackson and Natchez.

Other cities which have had such measures include Birmingham, Ala.; Terre Haute, Ind.; Newport, Ky.; Nogales, Ariz.; Iowa City, Iowa; Jacksonville and Miami, Fla.; and Albuquerque, N. M.

Penalties for failure to comply with the law range from 30 days in jail and a \$100 fine for Communists found in the four Mississippi cities, to one year in prison and a \$500 fine for those who disobey Terre Haute’s registration law.

In addition to the cities listed above from the UP survey, New

Rochelle, N. Y., adopted a Communist registration ordinance in September, 1950. It established a maximum penalty of six months' imprisonment and a \$500 fine for failure to register. Jersey City, N. J., October 17, 1950, adopted a similar ordinance calling for registration of all Communists and members of "other subversive organizations" who live or work there or who pass through the city regularly. Failure to register is punishable with a \$200 fine, a year in jail, or both.

Among the states are Maryland with its Ober law (see below); California, demanding loyalty oaths from all state employees; and Arkansas, banning Communists from the ballot as well as from the state payroll. Massachusetts passed a law in August, 1949, to make it illegal for Communists to hold jobs on public payrolls.

Feinberg Law: In addition to the states listed below, New York state since April 1, 1949, has had on its statute books the Feinberg law, barring members of so-called "subversive" organizations from employment in the state's public schools. Sponsored by State Senator Benjamin F. Feinberg, this measure directs the state board of regents to draw up a list of "subversive" organizations. Membership in any group thus listed by the board disqualifies a person from employment in the public schools.

This law has been opposed by the Teachers Union, a local of the United Public Workers (unaffiliated); by the Teachers Guild (AFL); the American Civil Liberties Union; taxpayers groups and other American citizens. But the act was upheld November 30, 1950, by a decision of the State Court of Appeals. The Teachers Union announced it would appeal its case to the U. S. Supreme Court.

Eight New York City school teachers were suspended May 3, 1950, because they refused to tell Dr. William Jansen, superintendent of schools, whether or not they were members of the Communist Party. They were tried in departmental proceedings during September and October, 1950, before board member Theodore Kiendl, who is also an attorney for J. P. Morgan & Co.

The eight were Alice B. Citron, Abraham Feingold, Mark Friedlander, David L. Friedman, Louis Jaffe, Abraham Lederman, Isadore Rubin, and Mrs. Celia Zitron. They had taught in the New York public school system from 11 to 26 years for a total of 126 years, and at no time had their classroom conduct ever been questioned.

In a brief supporting the teachers, two committees of the American Civil Liberties Union contended that: "Membership in the Communist

Party or in its affiliated organizations, in itself, is not enough to disqualify a person from employment as a teacher in the public school system. A public school teacher is not guilty of misconduct or insubordination by refusing to answer the question—Are you or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party.”

On December 12, 1950, Kiendl as trial examiner in the case recommended the outright dismissal of all eight teachers. The Board of Education on February 8, 1951, dismissed the eight.

Court Rulings: Maryland's thought-control act, requiring “anti-subversive oaths” from all public employees, was drawn up by Frank Ober, a Baltimore corporation lawyer and chairman of the state commission on subversive activities. It was passed in 1949 but declared “unconstitutional and invalid” by Circuit Court Judge Joseph H. Sherbow in August and again in September, 1949. The Maryland Court of Appeals reinstated the law in February, 1950, and it was upheld by the U. S. Supreme Court in April, 1951.

Many of the local laws have been under attack as an infringement of constitutional liberties. The Birmingham, Ala., ordinance to outlaw the Communist Party, passed July 18, 1950, provided that Communist membership would be taken for granted if a person “shall be found in any secret or non-public place in voluntary association or communication with any person or persons established to be or to have been members of the Communist Party.”

But Federal Judge Seybourn H. Lynne ruled that this law was unconstitutional. His decision upheld Sam Hall, chairman of the Alabama Communist Party, who argued successfully that he owned a house in Birmingham and was deprived of its use.

In Jacksonville, Fla., Circuit Judge Claude Ogilvie on October 3, 1950, ruled against the local law banning Communists from residence in the city. The Judge said “the Constitution should never be suspended in times of great excitement.” In Miami, Fla., Alfred P. Rosenberg, acting chairman of the Progressive Party, obtained an injunction against enforcement of that city's ordinance.

In Los Angeles, Calif., three judges of the California Superior Court Appellate Division in a unanimous decision declared February 28, 1951, that Los Angeles County's “Little McCarran” or Communist-registration ordinance was unconstitutional. This ruling affected also several city ordinances in the county. (“Little McCarran” acts are local measures similar to the McCarran act passed by Congress in September,

1950.) Two cases under the ordinance were dismissed by the lower courts.

Judges Edward T. Bishop, Hartley Shaw and Jess E. Stephens of the Superior Court in their decision said: "We have reached the conclusion that the ordinance violates the principle written into the Bill of Rights of the Federal Constitution, which is found in the constitution of every state in the country, and which is given this expression in Section 13, Article I, of our state constitution: 'No person shall . . . be compelled, in any criminal case, to be witness against himself.'"

"It inevitably follows that we find the ordinance to be without validity and, as a consequence, hold that the dismissals of the complaints based upon it were proper." The judges pointed out that registration is a form of self-incriminating testimony.

Cases Under Local Laws: Under the Communist registration law in Los Angeles County, three workers were arrested in September, 1950, for failure to register. The cases against Henry Steinberg and La Rue McCormick were dismissed in the lower courts.

One of the three cases brought under the Los Angeles ordinances was against Gus Brown, business agent of Local 576, United Furniture Workers. During a union struggle for a better contract from the Furniture Employers Council of Southern California, deputy sheriffs on September 14, 1950, raided the local's office and arrested Brown. He was later released on bail. But despite court rulings in early October that the ordinances were unconstitutional, the union officer's case was still pending when the Superior Court ruled the law was unconstitutional. A trade union defense committee was formed in Los Angeles to fight the Brown case and any other such cases as might develop.

Communists in Western Pennsylvania: Another important case was initiated in Pennsylvania by the Allegheny County grand jury in October, 1950. Three Western Pennsylvania Communists were indicted for "sedition": Steve Nelson, chairman of the Communist Party in Western Pennsylvania; Andrew Onda, Communist Party organizer among steelworkers; and James Dolsen, correspondent of the Daily Worker. The indictment was based on a 1919 anti-sedition law of Pennsylvania which forbids advocating "violent overthrow of the government." Judge Michael A. Musmanno, then Democratic candidate for lieutenant-governor of Pennsylvania, was the principal anti-Communist witness before the grand jury and at the trial in 1951. In 1926 Musmanno supported Mussolini's fascist policies.

COMMUNIST LEADERS' TRIAL AND APPEAL

Twelve leaders of the Communist Party of the U. S. had been indicted July 20, 1948, for an alleged conspiracy. No overt acts were charged, but the indictment claimed that, in the very fact of organizing a party to "teach and advocate" the philosophy and economic theories of Marx and Lenin, the Communists were conspiring to advocate "force and violence." The prosecution depended largely upon the Alien Registration Act, known as the Smith Act, which was passed in June, 1940, as a war measure.

Actually eleven leaders were immediately involved, as the case against William Z. Foster was separated and postponed on the score of health. The eleven are Benjamin J. Davis, Jr., Eugene Dennis, John Gates, Gilbert Green, Gus Hall, Irving Potash, Jacob Stachel, Robert G. Thompson, John B. Williamson, Henry Winston and Carl Winter.

Their trial before Judge Harold R. Medina began in January, 1949, and ended on October 14 of the same year with a verdict against the defendants. Ten were sentenced to five years in prison plus a fine of \$10,000 each. Thompson's war record for bravery beyond the call of duty was "rewarded" with a sentence of three years instead of five.

Pending appeals to higher courts, defendants were released, after some difficulty, on a total of \$260,000 more in bail provided by the Bail Fund of the Civil Rights Congress of New York.

In his summary to the jury, Eugene Dennis characterized the reasons for the trial as follows:

"There is more behind this trial than partisan politics. The jury can now see the sinister and far-reaching purpose that led to the indictment of the Communist leaders for our principles, our beliefs, our ideas—not for any overt act. In this trial the prosecution has been trying to lay the 'theoretical' foundation for nullifying the Bill of Rights, and has waged ideological warfare against Jefferson's principles as well as against ours. The prosecution is trying to lay the same anti-Communist ideological foundation laid by the Nazis for the destruction of the labor and Communist movements and of the bourgeois-democratic rights enjoyed by the German people under the Weimar Republic. . . .

"Theories, ideas, and political policies," Dennis stated, "are not triable in any court of law."

Verdict and sentence were upheld August 1, 1950, in the Second Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. Appeal to the U. S. Supreme Court followed immediately. Bail was restored to all except Dennis by As-

sociate Justice Robert H. Jackson. Dennis was already serving a year's sentence for "contempt" of Congress (See p. 66). Up to mid-May, 1951, no decision on this case had been handed down by the high court.

In his ruling on bail, Justice Jackson said that the Communist leaders "were not charged with any attempt nor with any overt act toward that end [violent overthrow of the U. S. government] other than those incident to such organization and teaching. . . .

"It is still difficult to reconcile with traditional American law the jailing of persons by the courts because of anticipated but as yet uncommitted crimes. Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in this country and so fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that I am loath to resort to it, even as a discretionary judicial technique to supplement conviction of such offenses as those of which defendants stand convicted. . . .

"The Communist Party has not been outlawed either by legislation, nor by these convictions. . . . Nor were defendants indicted under that part of the statute which prohibits publication of matter intended to cause overthrow and destruction of government. . . . I think courts should not utilize their discretionary powers to coerce men to forego conduct as to which the Bill of Rights leaves them free. Indirect punishment of free press or free speech is as evil as direct punishment of it. . . .

"If all that convicted these defendants was such utterances as have followed their conviction, there would indeed be doubt about its validity, for I am unable to find in them any word of advocacy of violence either to overthrow the government or of forcible resistance to its policy. If that inference can be drawn from these utterances, it can equally well be drawn from many other opposition speeches by non-Communists."

Petition to Supreme Court: The appeal of the eleven, concerned chiefly with the constitutionality of the Smith Act, contended that Congress had no right to ban dissemination of ideas; that it is unfair to translate possible danger in the future to a "clear and present danger" of violent overthrow of the government; and that the indictment included no bill of particulars.

The defense also raised specific questions on the way the trial had been conducted in the lower court. In relation to each individual it held the evidence was insufficient. It contended Judge Medina was not justified in dismissing the defense challenge to the fairness of the jury. Counsel for the defense, Louis F. McCabe of Philadelphia, argued that

the judge interfered with fuller questioning of jurors. Several were challenged but only two were excused for obvious bias. At least one juror had openly boasted of anti-Communist feelings.

The testimony of stoolpigeons cannot be depended upon, the defense contended. Also, it held that Medina's prejudiced conduct and unconcealed hostility made a fair trial impossible; and that the judge could not legally deny to Benjamin Davis the right to serve as his own lawyer.

The U. S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal. Defense of the Communist leaders before the high court was joined by the American Civil Liberties Union, as "friend of the court," with a brief arguing that even if the Smith Act were constitutional it had been applied in this case without any finding of "clear and present danger" of action. The ACLU maintained that the constitutional right of free speech even "extends to the advocacy of violent overthrow." However, the ACLU was not permitted by the Supreme Court to join in the case as a "friend of the court."

In carrying the case to the Supreme Court, the Communists filed a motion to permit D. N. Pritt, noted British barrister, to represent them. They requested postponement of oral argument from December 4 to January 22, 1951, or later, to enable Pritt to take the case, but the high court refused to postpone it. It was reported that 24 prominent American lawyers had declined to participate in the case, in spite of admitting that they personally believed the Smith Act to be unconstitutional, because they feared the effect on their positions as attorneys under the prevailing conditions of anti-Communist hysteria in the nation.

The case was argued before the U. S. Supreme Court on December 4, 1950, by attorneys Harry Sacher and Abraham J. Isserman of New York, and by George W. Crockett, Negro member of the Michigan Bar Association.

LAWYERS IN "CONTEMPT"

Attorneys in the case of the 11 Communist leaders included George W. Crockett, Negro member of the Michigan Bar Association; Richard Gladstein of California; Abraham J. Isserman of New York; Louis McCabe of Pennsylvania; Harry Sacher of New York; and Maurice Sugar of Michigan. Eugene Dennis acted in his own defense.

At the end of the trial in October, 1949, Judge Medina called the defense attorneys before him. Without a hearing, with himself acting as prosecutor, judge and jury, he convicted the lawyers of "contempt

of court" and sentenced them to terms ranging up to six months in prison. He charged they had "conspired" not only to "cause disorder and confusion" in the court but also to "impair" his health.

When the lawyers appealed their own case to the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, two of the justices rejected the charge of conspiracy. Justice Clark rejected all the specifications against the attorneys. Two of the justices, however, ruled that the lawyers were guilty of contempt, if not of conspiracy to commit contempt. The attorneys then appealed their case to the U. S. Supreme Court. Their petition said in part:

"The decision of the lower court establishes a procedure which tends to intimidate counsel in all cases. No trial lawyer is safe carrying out his high obligation of vigorous defense of his client, even to the point of resisting a judge's misconduct or oppression, if he can be punished without hearing by the same judge." The Bar Association of the City of N. Y. and the N. Y. County Lawyers Association in 1950 instituted disbarment proceedings against Sacher and Isserman.

In the defense of Pres. Harry R. Bridges of the International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union (at that time CIO) his two attorneys, Vincent Hallinan and James MacInnis, were sentenced on April 10, 1950, to six months and three months respectively for "contempt of court." Federal Judge George B. Harris, who tried and sentenced Bridges, immediately appointed himself prosecutor, judge and jury to try and sentence the defense lawyers. They appealed the case.

Immediately after the Civil Rights Congress obtained a stay of execution in the case of Willie McGee in July, 1950, his Mississippi attorney, John Poole, was confronted with disbarment charges. The legal actions he had taken, which helped to save McGee's life, were the sole basis for the charges. It was charged that he was retained by the CRC and that he had made improper charges (in the legal papers filed on McGee's behalf) against other attorneys—the present and former prosecuting officials. The charges were still pending in March, 1951.

THIRD TRIAL OF BRIDGES

Harry R. Bridges, president of the International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union (formerly CIO), was tried for the third time in the Federal Court in San Francisco, convicted of "perjury and conspiracy," and sentenced on April 10, 1950, to five years in prison. His two co-defendants, Henry Schmidt and J. R. Robertson, both ILWU officers, were each sentenced to serve two years.

Federal Judge George B. Harris in San Francisco on June 16, 1950, revoked Bridges' citizenship on the claim that he had been a Communist Party member when he obtained citizenship in 1945. Bridges, who was born in Australia, retains his U. S. citizenship, however, while his appeal from the perjury and conspiracy conviction is going through the higher courts.

Bridges' third trial started November 14, 1949, and lasted five months. Two expelled former Communists, Paul Crouch and Manning Johnson, were allowed to swear falsely at this trial that they had seen the long-shore leader at a Communist meeting in New York City in June, 1936. Bridges' lawyers proved conclusively with documented records that he was in California at that time. A third government witness, Lawrence Seton Ross, confessed under cross-examination that he himself had given perjured testimony.

Among those who testified at the third trial that Bridges was a man of honesty and integrity were Walter Buck, prominent West Coast industrialist and a director of the Matson Navigation Co.; Father Paul, a Catholic priest; Daniel del Carlo, American Federation of Labor secretary in San Francisco; Dewey Mead, City Supervisor; and Stanley Bailey, president of the Chamber of Commerce in Portola, Calif.

Ever since Bridges led the great West Coast waterfront strike in 1934, the Department of Justice has carried on a campaign to get him out of the country. But the U. S. Supreme Court ruled in 1945 that he was not deportable. The late Supreme Court Justice Frank Murphy stated at that time: "The record in this case will stand forever as a monument to man's intolerance of man. Seldom if ever in the history of this nation has there been such a concentrated and relentless crusade to deport an individual because he dared to exercise the freedom that belongs to him as a human being and that is guaranteed to him by the Constitution."

CASES AGAINST NEGROES

Trenton Six: The death sentences against the six Trenton (N. J.) Negro workers (Labor Fact Book 9, p. 97) were reversed on June 30, 1949, by the New Jersey Supreme Court. The court indicated that it believed the "confessions" on which the convictions were based were illegally extorted by the Trenton police while the men were held without warrants. The decision criticized the trial judge for improperly charging and influencing the jury.

Suppression by the prosecution of important finger-print evidence was also criticized by the state supreme court. Defense lawyers had been seeking this evidence. They stated they could prove that the state's witness, common-law wife of the murdered man, perjured herself when she identified the six Negroes.

The six Negroes are: Collis English, McKinley Forrest, Horace Wilson, Ralph Cooper, James Thorpe, and John MacKenzie. They were condemned to death in August, 1948, for allegedly murdering a white man, William Horner, on January 27, 1948.

Three defense lawyers representing the Civil Rights Congress were banned from the case by the trial judge, Charles P. Hutchinson. The judge's order came after the lawyers had introduced motions on new evidence which if granted should have ended the case. The U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals in a two to one ruling held that the judge had been wrong but did not order him to restore the defense lawyers as counsel.

After three years the six workers are still in prison without bail. But their lives have been saved, their families state, by the efforts of the Civil Rights Congress and by nationwide protests against the frame-up. In a new trial during the winter of 1951, new evidence showed the innocence of the men and the character of the frame-up against them.

Martinsville Seven: At Martinsville, Va., seven young Negro men were convicted by an all-white jury and sentenced in May, 1949, by Judge Kennen C. Whittle to die in the electric chair for allegedly raping a white woman in January, 1949. The trials were rushed through with no real defense allowed. No white man has ever been executed for rape in Virginia's history.

The seven are: Joseph Hampton, 20 years old; Frank Hairston, Jr., 19; Booker T. Millner, 20; Howard Lee Hairston, 19; Francis Grayson, 38; John C. Taylor, 22; and James L. Hairston, 21. Their original trials were rushed through in six days. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, defending the men, was unable to question the state's chief witness who disappeared immediately after the trials.

The Court of Appeals in Virginia in March, 1950, upheld the lower court's verdict. The U. S. Supreme Court in May, 1950, and again in January, 1951, refused to hear the case. A stay of execution was ordered by Judge Doubles of Richmond in July, 1950, but despite appeals from all parts of the country, Governor John Battle of Virginia refused a plea

for clemency. In October, 1950, the seven were re-sentenced to death by Judge Whittle, later sentenced to be executed November 17 and 20 and granted a 60-day reprieve so that defense could have time to protest legal errors in the case.

Final appeals were made to President Truman and all-night vigils were maintained outside the White House and Gov. Battle's office. But despite worldwide and nationwide protests, four of the Martinsville seven were executed on February 2, and the other three on February 5, 1951.

The mass campaign was led by the Civil Rights Congress which has declared February 2nd a memorial day for the Martinsville martyrs.

Willie McGee Case: At Laurel, Miss., a Negro worker, Willie McGee, was three times convicted by an all-white jury of allegedly raping a white woman in November, 1945. Sentenced to death, he was four times saved from the electric chair by nationwide protests organized by the Civil Rights Congress, which conducted the legal defense and produced new evidence in the case.

The first verdict was reversed by the state supreme court and a change of venue was granted because of local public feeling. The second verdict was reversed by the state supreme court on the ground that Negroes had been systematically excluded from Mississippi juries. Both of these reversals were won through efforts of the CRC. The third verdict was affirmed by the state supreme court. The U. S. Supreme Court then refused to review it.

McGee's execution was stayed temporarily on July 26, 1950, by order of Justice Harold H. Burton of the U. S. Supreme Court, just 11 hours before he was to be electrocuted. Attorneys for the defense, representatives of the Civil Rights Congress, and northern newspapermen covering the case were subjected to mob violence in Laurel on the day the stay of execution was granted. The date of execution was postponed by action of U. S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black on March 15, 1951. McGee was electrocuted on May 8, 1951.

Lt. Gilbert: In the armed forces during the intervention in Korea, Negro servicemen have been subjected to discrimination and persecution. Lt. Leon Gilbert, 31-year old Negro army officer of York, Pa., was condemned to death in August, 1950, by a court martial for allegedly refusing to obey an order on the fighting front. His platoon had been in action without relief for 13 days and he himself had gone without sleep for six days and was ill with dysentery. To have obeyed

the order would have taken his men into certain death. No Negro soldiers were allowed to testify in his behalf. Following widespread protests from many groups all over the country, his sentence was later commuted to 20 years at hard labor.

The National Association for Advancement of Colored People received so many appeals for help from imprisoned Negro soldiers in Japan that it sent Thurgood Marshall as special counsel to investigate the cases of those who were victims of racial discrimination.

Negro Rights: A bill for a "voluntary" Fair Employment Practice Committee (FEPC) was passed by the House in February, 1950, but sidetracked in the Senate. Since 1945, eight states (Conn., Mass., N. J., N. M., N. Y., Ore., R. I., and Wash.) have adopted enforceable FEPC laws. Two states (Ind. and Wis.) have laws which are non-enforceable.

Poll taxes, in effect disfranchising most Negroes in the South, were still required in six southern states (Ala., Ark., Miss., Tenn., Texas, and Va.) in early 1951. In February, 1951, South Carolina discarded the poll tax as a requirement for voting in general elections. Bills to outlaw the poll tax in federal elections have passed the House four times in recent years, only to die in the Senate.

LOYALTY OATHS FOR TEACHERS

The long struggle during 1949-50 over loyalty oaths for teachers in California called nationwide attention to the oaths required of teachers in many other states. Such oaths for publicly-paid teachers were widespread by the end of 1950.

Most of the refusals to sign these oaths centered in colleges and universities, the American Civil Liberties Union reported. Below the university or college level little opposition to the oaths was recorded. Most teachers were forced to sign when faced with the penalty of losing their jobs in the school system.

In California, the regents of the University of California after a year of controversy adopted a "declaration" in the spring of 1950. This is not an "oath" but an addition to the contract of employment, stating that the faculty member is not a member of the Communist Party, and must be re-signed each year. The regents announced definite refusal to rehire anyone declining to sign this declaration. For refusal to sign, 26 professors were ousted from the university and many younger teachers were not reappointed. In April, 1951, they were ordered reinstated when the Court of Appeals ruled the special declaration was invalid.

A California state loyalty oath became law on October 3, 1950, requiring all state, county and city public workers to declare in writing within 30 days that they had not been within the last five years, were not now and would not in the future become members of organizations which advocated overthrow of the government by violence "or other unlawful means." If convicted of perjury after signing, they could be imprisoned up to 14 years. If they refused to sign, they would lose their positions.

Opposition to Oath: By the end of the year, over 1,000 public workers, including some 650 employees of the University of California, had either failed or refused to sign the state oath. Most of those who did not sign have been dismissed. They plan to take their cases to the U. S. Supreme Court, if necessary.

The California Federation of Teachers (AFL) has gone on record against the state oath, because it "ignores the constitutional provision that no statutes shall change the salary, term of office or duties of public officers on the grounds of 'urgency'." The union also charged that the oath law "imposes on public workers a political test for employment, deprives them of equal protection under the law as guaranteed in the 14th amendment and exposes them through its ambiguity to self-incrimination and perjury." The American Federation of Teachers at its national convention in August, 1950, registered its continued opposition to such oaths.

After the dismissals at the University of California, the Academic Senate of the university passed a vote of censure against the regents. Many of the student body joined the campaign for reinstatement. Various learned societies have spoken up in defense of those who lost their posts through refusal to sign. The American Psychological Association, the American Anthropological Association, the American Chemical Society and others have blacklisted the University of California.

In Other States: At the beginning of 1951, loyalty oaths were required of teachers under the laws of at least 22 states, representing all sections of the country. Indiana was the first to enact such a law in 1933. In 14 other states this requirement had been enacted before the U. S. entered the Second World War.

These states with date of enactment are: Colorado, Georgia, Montana, Vermont in 1935; New Jersey in 1937; Arizona, South Dakota, Washington in 1939; Michigan, New York, Oregon in 1940; Florida, Oklahoma, Texas in 1941.

During the war South Carolina, North Dakota, and West Virginia followed suit; and after the war such an oath was introduced in Nevada (1947), in Massachusetts (1948), and in Kansas and Maryland (1949).

In New Jersey, George B. Thorp, a member of the Fellowship of Reconciliation who had been engaged as a teacher by the Newark College of Engineering, was dismissed, March 19, 1950, when he refused to sign such an oath. Two months earlier (January, 1950) in a test case initiated by James B. Imbrie, Progressive Party candidate for governor, four sections of the Tumulty-Mehorter Act, requiring loyalty oaths from state officers and candidates for public office, had been held unconstitutional by a five to two decision of the state supreme court. But in that case the question of loyalty oaths for teachers had not been included.

At the annual convention of the American Association of University Professors, in March, 1950, the 250 who were present voted unanimously in opposition to the discharge of college or university professors for membership "in any lawful political party or other organization." They also opposed "guilt by association," loyalty oaths, and such controls as the checking by the F.B.I. of teachers and students who may receive fellowships under the proposed National Science Foundation.

BLACKLISTING MARITIME WORKERS

An act sponsored by Sen. Warren G. Magnuson (D., Wash.) was passed by the 81st Congress and became law on August 9, 1950. It gave the President power to control all matters relating to the movement of vessels in U. S. waters, including all questions of "security." Not satisfied with voluntary controls under this act, the U. S. Coast Guard drew up a drastic order for the screening of maritime workers. Signed by President Truman December 27, 1950, this executive order subjects all maritime workers to a security clearance system.

Every person employed on ships or on docks is required to have a security card. The Coast Guard Commandant can deny those credentials if there are "reasonable grounds" to suppose that the worker has engaged in any "subversive" activities, as interpreted by the Coast Guard. These regulations bar all members or associates of members of groups listed in 1947 by Tom C. Clark, then Attorney General, as "subversive."

But the order goes further. It gives the Commandant power to deny a security clearance to any person whose "character and habits of life" might make his presence on U. S. vessels "inimical to the security of the United States"—as interpreted by the Coast Guard.

Under the broad powers thus given the Coast Guard, the Magnuson Act has been used by West Coast employers to revive the blacklist in the maritime industry and drive out the more militant workers. Five members of the Marine Cooks & Stewards Union and of the Seamen's Rights Committee on the Pacific Coast in December, 1950, were denied clearance by the Coast Guard. All had been active in the union, serving as ship's delegate or as committeeman. They were refused any explanation of the charges on which they were deprived of their livelihood. Under the Magnuson Act, the Coast Guard is not required to furnish any information on charges against the workers.

ATTACK ON INTERNATIONAL WORKERS ORDER

The International Workers Order, a fraternal insurance society with 162,000 members (chartered in 1930), was attacked during the latter part of 1950 by the New York state insurance department, headed by Superintendent Alfred J. Bohlinger. The IWO has policyholders in 19 states and the D. of C., organized in 1,600 fraternal lodges. The IWO accused Gov. Thomas E. Dewey's administration of ordering the attack so as to "confiscate the savings and insurance of IWO members and their families and turn them over to the insurance monopolies."

A state petition was entered to liquidate the IWO on the preposterous charge that its insurance operations are "hazardous" because it is a "subversive" organization. Members of the order formed the IWO Policyholders Protective Committee to handle the defense in a trial starting in January, 1951, in the N. Y. state supreme court. The defense pointed out that under the insurance law "hazardous" operations have been concerned only with hazardous financial transactions.

As a fraternal insurance society the IWO was awarded the highest rating—"A plus (Excellent)" by Dunne's Insurance Report in 1949. This standard report placed the order among the top five among 200 national fraternal societies. It said the IWO "is worthy of public confidence and we so recommend it."

As to the order's finances, the policyholders' committee points out that the society has \$110,950,000 worth of insurance in force. It has a surplus of \$1,865,000, far above the legal minimum. The ratio of its assets to its liabilities is 141%—more than 40% above legal requirements. Its assets of \$7 million are largely in government bonds.

The protective committee pointed out that if the IWO were liquidated, many policyholders would lose the protection which the society's

assets have given them. Members past the age of 60, insured for many years in the IWO, would find themselves uninsurable by other companies. Sick and disabled members would be unable to get insurance elsewhere.

Negro members would be forced to pay higher rates—as much as 200% higher—than white members for insurance from commercial companies. The IWO charges everyone the same rates and practices complete equality in insurance and fraternal life. It especially encourages Negro membership. The defense committee pointed out further that fathers and mothers whose sons died in World War II and were buried in family plots at IWO cemeteries would have to pay much higher rates to maintain the plots. Industrial workers insured by the IWO would find in many instances that other companies would refuse to sell them life, health and accident insurance because of the hazards of their jobs, for example in the mining and steel industries and in longshore work. It concluded:

“The commercial companies would be gratified by the disappearance of a non-profit insurance society whose non-discriminatory rates are a rebuke and a challenge to the inequities they practice against the Negro people and others.”

At the trial before Justice Henry Clay Greenberg, the state insurance department produced a number of professional informers who were paid by the state for testifying that officers of the IWO some years ago had been Communists.

Ban on Convention: On demand by Superintendent Bohlinger, Judge Greenberg banned the eighth regular convention of IWO members which had been scheduled for January 13-16, 1951, in New York City. The convention was called in accordance with the state-approved charter of the IWO and state insurance laws. The IWO executive committee charged that the ban was “an outrageous denial of the lawful rights of members to assemble and democratically express their will and desires with regard to the administration of their insurance organization and their insurance protection.”

FASCIST VIOLENCE NEAR PEEKSKILL

Paul Robeson, noted Negro baritone, was scheduled to sing at a concert near Peekskill, N. Y. on August 27, 1949. In previous years he had sung at several outdoor concerts in the same town. But at the first 1949 concert, Robeson was prevented from singing. “A fascist-like mob,

shouting anti-Semitic and anti-Negro obscenities and calling for the lynch murder of Mr. Robeson" attacked and drove away the audience. (Nation, Sept. 10, 1949) A fiery cross, symbol of the Ku Klux Klan, was burned nearby; cars were overturned; many men, women and children were stoned and injured in the night attack by the mobsters. Howard Fast, world-known author and chairman of the concert, was among those attacked.

For a second concert on Sunday afternoon, September 4, police protection had been promised. Families came with small children. Robeson sang. But as some 15,000 concert goers left the grounds in small groups, in cars and chartered buses directed up three different roads by the state police, they were attacked by organized veterans who had been parading, and by fascist-minded hoodlums. Over 200 men, women and children were injured, many seriously, by rocks thrown through car and bus windows. Cars were overturned and smashed, while state and local police looked the other way or in some cases joined in the attacks on the people, including a Negro veteran who was badly beaten by the police.

After careful investigation of the violence, the American Civil Liberties Union in December, 1949, issued a report, backed by the National Assn. for the Advancement of Colored People, American Veterans Committee, Council Against Intolerance, American Jewish Congress, and Americans for Democratic Action. It emphasized that violence would not have erupted except for the provocation of the Peekskill Evening Star, the "excited responses of organized veterans and the aroused mob spirit of youthful hoodlums."

This ACLU investigation revealed "that there was no Communist provocation at either concert; behind the rioting lay long-smouldering anti-Semitism . . . terrorism was general against all who advocated freedom of speech and assembly; the veterans fully intended to prevent the concerts from being held; . . . police preparations for the second concert appeared adequate but were a sham insofar as Westchester county police were concerned; . . . county police openly fraternized with the rioters; the violence was planned; terrorism spread over the whole area and included threats against private individuals, their safety, property and business."

Paul Robeson, Howard Fast, the Civil Rights Congress, and 25 victims of the Peekskill mob violence in December, 1949, filed federal suits asking a total of \$2,020,000 for personal injuries, property dam-

age and deprivation of civil rights. Named as defendants were George M. Fanelli, Westchester County District Attorney; Fred W. Ruscoe, Westchester County Sheriff; veterans organizations and state police officials.

Leon Straus, executive secretary of the Joint Board of Fur Dressers & Dyers and a war veteran, headed a group of young men, many of them war veterans, who circled the second Peekskill concert to protect Robeson and the audience from mob violence. A second lieutenant in the U. S. Army Infantry Reserve, Straus, because of his participation in the defense of Robeson, was summarily discharged in January, 1950. "under conditions other than honorable."

Thomas E. Dewey, Republican governor of New York, ordered District Attorney Fanelli to conduct a grand jury investigation of the Peekskill attacks. The Grand Jury on June 16, 1950, issued a report whitewashing county and state authorities and blaming Paul Robeson, his audience and "the Communists" for holding the concerts.

SUPREME COURT ON "SUBVERSIVE" LISTS

In a notable decision on April 30, 1951, the U. S. Supreme Court by a five to three vote ruled that the Department of Justice had been "arbitrary" and "unauthorized" in listing as "subversive" the International Workers Order, the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, and the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship.

Justice Hugo L. Black in his opinion wrote that the list "smacks of a most evil type of censorship." He pointed out that the Attorney General has no constitutional authority, with or without a hearing, to prepare and publish a subversive list, because this involves punishment of members of the organizations for their political beliefs. He called the list a bill of attainder, i.e. a law identifying intended victims by name.

Lists of so-called "subversive" organizations were first instituted in December, 1947, by former Attorney General Tom C. Clark. Now a Justice of the Supreme Court, Clark did not participate in the April 30 ruling.

V. TRADE UNIONS IN THE U.S.

LABOR UNION MEMBERSHIP

Union membership has declined during the last two years. However, the U. S. Department of Labor estimated that the total labor union membership in the United States in 1949 was somewhere between 14 and 16 million. (Directory of Labor Unions in the United States. Bulletin No. 980. 1950.)

This estimate is based on the claims of the unions and "other available sources." It includes such claims as that of the Congress of Industrial Organizations of approximately six million members.

A truer picture of the total may be obtained from the financial statement filed by the CIO with the Department of Labor under the Taft-Hartley Act. This indicated that average membership paying per capita dues during the year up to October, 1950, was only 3,400,000. This figure was reported by CIO after the expulsion of progressive unions.

To this number is added the 7.1 million members claimed by the American Federation of Labor, as of August 31, 1950; somewhere around 580,000 members in the Machinists Union (independent in 1950); 600,000 claimed by the United Mine Workers of America; about 450,000 in the non-affiliated railway "operating" brotherhoods; and over 500,000 in the unions expelled from the CIO (although Pres. Murray put the figure higher, at 900,000, at the time of the 1950 CIO convention). This gives a total of approximately 12.5 million. If we include the members in all the other independents, including some that are nearer to company unions than to bona fide trade unions, the total is somewhere under 14 million.

The Department of Labor bulletin reported, for 1949, a total of 209 national or "international" unions, 107 of them affiliated to the AFL, 33 at that time to the CIO, and 69 classified as "independents."

Of the 207 unions on which the Department of Labor reported membership figures, 35, or one out of six, claimed more than 100,000 members. The largest union was the Teamsters (AFL) with over 1,100,000 members, while the smallest was the Sidegraphers (AFL) with 55 dues-payers.

1949 AFL CONVENTION

The sixty-eighth convention of the AFL met at St. Paul, Minnesota, October 3-10, 1949. It reported a paid membership of 7,241,290 as of August 31, 1949, a slight increase over the 7,220,531 reported the year before.

Dominant themes of the convention were support to U. S. cold war policies and political action to elect a new Congress in 1950 that would repeal the Taft-Hartley Act. The foreign policy resolutions stressed increased labor participation in the cold war.

The spread of AFL activity in foreign fields was evident in the financial report where the total of identifiable items for such purposes came to \$115,836. The largest amount, \$37,580, went as per capita tax to the newly formed Inter-American Confederation of Labor. The Free Trade Union Committee, forerunner of the International Conference of Free Trade Unions, received \$32,400 for operations abroad, and \$25,000 was advanced to Force Ouvriere, the French anti-Communist labor federation.

The convention adopted a plan for a 1950 drive for a million new members to be carried on principally through city and state central labor bodies. Closer work with CIO was indicated in President Green's statement that cooperation of local AFL bodies with the CIO in political action would not be interfered with by the top AFL leaders although they did not approve it as a policy. Joint action with the CIO at the national level was ruled out by the executive council.

Constitutional Changes: Convention voted two changes in the AFL constitution. One raised strike benefits paid federal labor unions by AFL national headquarters from \$7 per member weekly to \$10. (Executive council reported that 169 such directly-affiliated AFL federal labor unions had been organized during the past year.) The second change shifted conventions in Presidential election years to the third Monday in September.

1950 AFL CONVENTION

The sixty-ninth convention of the American Federation of Labor met at Houston, Texas, September 18-23, 1950. Its paid membership as of August 31, 1951 was reported as 7,142,603.

Main purpose of the convention seemed to be the rallying of the representatives of this section of organized labor behind the Korean war and to further transform the AFL into a propaganda agency for

State Department policy especially in the Far East and Western Europe.

Said the Wall Street Journal (Sept. 23, 1950) in a sympathetic report from Houston, "Wages, hours and organizing activities are taking a back seat to national politics at this year's American Federation of Labor convention." However, the report of the executive council said that "about half of the workers in this country have yet to be organized," pointing out also that the majority of the unorganized are in the white collar and service fields. Others estimate that about two-thirds of this country's workers are still outside the unions. Those not yet organized include the great majority in the South, chemical workers and farm workers, etc.

A main speaker at the convention, Secretary of Labor Maurice J. Tobin, told the delegates he expected the AFL "to face the unpleasant task of restraining the upward general wage movement." He admitted, however, that "the wages of labor usually lag behind prices as they rise." He held that wage controls would have to be adopted if prices were controlled in the future.

The convention responded by toning down the wage-price policy resolutions which had already been submitted. The report adopted said that "some form of wage stabilization may well be inevitable." But there was the added note that "it would be contrary to sound economic policies as well as extremely unjust to freeze wages at this time."

Foreign Policy: Fully 60% of the convention's time was given to foreign affairs. The government speakers, as well as labor leaders from Latin America and Europe, visitors from Australia and New Zealand and spokesmen from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions all attacked communism and praised U. S. moves against the Soviet Union. There were no dissenting voices from the floor, but, on the other hand, no appreciable enthusiasm was expressed.

The emphasis on foreign policy was signalized also by the fact that the Voice of America, a U. S. government institution, recorded and broadcast the proceedings to the world. This function was under the charge of professional anti-Communists.

The war policy line of the convention was laid down by guest speaker, millionaire Wall Street banker W. Averell Harriman who, as Presidential assistant, developed the official government police-court theory of the workings of world communism. And as a means of combatting communism Harriman told the delegates "there is no group

of Americans who can do more than the organized labor movement in getting the American message abroad."

This message, as outlined by the convention itself, included such points as urging the American delegation in the UN to veto the admission into the UN of the Republic of China; reaffirming "our support of the Marshall Plan"; and supporting Truman's Point Four program for stopping communism by the granting of foreign loans.

The convention also applauded the policy reflected in President Green's opening speech when he said that it "should call upon our government now to stop buying anything from and selling anything to Russia."

Negro Discrimination: The convention noted with regret (but even representing seven million members was unable to do anything about) the discriminating practices used against the Negro delegates in Houston hotels. The leading Negro delegate, A. Philip Randolph of the Sleeping Car Porters, complained against the character of the "entertainment" provided by the local committee for colored delegates to the convention. He said they "would rather not have any entertainment at all than to have any Jim Crow entertainment." The colored delegates, he said, had been "made the victims of humiliation and insult and embarrassment." The convention passed the usual civil rights resolution and supported legislation to compel fairness in employment practices.

Political Action: At a meeting of the National Committee of Labor's League for Political Education, held at the close of the convention, George Meany, secretary-treasurer, reported that this year (up to September 22) the League had collected \$402,000 in voluntary individual contributions to the political fund and \$209,000 for the educational fund. Joseph D. Keenan, director of the League, according to American Federationist, October, 1950, "described in some detail the viciousness of the underhanded campaigns of the reactionary, plutocratic combine in various states against honest, progressive legislators who faithfully protect the rights of the American people. He pointed out that organized wealth knows no party lines when a liberal is running."

Other Actions: Some of the other actions of the convention, reflected in the 128 resolutions passed, were as follows, according to the American Federationist review of the convention: called on labor "to continue and intensify labor's three-year drive" for repeal of "the hated Taft-Hartley Act"; asked for "full labor representation in new emergency agencies

and on all policy-making government boards"; asked a lowering of the tax burden on smaller incomes and urged an excess profits tax; proposed an increase in minimum wage under Wage and Hour Act to \$1 an hour; reaffirmed support of a low-rent housing program, national health insurance, and public health legislation.

President Green, Secretary Meany and all 13 vice-presidents were re-elected.

1949 CIO CONVENTION

The eleventh convention of the CIO, held in Cleveland, Ohio, October 31-November 4, 1949, was marked by the bitterest factionalism in the history of the organization. There were 615 delegates from 39 national unions (with 309 delegates), 38 state councils, 159 city and county councils and 99 directly-affiliated local industrial unions.

Pres. Philip Murray reported that the CIO had won 2,102 out of 2,153 union-shop authorization elections between July 1, 1948, and August 31, 1949; that it had won 1,017 of 1,850 National Labor Relations Board representation elections. He said that the combination of the Taft-Hartley law and the more ruthless resistance of the employers had slowed down the drive to organize the South and gave no figures on membership gains in this area.

Moves to Expel Minority: Despite pleas for unity by the minority left-wing group the convention adopted constitutional amendments permitting the executive board by a two-thirds vote to expel international unions. These amendments, in effect, restricted a union from choosing for its representative on the national executive board of the CIO any except those who were in complete agreement with the position of the CIO majority on the Marshall Plan, North Atlantic Pact and other cold war issues. They stripped unions of autonomous rights and required as a basis for continued membership in CIO full conformity with the dictates of its top leadership.

First union to be expelled, by the Convention itself, was the United Electrical Workers with 450,000 members (see p. 104) followed by the Farm Equipment Workers, which had previously united with the UE. The convention gave the executive board power "to take appropriate action" against the other unions which failed to conform to CIO policy.

Foreign Policy: Resolution on foreign policy showed the CIO's stand for a pro-war program, calling for continued support of the Marshall

Plan, North Atlantic Pact, expansion of world trade, and the Truman Point Four Program.

Speaking for the minority, Pres. Harry Bridges of the Longshoremen criticized the resolution for failing to incorporate "any new policies adopted to fit new situations developing throughout the world." He said that "people are on the march throughout Asia, the East Indies and elsewhere," after years of oppression not from communism but "from colonial slavery." He said the key to a correct foreign policy is "what position do we take" toward these people, and deplored the boycott on trade with China, the East Indies and elsewhere because of the "crusade to stop communism." He urged the convention to take a stand in favor of opening these avenues of commerce.

Legislative Program: Convention went on record for repeal of Taft-Hartley Act, enactment of an improved social security program, a tax program based more equitably on "ability to pay," extension of rent controls, an adequate housing program, a national health insurance law, and improvement of the Fair Labor Standards Act by raising the minimum wage to "at least \$1 an hour" and by extending coverage to more workers.

Pres. James Durkin of the Office Workers, speaking for the minority, criticized the CIO top leadership for laxity in the fight against Taft-Hartley. The job of the convention, he said, was not to put "reliance on the politicians" but to help develop a "mighty mobilization of workers" on behalf of Taft-Hartley repeal.

Civil Rights: As in previous conventions the CIO supported the recommendations of the President's Committee on Civil Rights, backed passage of FEPC laws, enactment of a federal anti-lynching law, and an anti-poll tax law, abolition of segregation in the armed forces, and urged laws to ban segregation in interstate travel.

A minority delegate, President Thomas Richardson, vice-president of the United Public Workers, said the resolution dealt inadequately with the problem of unemployment, and cited evidence of Jim Crow practices in the federal government's Bureau of Engraving. He asked for an amendment to the resolution which would call upon President Truman to "wipe out discrimination" in government agencies.

Position of the Communist Party: Since "communism," as Pres. Murray had pointed out, was the sole issue in the decision to expel the progressive-led unions, the position of the Communist Party on the question is pertinent.

In an open letter to Murray, published before the opening of the convention, John Williamson, National Trade Union Secretary of the Communist Party of the United States, declared:

"We stand as uncompromising today as ever for the unity of the labor movement. We are particularly firm in our stand for a united CIO, for a united wage fight, for a united fight to repeal Taft-Hartley. We are against splits, against secessions and against expulsions. We believe that there is room in a trade union for differences especially on political issues. And these issues can and should be openly debated. . . . A trade union is not a political party where people voluntarily obligate themselves to the common political line of that party. Trade unions are elementary economic organizations, uniting workers of different political beliefs. They can grow and prosper if they adopt a fighting policy in the interests of their members and never forget that their enemies are the employers, especially the big trusts, and all the political instruments of the trusts."

1950 CIO CONVENTION

Twelfth annual convention of the CIO, held in Chicago, November 20-25, 1950, was attended by 557 delegates, 258 of them from the 32 national unions. The Auto Workers had the largest representation. Remainder were from 175 industrial union councils and 127 local industrial unions. Although the CIO Negro membership is estimated at around 400,000, only seven delegates were Negroes. There were only 19 women delegates.

Harmony prevailed at the convention and the N. Y. Herald Tribune reported (Nov. 26, 1950) that it was "almost as listless" as an AFL convention. "Issues were decided in committee and floor fights avoided. Most speakers, even Mr. Murray, got poor attention from bored delegates."

All the resolutions were carried unanimously except one on a minor issue in which right-wing Utility Workers' delegates, expressing the views of monopoly power interests, opposed the nationalization-of-industry features of the statement on TVA.

Pres. Murray took an entirely different position toward the Utility Workers than he had toward those who had been expelled for refusing to go along with Marshall Plan and U. S. State Department foreign policies. He said the Utility Workers "can appear before any congressional committee and say anything they want. That's their business."

Nobody is bound or gagged in these matters. . . . If we did not enjoy the freedom and the right to speak out about these issues I don't believe we would have an organization." No such freedom was permitted, however, when political differences over "the issue of Communism," as Pres. Murray calls it, were involved.

A few charges of raiding were made against the steel and auto workers as jurisdictional disputes were carried on behind the scenes.

The usual list of government officials addressed the convention and the resolutions were similar to those passed at the 1949 convention. Legislation called for by various resolutions included enactment of an effective excess profits tax; extension and strengthening of nation-wide rent control; improvement of the wage-hour act to increase the minimum wage to at least \$1 an hour; federal aid for housing; FEPC and other civil rights legislation; federal aid to education; national health insurance and the undertaking of "integrated regional development of rivers and natural resources." But such resolutions were nearly meaningless in the face of the CIO's endorsement of the government's armament drive absorbing billions which could go for welfare measures.

A withering blast at the colonial system of U. S., British and Dutch imperialism was made by one guest speaker, Dr. Mordecai W. Johnson, President of Howard University. He said "we are probably the most ruthless dominators and exploiters and humiliators of human rights that ever spanned the pages of history." He declared that "At this very moment there are over 250 million human beings who are living" under the domination of the "western bloc" in Africa, Indo-China and Malaya. "And there is not a single, solitary sign that Britain, France and the Dutch have any intention and a willingness to give up that system, except at those points where they are vigorously confronted with communism, and they would give it up as a matter of tactics only." And instead of challenging this colonial system we in the United States "are busy at this very moment, undertaking to confirm and strengthen it."

The convention approved U.S. intervention in Korea and the main bi-partisan cold war policies, but opposed the loan already voted by Congress to Franco Spain and any aid to Peron's Argentina. It repeated its demand for labor leader representation in U.S. foreign policy councils.

Mobilization Proposals: The convention called on the Truman administration to place the nation on a scale of full mobilization for war, and at the same time charged that "piecemeal" planning would cause mass layoffs in a number of basic industries.

The resolution complained that "to date, there appears to be little evidence of a sense of urgency" in mobilizing the economy "to meet military requirements." It proposed "centralized direction" of the mobilization and asked for full labor participation in economic planning.

A wire from Pres. Murray to Secretary of Commerce Sawyer, approved by the convention, said that the curtailment of civilian use of aluminum "already has caused sharp reduction in manufacturers' schedules for future production of essential civilian goods and thousands of workers will be laid off for whom no defense employment is yet in prospect."

McCarran Act: The McCarran subversive activities control act was called "ill-considered and unwise" and the convention voted for its repeal, "with the exception of those provisions tightening the existing sabotage and espionage laws which were requested by the Department of Justice." Referring to the sections of the bill relating to registration of Communists, the resolution stated that the tests laid down "tread dangerously upon freedom of speech and belief since they depend upon political tenets rather than actual conduct." The resolution also attacked the Truman "loyalty" control program.

It said also that, "The irresponsible headline-seeking activities of Senator McCarthy during the past year, and the similar conduct of the House Un-American Activities Committee during prior years have, unfortunately, created an atmosphere of alarm and insecurity which . . . seriously endangers every individual's democratic rights."

Taft-Hartley Repeal: Although Pres. Murray called the Taft-Hartley Act a "diabolical piece of legislation" and the convention again went on record for its repeal, press reports from Chicago stated that CIO leaders were saying privately that they had "accepted the facts of life" and were prepared to compromise with the incoming 82nd Congress and accept the law with certain changes, in other words, to do little or nothing about it.

Reject MCS Appeal: The convention upheld the executive board's expulsion of the Marine Cooks & Stewards in August, 1950. In its appeal to the convention, the MCS pointed out that differences with the national CIO "on certain issues of domestic and foreign policy have been the sole grounds used by the committee to make its fantastic findings." It also cited the fact that a delegation of Auto Workers headed by vice-president John W. Livingston to study Marshall Plan operations in Europe had supported the position of the MCS on this subject.

In addition to upholding the expulsion of MCS the convention upheld the CIO executive board's expulsion of the other nine affiliates on the charge that they were "Communist-dominated."

EXPULSIONS FROM CIO

In the course of its 1949-1950 campaign to make all unions conform to its domestic and foreign political policies, the CIO executive board expelled eleven unions. At its convention in 1949 it had expelled the United Electrical & Machine Workers and the Farm Equipment Workers. In February, 1950 the CIO executive board took the same action against the Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers, the United Office & Professional Workers, the Food, Tobacco & Agricultural Workers, and the United Public Workers.

In June it expelled the American Communications Assn. and the Fur & Leather Workers. In August it continued its expulsion program by voting out the Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union—including the Fishermen & Allied Workers, which had affiliated with the Longshoremen several months before—and the Marine Cooks & Stewards.

Office Workers: When this union was expelled by the CIO executive board, February 15, 1950, the reason given was that it refused to comply with the national CIO's endorsement of American foreign policy, including the Marshall Plan. It was accused also of following a course of action "paralleling the Communist Party line."

At hearings before the Board, CIO President Murray told the UOPWA leaders: "We have a right to kick you out if you don't conform." The leaders, in turn, regarded the expulsion as proof that the real purpose behind the proceedings was "to destroy the right of affiliated unions to make their own decisions." The ouster was termed "a splitting move harmful to labor," which would cause "employers and reactionaries" to rejoice.

Three months later, in May, 1950, at the UOPWA convention, the delegates, representing some 30,000 members and some 220 local unions, unanimously approved the position taken by their officers.

Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers: Another union voted out of the CIO at the February 15, 1950 executive board meeting was the Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers with a membership of over 91,000. Here too, the charge was one of "violating CIO policy" and "paralleling the Communist Party line."

In its brief to the trial committee, Mine-Mill labeled the CIO Board's accusation of "communism" a "smoke screen" designed to cover up the "surrender to forces outside the trade union movement."

Most of the trial hearings consisted of smear charges against Mine-Mill leaders reminiscent of the "kangaroo court" proceedings conducted against the entire CIO by the House un-American Committee in earlier years. The arguments and reasoning used to indict Mine-Mill leaders at the hearings were similar to those usually presented by reactionary employers in attacking trade unions.

United Public Workers: Some 200 rank and file members of this union were denied admission to the hearings preceding its expulsion. Police were posted around the CIO headquarters and FBI men operated movie cameras in attempts to intimidate protesting members.

Enemies of the union offered articles from the union's newspaper in an effort to show similarity with the "Communist Party line" on specific issues. UPW spokesmen replied that in its "opposition to the loyalty purge in federal government it followed CIO policy," but that "the CIO was apparently using the purge to tear down the UPW and replace it with" another union.

At its national convention in May, 1950, the UPW, with more than 300 delegates present, condemned the expulsion trial as "a fake and a frameup," voted complete confidence in its officers, and approved a report which accused CIO leaders of "surrendering the independence of the labor movement to the Democratic Party."

Food, Tobacco & Agricultural Workers: This union had been denied the right to bring witnesses to testify on its behalf at the hearings preceding its expulsion. However, after a court order was obtained it was permitted to present the testimony of rank-and-file witnesses.

As in the case of the other unions, the issue was "conformity." The record of the union in raising the wages and living standards of workers in its industries was not challenged. In fact, the CIO trial committee chairman told FTA officers at the hearings: "The CIO charges are not that you have failed to do a job for the workers, but that you have failed to carry out CIO policies."

One of the rank-and-file witnesses, Robert C. Black, co-chairman of FTA local 22 in the R. J. Reynolds tobacco plant at Winston-Salem, N. C., told how officials of CIO's Southern Organizing Committee had tried to bribe him—with \$390 a month and a new car—to lead the 10,000 Reynolds workers out of FTA and into a raiding CIO union.

Fur Workers: Expulsion of the Fur and Leather Workers on June 15, 1950, was a mere formality since this militant union three weeks before, at its 18th biennial convention, had voted to disaffiliate from the CIO. In his telegram to Pres. Murray of the CIO, reporting the decision to withdraw, Ben Gold, Fur Workers' president, said: "Our union stands for a united labor movement of AFL, CIO, miners' union, railroad brotherhoods and all independent unions on a policy of trade union democracy and the original policies of CIO against war and fascism, and for security, democracy and peace."

At the Fur Workers convention all but four of some 450 delegates voted for withdrawal from CIO on the ground that its national leaders were themselves guilty of "betrayal" of CIO policy. Convention delegates attacked CIO leaders for union-splitting. The bitterest condemnation of these leaders was reserved for their "shocking and disgraceful" tactics at Gloversville, N. Y., early in 1950, which helped to break a nine-month strike of leather workers.

American Communications Assn.: Also expelled on June 15 was the American Communications Association. This union in previous years had come in for a large share of praise from Pres. Murray, who had called it "an effective, responsible organization, devoted wholeheartedly to the interests of the people whom it is privileged to represent." He had hailed its leadership as "sound, intelligent, constructive," as well as "energetic."

In its statement to the trial committee, ACA pointed out that its program and leadership were the same as when praised by Murray. On the contrary, the union argued, it was the CIO, itself, that had begun to abandon "its fundamental policies and objectives of improving the wages, hours and working conditions of American workers."

An ironic feature of the ACA's expulsion trial was the fact that its prosecutor, as in the other trials, was William Steinberg, who in 1948 was responsible for leading a secession movement from this union.

Despite its ouster, ACA declared that it "will continue to fight for unity within the labor movement, in the interest of the rank and file of the labor movement and against the enemies of labor."

ILWU: At its trial in May, 1950, the leaders of the Longshoremen & Warehousemen had referred back to the period before its entrance into the CIO in 1937 when it had enjoyed complete autonomy in its activities. It pointed out that before joining the CIO it had received assurances that this autonomy would continue; the contract it had entered

into with the CIO specifically guaranteed that "all decisions of national importance" would be decided by referendum among longshoremen.

In presenting its case, the union pointed to the similarity between the CIO's position and that of the AFL in 1937 when the latter was carrying out red-baiting purges against militant unions. These earlier purges had been described at that time by CIO organizer John Brophy as "a confession of bankruptcy and defeat intellectually."

ILWU condemned the CIO leaders for their weak effort on behalf of Taft-Hartley repeal, and blamed this on "subservience to Truman and the Democratic machine which sees in Taft-Hartley too good an issue to lose by the law's repeal."

When the union's expulsion was announced on August 29 the ILWU officers, headed by Pres. Harry Bridges, issued a statement calling the national CIO a "political dictatorship" which denied rank and file workers any voice in "their political and economic destinies." It also termed CIO officialdom "a union-busting and strike-breaking agency" operating "under the usual smokescreen of fighting communism."

Marine Cooks and Stewards: This union was also expelled on August 29, 1950. Its president, Hugh Bryson, charged: "The CIO excluded MCS from affiliation because it cannot allow any opposition to its program of rubber-stamping everything the Truman Administration says and does."

Declaring that his union would continue to fight for the return to CIO's founding principles, "in or outside CIO," Bryson emphasized that "MCS members run their union and will continue to do so. Nobody controls MCS, its program or its policy, except MCS members, and no outside interference has ever been or ever will be tolerated."

UE AND THE CIO

The largest and most important progressive union expelled from the CIO was the United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America (UE), the third largest union in the CIO.

Opening round in the gang-up against UE took place in March, 1948, when the Auto Workers launched a series of raids. Proceeding under the guise of fighting "communism" and using the Taft-Hartley Act, Pres. Walter P. Reuther and his associates tried to break up established local unions of UE. Other CIO unions including the Steelworkers, headed by Philip Murray, did the same thing.

Between March, 1948, and January, 1949, the UE tried at least six

times to convince Murray of the dangers to the whole labor movement of such disruption. However, with the tacit and not infrequently open consent and encouragement of high-ranking CIO officials, no fewer than 456 raids were undertaken by CIO unions against the UE. Despite the obstacles involved, the cooperation of employers, government officials, professional red-baiters and the Taft-Hartley Board, the UE succeeded in defeating no less than 418 of these raids.

Top CIO leaders also tried to destroy UE from within. They supported and financed a disruptionist clique in the union calling itself the UN Committee for Democratic Action, headed by James B. Carey, who had been defeated for the UE presidency in 1941. As secretary-treasurer of the CIO, Carey was given a free hand by top CIO officials to devote his time to his nation-wide anti-UE activities. He also worked with such congressional red-baiters as Rep. Charles J. Kersten (R., Wis.), chairman of a subcommittee of the House committee on labor and education. (See Labor Fact Book 9, p. 89.)

Carey's activities in this direction, as well as those of the faction he headed, were repeatedly condemned by UE conventions. The Carey faction was aided in its disruptive tactics by an outside organization, the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, which interfered time and again in UE local, district and national elections. After being soundly defeated at the UE convention in September, 1949, the Carey-ACTU faction called publicly for wholesale secession from the union.

In the presidential campaign of 1948 the Murray-Reuther leadership came out for the election of President Truman and ordered each affiliated union to conform to so-called CIO policy. The UE held that the position on the election was a matter for the membership of the union to decide. Similarly, top CIO officials in 1948 and 1949 tried to line up all CIO unions behind the Marshall Plan, which the UE opposed.

The UE was critical also of the government's domestic policy. Throughout 1949 it pointed to the failure of the Truman administration to live up to the promises it had made to labor and the people and the dangers involved in making the CIO an appendage of the Democratic Party.

In September, 1949, the UE convention called on the CIO to discontinue its dictatorial policies and raiding practices. It also authorized the withholding of per capita payments if the CIO refused to do this.

The UE officers in a letter dated October 7, 1949, informed Murray of this convention action and stated also: "We of the UE consider that the

first and by far the most important business of a union, or of any federation of unions, is to fight and improve the wages and conditions of the membership. We of the UE consider that the right to disagree on political issues is an American right worth fighting for."

On the eve of the CIO convention Murray met with UE leaders, who proposed a no-raiding agreement. But Murray refused even to discuss raiding.

The UE executive board issued a statement November 1, 1949, authorizing the withholding of per capita payments from the CIO "until such time as the CIO returns to the principles of free, democratic, industrial unionism." The following day, the CIO convention expelled the UE for being supposedly "communist-dominated" and immediately issued a charter to James B. Carey for a dual electrical union, the International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers.

Anti-labor newspapers and industrialists joined the CIO top leaders in an unprecedented campaign of red-baiting. But except for a few locals controlled by the Carey-ACTU faction, UE members refused to be stampeded. As a result, the IUE-CIO resorted to Taft-Hartley Board elections. On the basis of such elections, however, the UE continued to be the bargaining agent of 44,000 General Electric and 22,000 Westinghouse workers. In two of the big plants of these companies—the GE Lynn and Westinghouse East Pittsburgh works—the IUE won narrow victories as the result of Taft-Hartley Board gerrymandering of voting units and plants.

In East Pittsburgh, local and state political leaders appealed at plant gates to Westinghouse workers to vote against UE. In Lynn, Maurice J. Tobin, Secretary of Labor, was brought in to influence GE workers against the UE. During the Sylvania Corp. elections the House un-American committee attempted to incite anti-UE hysteria. And President Truman publicly expressed his support for the IUE.

The ACTU brought religious issues into the campaign and a number of priests sought by red-baiting and intimidation to high pressure Catholic workers to vote against the UE. The employers' press and radio served in the drive to get votes for the IUE.

For its raiding activities the IUE received an admitted \$805,540 from the CIO, as well as the free use of CIO lawyers and facilities. It is estimated that more than \$1 million went into the CIO campaign to disorganize the organized workers in the electrical industry.

The attempts to destroy UE failed; the great majority of UE mem-

bers held fast. By the middle of July, 1950, after the major elections had been held, even the National Foreman's Institute was forced to admit that the UE "showed up with more strength than expected in early wishful thinking days of January 1, 1950."

FE JOINS UE

United Farm Equipment & Metal Workers, which had been ordered by CIO to dissolve and join the United Automobile Workers, instead voted in November, 1949, to merge with the United Electrical Workers. Over 84% of the 50,000 FE members voted in favor of the merger.

As a result of its vote to merge with the Electrical Workers, FE was expelled from the CIO at the 1949 convention of the CIO. Because of its refusal to join the Automobile Workers the leadership of that organization conducted repeated raids against FE, "spending hundreds of thousands of dollars in each attempt to raid a plant. In every major raid attempted, UAW-CIO was decisively rejected by the workers. In face of terror, bribery, intimidation of all kinds, workers at International Harvester plants at Louisville, Tractor Works and Pullman Works, as well as Ingersoll Steel Division of Borg Warner, among others, again let the UAW-CIO know they did not want a UAW-type of union." (Report of General Officers of United Electrical Workers, 1950, p. 28)

UNION RAIDING

The expulsion and red-baiting policies of the national CIO and the general dissension in the trade union movement have continued to stimulate the practice of "raiding," or invasion of another union's jurisdiction. The application of the Taft-Hartley Act (See Labor Fact Book 9, p. 137) has accentuated this trend toward trade union "cannibalism," or the attempt by one union to grab the members of another in specific plants or areas or in the country as a whole.

Resolutions against union raiding were rejected by the CIO convention of 1949. Among the unions that have been raided the most have been such progressive bodies as the Electrical Workers (see above), the Office Workers, the Food & Tobacco Workers, the United Public Workers and the Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers.

President Abram Flaxer of the United Public Workers declared in March, 1950: "We have been fighting CIO raiders for nearly two years. Our members threw out a CIO raiding mission assigned to wreck the Panama local nearly six months ago. Similar attempts at disruption will

be repulsed by Local 713, the only union that has brought a measure of dignity and self-respect to the more than 17,000 Negro employees of the government in the Panama Canal Zone."

The Food & Tobacco Workers reported in September, 1949, five months before its expulsion from the CIO, that during that year alone it had been raided in at least 20 locals throughout the country and that six different CIO international unions had conducted nearly all of these raids—Packinghouse Workers, Brewery Workers, Wood Workers, Oil Workers, Auto Workers and Transport Service Employees, none of whom had any jurisdiction over industries covered by FTA.

The Mine-Mill union reported to its convention in December, 1950, that out of more than 100 of its locals that had been raided by other CIO unions in all parts of the country during the previous winter and spring, only a few small ones were lost. These were mainly locals that had not been long in the organization.

Maurice E. Travis, Mine-Mill national secretary, had to have his right eye removed following an attack by goons while defending his union against a raiding operation by the United Steelworkers at Bessemer, Ala., in April, 1949.

Two members of Local 82 of Mine-Mill were shot and seriously wounded by a local official of the Gas, Coke & Chemical Workers at Fairmont, Ill. in June, 1949. He was helping a unit of the Shipbuilding Workers break a strike of Mine-Mill at the American Zinc Co. plant in that city.

The Office Workers reported at its convention in May, 1950, that it had been subjected to at least 76 raids in two years, "at the direction of the national CIO or by rival AFL organizations."

Raiding is of course not confined to CIO unions. For example, the Teamsters union of the AFL has frequently resorted to this practice. A list of 18 raids by this union on the Longshoremen (formerly CIO) was issued in February, 1950 by the latter organization. It included raids in San Francisco, Oakland, Los Angeles, Redwood City, Petaluma and San Jose, Calif., in Freeport, Ill. and in Hawaii.

Dave Beck, executive vice-president of the Teamsters and head of that organization on the West Coast, had announced at the Bellingham Convention of the Western Conference of Teamsters on July 2, 1948, that the Teamsters were planning to obtain jurisdiction over warehousemen in "every nook and corner of the west." This involved especially raids and strikebreaking assaults on the Longshoremen. It

was charged by the Longshoremen that in almost every Teamster raid on another union there was some evidence of collusion with employers.

Labor has paid a heavy price for raiding both by CIO and AFL unions. In some cases it has cleared the way for company unions and anti-union open shop elements.

A great deal of money has been wasted in these efforts to raid other unions and to disorganize the organized. The Mine-Mill organization estimated that in the first part of 1950, Steelworkers officials were spending about \$250,000 a month for this purpose.

UAW-Machinists Agreement: While continuing to raid other unions, including some formerly affiliated to the CIO, Auto Workers (CIO) made an agreement with the Machinists (unaffiliated) which banned raiding by both parties.

The agreement declared that where one union has established contractual relations with an employer or has been certified as bargaining agent, the other union will not encourage or accept members from the employer's plant.

Neither union had made a similar agreement with any other organization. U. S. Secretary of Labor, Maurice J. Tobin, in announcing the agreement, January 31, 1950, said that it could "be a major contribution toward industrial peace through the removal of unnecessary jurisdictional disputes. Certainly, it is evidence that organized labor can work out its own internal problems voluntarily and without governmental intervention."

Mr. Tobin made no reference to the red-baiting aspects of raiding where one union combines with an employer to wreck another union which is alleged to be "subversive" or to follow a "line" similar to that of the Communist Party. Tobin had himself aided in such raiding against the United Electrical Workers. He had also given encouragement to the Association of Catholic Trade Unions which represents the interests of the Vatican State in dividing the American labor movement.

NEW INDEPENDENT UNION

Three militant unions, formerly affiliated with the CIO, merged at a convention on October 7, 1950, to form a new independent national organization, 80,000 strong, called the Distributive, Processing & Office Workers of America. Some 150 local unions in about 50 cities in half the states of the country were represented by the 275 delegates who attended the founding convention in New York City.

The unions combining were the United Office & Professional Workers, the Food, Tobacco & Agricultural Workers, and the Distributive Workers Union. The last mentioned had been formed in February, 1950, by a number of New York locals in the retail and wholesale field. These included Local 65 (wholesale and warehouse workers), the United Department Store Workers, and a retail drug clerks local which had seceded from the CIO in 1948.

About half of the members of the new national union are in District 65 comprising New York City and vicinity, the 40,000 members in this body thus constituting the largest labor union in New York. It would also be second in size to the world's largest local union, Ford Local No. 600 of the Auto Workers (CIO).

Arthur Osman was elected president of the new national union and emphasized, as did the officers' report, the main theme of the convention—the democratic character of the union. "Our union," he said, "will be actually and genuinely of and by the rank and file . . . an organization whose officers execute the decisions of the rank and file, rather than the other way around, as is the case in most unions." This policy would apply to strikes and settlements, political and policy questions, financial and organizational programs.

Negro and white unity was also stressed in the new union as it had been in the actual work of the constituent organizations. Osman said: "There is no room for racial or religious prejudices among us. Negroes, Jews, Puerto Ricans, Italians—all sorts of minority groups enjoy equal rights and opportunity.

Donald Henderson was elected administrative director of the new union and James H. Durkin secretary-treasurer.

TRADE UNION UNITY

Unity Conference: Over 800 delegates attended a "working alliance" conference of delegates from left-wing labor unions in 18 states in Washington, D.C., November 28, 1950. It was called to organize a movement to protect wages, working conditions and civil rights.

It was the first nation-wide co-ordinated action of eight independent progressive unions formerly affiliated to CIO. Its call, which emphasized "Repeal Taft-Hartley and McCarran Acts," declared that the disunity in the labor movement "has been brought about by those misleaders of labor who advocate capitulation before the trusts, and who hope to buy personal immunity from attack at the expense of the rank and file."

In a keynote speech, Harry Bridges, President of the Longshoremen, said that leaders of neither CIO nor AFL were putting up any real fight against the conspiracy of big business to load the burdens of economic mobilization for war onto the low-income groups.

The conference passed a resolution calling for wage increases for all workers and no wage freeze; rollback of prices and effective price and rent controls; enactment of a "severe" excess profits tax; defeat of the sales tax, and reduction of taxes on low-income families; repeal of Taft-Hartley and the McCarran Act; immediate enactment of a Fair Employment Practices measure; repeal of the Magnuson Act which provides for a "loyalty screening" of all seamen, longshoremen and harbor workers; defense of the framed-up victims of government and employer anti-labor drives.

Delegates were instructed to establish labor unity committees in each city to achieve these ends. Bridges explained that the conference was not held in order to form a third labor federation or to set up "any formal or even informal apparatus. . . . We must continue to work," he said, "for labor unity at the bottom, and there are many ways to go about it."

RAILROAD LABOR DEVELOPMENTS

The main "operating" railroad brotherhoods are still largely craft unions and still unaffiliated. The "Big Four" with their latest membership figures, as reported in 1950, are as follows: Locomotive Engineers, 79,667; Locomotive Firemen, 102,932; Railroad Trainmen, 210,624; Railway Conductors, 37,562. In these four the number thus totals 430,785.

Also unaffiliated are the Train Dispatchers, 4,165; and the larger Machinists union (independent in 1950) some of whose 580,000 members are rail workers. The Machinists rejoined the AFL in January, 1951.

The following are AFL unions: Railway Carmen, 145,530 members; Railway Clerks, 350,000; Signalmen, 12,942; Switchmen, 8,900; Telegraphers, 57,523; Yardmasters, 3,600; Sleeping Car Porters, 10,597, mostly Negro porters.

The Railway Labor Executives' Association, organized in 1926, is an "unincorporated and voluntary association of the chief executive officers" of 21 railway unions. It represents most of the rail organizations except Engineers, Trainmen, and the segregated Negro railway unions. Of the 21 in the RLEA, 16 are in the AFL including five that represent

the shopcraft workers. Transport Service Employees (CIO), organizing station porters, is not included in the RLEA. In all, the total number of organized rail workers is now estimated as 1,200,000. United Railroad Workers now merged with the Marine & Shipbuilding Workers (CIO) has renewed its efforts to organize in some railroad centers.

Negro Railway Unions: Most of the railroad brotherhoods discriminate against Negro workers, either by "lily-white" clauses in their constitutions, by establishing Jim Crow locals, or by signing agreements that prevent the promotion of colored railwaymen. For this reason, Negro rail workers have been forced to establish separate, unaffiliated unions to represent the non-white employees and protect their rights. A partial list of these unaffiliated unions follows:

Association of Colored Railway Trainmen & Locomotive Firemen (Roanoke, Va.); Colored Trainmen of America (Kingsville, Tex.); Association of Train Porters, Brakemen & Switchmen (Richmond, Va.); Association of Brakemen Porters (St. Louis); International Association of Railway Employees (Memphis, Tenn.); Southern Association of Colored Trainmen (Savannah, Ga.). These Negro unions together with the Dining Car & R. R. Foodworkers Union organized in 1948 the Negro Railway Labor Executives Committee which publishes a paper called the Negro Railway Labor News.

Discrimination on Railroads: Representatives of these Negro unions and of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People testified against race discrimination by rail unions at hearings in May-June, 1950, on a bill to permit the union shop on railroads. They named five unions which discriminate against Negro rail workers: Locomotive Firemen, Trainmen, Engineers, Conductors and Switchmen. Witnesses requested a provision in the Railway Labor Act to bar any union which engages in race discrimination in membership or hiring from becoming collective bargaining agent for any group of rail workers.

Court Decisions: The U. S. Supreme Court on November 7, 1949, ruled Negro firemen could bring their case to the Federal District Court in Washington, D. C. The case is a complaint against the Locomotive Firemen and three southern roads, Southern Ry., Seaboard Air Line, and Atlantic Coast Line. By this decision, Negro firemen won the right to seek a District Court injunction against the union and the roads.

In the ruling Justice Robert H. Jackson sharply criticized the agreements with southern rail companies by which the Negro firemen are "not promotable." He said the case showed a "continuing and willful

disregard of rights which this court in unmistakable terms has said must be accorded to Negro firemen." Up to the end of 1950 there had been no final decision in this case.

Federal District Judge Clarence Mullins in Birmingham, Ala., ruled on May 3, 1950, that the Locomotive Firemen must cease discriminating against Negro firemen and denying them their rights on the Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. The suit against the union and the road was filed by three firemen on behalf of all Negro firemen employed by the company. The judge ordered the line to assign the firemen to jobs on steam locomotives or as helpers on diesel engines "to which their seniority as firemen, based upon continuous service, entitles each of them." The Negro firemen were also awarded damages which will amount to what they would have earned "if they had been assigned to jobs they were entitled to."

Rail Labor's Program: For the year 1950-51, the Railway Labor Executives Association outlined a program as follows: a 40-hour week with no reduction in the 48-hours pay for yard service employees; time and one-half rates for overtime in passenger service; compensation for delay at initial terminal; allowance for expenses while away from home terminals, correction of certain inequities and inequalities in rates of pay; basic day to be established in passenger service as now effective in road freight service.

Other points in the program included: improvements in the Railroad Retirement Act; greater safety on the rails; legislation establishing the right to negotiate the union shop on the roads; cooperation with other labor organizations for "progressive legislation generally," with every worker registered to vote and exercising his right to vote in political elections.

The 40-hour week for "non-operating" rail employees went into effect on September 1, 1949. No further progress has been made in shortening hours for other rail workers, nor on any of the other points raised in the above program. By the end of 1950, all rail workers were seeking wage increases ranging from 25¢ up to 35¢ an hour.

Government Broke BRT Strike: Some 2,500 switchmen members of the Railroad Trainmen went on mass sick leave December 13, 1950 on 15 railroads centering in Chicago. For a year they had been considering a strike to get action on their long-standing demand for the 40-hour week with no cut in the present 48-hour pay. (See Labor Research Association's Railroad Notes, Jan. 1951.)

Within three days the strike had spread to 14 other centers and involved 10,000 switchmen. Following President Truman's demand that the strike be ended because of a "national emergency," most of the men returned to work on December 16.

Strikers had stood out against three Federal court injunction orders, issued in Chicago, Washington and Cleveland. The union was also cited by the Chicago Federal District Court for "contempt of court." The federal government, "operating" the roads since August 27, 1950, had asked for these injunctions to halt the strike. Top union officials stood aside as rank-and-file workers tried to get a settlement of the wage-hour issue before the government acted to freeze wages.

Again at the end of January, 1951, a similar walkout of Switchmen occurred. These men had been working 48 to 56 hours or more a week at straight time pay.

The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen was fined in all \$100,000 for the two work stoppages. For the first a Chicago federal court fined the union \$25,000. For the second stoppage U. S. District Judge Edward A. Tamm in Washington fined the union \$75,000—\$25,000 for civil contempt and \$50,000 for criminal contempt.

UNION HEALTH ACTIVITIES

In 1949 and 1950 unions obtained health benefits for hundreds of thousands of members through strikes and collective bargaining, and many additional workers continued to be "covered" under programs previously won. The typical "package" of benefits included disability compensation, hospital and surgical idemnity coverage, medical fees for hospitalized illness and group life insurance.

Most of the benefits were the result of insurance company group contracts in which part or all of the premium is paid by the employer. Substantial numbers, however, received their hospitalization coverage through the inadequate Blue Cross plans, and some got medical coverage through Blue Shield. A smaller group were covered under plans for the provision of direct medical services by group practice clinics.

The most notable developments in this period occurred in the mass production industries such as steel, auto, coal mining. Although no figures of total coverage are presently available, the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that by mid-1950 at least 7,650,000 workers were covered by "health insurance and/or pension programs under collective bargaining."

The general trend in financing of health plans moved further in the direction of sole employer contributions. In a study of 678 collective bargaining agreements in effect during 1949, the BLS found that approximately 80% of sickness and disability benefits provided therein were completely employer-financed. Exceptions to this trend were to be found in agreements in the steel and auto industries.

Within the past two years, demands by unions for health and medical benefits were often coupled with pension demands. For example, the United Steelworkers (CIO) negotiated contracts with the major steel firms in 1949, calling for a non-contributory pension plan but for a jointly-financed social insurance program, even though a Government Fact Finding Board had ruled in favor of non-contributory financing for all welfare benefits. When the steel companies refused to accept this ruling, the union leadership agreed to a compromise settlement which involved close to a million steel workers.

Miner's Plan: In March, 1950, after a bitter strike, the United Mine Workers won a significant victory over the combined pressure of employers and the government. Besides gaining a sizable wage increase, the union obtained an additional 10 cents per ton contribution by the companies to the welfare fund. This brought the total obligation of the operators to 30 cents for each ton of coal mined.

As a result of this settlement benefit payments, which were temporarily suspended by the fund's trustees in September, 1949, were resumed in full by June, 1950.

The scale of medical aid provided by the United Mine Workers for the rehabilitation of sick and disabled miners was enlarged. A number of sanatoria for the care and treatment of victims of silicosis were set up in the anthracite mining regions. Many rehabilitation centers for paraplegics and victims of spinal injuries were in full operation in various parts of the country, equipped with the most modern facilities.

Direct Service Plans: In general, unions have learned that direct service plans (those providing medical care) are superior to those revolving about the payment of cash benefits. Such direct service plans include, for example, the Labor Health Institute program set up by the St. Louis Joint Council of United Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Employees (CIO).

Dr. Dean Clark estimates that the typical group practice set-up offering comprehensive health services covers 46% of the average health budget. This is a far higher figure than the 16% met by the typical

commercial policy or the 21% met by the typical Blue Cross-Blue Shield policy. Not only are dollars saved when doctors work under one roof, sharing expensive equipment and overhead, but better results are obtained. Workers are seen earlier when they are ill, and have more often the advantage of specialist consultation.

The non-service plans under which most "covered" workers are enrolled have been found to pay out in benefits much less than they collect in premiums. This is true of insurance companies because about 40 cents of every premium dollar for disability and medical coverage goes to expenses and profits. The non-profit Blue Cross-Blue Shield plans have excessive administrative costs (15% and higher), and both profit and non-profit indemnity organizations have high promotional costs.

Exclusions and restrictions drastically limit the practical value of the non-service policies to the worker. Waiting periods are imposed before benefits are payable for common operations and pregnancy; chronic illness is excluded; dependents get little or no coverage; there is no provision for expensive drugs, blood transfusions, and necessary special services. Preventive and diagnostic care are not covered. Although a hospital bed may cost as high as \$20 a day, the indemnity may be a mere \$8 or less, with a time limit which throws the main burden of a long illness on the worker.

Unions that have experimented with group practice service plans have found that it is possible to get more, better, and earlier (preventive) service in this way. However, there may be limits to a union's resources, particularly in the provision of hospital care, important drugs and other auxiliary services, and coverage of long-term expensive illness.

On July 1, 1950 New York State put into effect its temporary disability law. Thus it became the fourth state to have such a law in operation (the other three are New Jersey, Rhode Island and California). One effect of these laws is to raise the amount of weekly disability benefit in union plans to the level called for in the state statute.

Broader Program: A more far-reaching labor program, put forward by the Progressive Party in 1949 and 1950, calls for a full social insurance system, including health insurance, maternity benefits, pensions, and all phases of social security, to be established by the government. Some local unions discussed this broader program in connection with the election campaign. But all measures calling for national health insurance have been sidetracked in Congress in the reactionary drive to cut all expenditures for social welfare.

PENSIONS IN UNION PLANS

During the past two years, the question of pensions for older workers occupied a major position in labor's struggle for a larger share of the profits the workers create. Under the terms of the wholly inadequate Social Security Act, labor and management are making equal payments into a fund which provided a pittance to workers retiring after age 65.

Labor began to press for separate pension funds to be set up by employers or by joint trusteeships of labor and employer. As a result of this drive, pensions were won by most workers in basic industries during 1949-1950. By mid-1950, some five million workers were covered by pension plans under collective bargaining contracts, the BLS reported.

The pensions, however, were commonly tied to social security pensions in that the amount received from the government is to be deducted from the amount guaranteed by industry. For the first time, the employer acquired a stake in the federal old age benefits insurance fund. Under the provisions of their pension contracts with labor, every additional dollar which could be squeezed out of the government would reduce the amount of money to be paid by the corporations.

Under the 1950 amendments to the Social Security Act (see p. 42), benefits to be paid by the government were increased and the difference to be made up by industry was greatly decreased. But more than half the cost of these increased benefits to be paid by the government was passed on to labor by increasing workers' contributions to the federal old age benefits tax from 1% of the first \$3,000 earned to 1½% of the first \$3,600.

Pensions Versus Wage Increases: An examination of the "gains" through which pensions have been won indicates that the granting of even the best pensions by basic industries has too often been practically a cheap substitute for wage increases. Except in industry-wide pension plans, of which there are very few, the payment of pensions is surrounded by so many "safeguards" for industry that the net cost (to the companies) will be negligible compared to the cost of the wage increases which they were able to avoid by granting the pensions.

Protection of the American people from want in their old age is and must remain a government function, progressive union spokesmen point out. As such, the cost must be paid from taxes levied on the principle of ability to pay. Millions of people are still excluded from social security benefits because they do not work in so-called covered employment. Workers least able to pay must contribute large social security tax de-

ductions. Trade unions attempting to provide for the security of their members in old age deprive them of much needed increases in take-home pay, these progressive unionists say; and such efforts delay the pressure on the government for more adequate social security laws.

VI. LABOR RELATIONS AND LEGISLATION

WORK STOPPAGES, 1949-1950

Strikes in 1949 totaled 50,500,000 man-days, 48% above the 1948 figure but less than half of that for 1946. Apart from indirect effect on other establishments, these man-days amounted to slightly more than one-half of 1% of total working time in U.S. industries.

In each of 20 strikes beginning in 1948 and 18 strikes beginning in 1949 at least 10,000 workers were directly involved.

Wages and hours were the primary issue in about half of the strikes in 1949, with more than three-fourths of the total man-days involved. Demands for pension and social insurance plans figured more largely in the strikes of 1949 than ever before and were directly involved in strikes accounting for more than half the total strike man-days in that year.

The year 1949 opened with 108 strikes continuing from 1948. Most important were the strike of some 1,600 Chicago printers, holding over from November, 1947, and a strike of 3,900 workers of Kennecott Copper Corp. in Utah. The Chicago printers won wage increases with continued recognition of the union, but they lost their former closed-shop arrangement and accepted the hiring of experienced non-union men. The 106-day Kennecott Copper strike was ended when a fact-finding board was appointed by the federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.

Gravediggers Strike: At Calvary Cemetery (Queens County, N.Y.) gravediggers went on strike January 13, 1949, demanding a five-day, 40-hour week and time-and-a-half for Saturday work. They were joined four weeks later by gravediggers at Gate of Heaven Cemetery, Hawthorne, New York.

Strikers were members of United Cemetery Workers, a subdivision of the Food, Tobacco & Agricultural Workers, then CIO. Cardinal Spellman, representing the trustees, refused to bargain with the union, charging that the FTA was "Communist dominated." The Calvary workers voted unanimously by secret ballot to remain on strike, and the next day the Cardinal led student priests in strike-breaking labor. Challenged for this, the Cardinal said: "I admit to the accusation of strike-breaking

and I am proud of it." (N.Y. Times, March 5, 1949.) A week later, the 1,100 members of the striking local, under strong pressure from the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, voted to quit the FTA and join instead the Building Service Employees (AFL). The strike was settled two days later, with an 8 1/3% increase in wages (only 1/3% higher than the last rejected offer of the employer) bringing the weekly total to \$64.35. The question of hours was submitted to a three-man arbitration panel.

Ford Strike Against Speed-up: On May 5, 1949, some 60,000 workers walked out at the River Rouge plant and 3,500 at the Lincoln plant of the Ford Motor Co. in the first major strike at this company since the union was recognized in 1941. As the strike went on it involved 106,000 Ford workers. The union held that the company had been speeding-up the assembly line in building "B" at River Rouge to make up for losses in production due to management's mishandling of supplies.

Offers of mediation from city officials of Detroit and Dearborn were refused by the company. On May 14 Pres. Walter Reuther of the Auto Workers asked for federal aid in a telegram to Federal Mediation Director Cyrus Ching. The company refused to cooperate with the government officials.

"The rank-and-file members of the UAW immediately affected by the strike have shown unbending unity and firmness," the N. Y. Times reported, May 15, 1949. "Lectured and trained for years on the need for such unity in strike strategy, the workers have been unwilling to retreat in their demands, although it has been apparent that some of the international leaders, Mr. Reuther among them, have been most anxious to settle the strike in rapid fashion through some face-saving device. But these leaders dare not say so without risking charges of a 'sell out' by the membership."

A settlement was reached May 29, the agreement calling for an arbitrator to settle the question of speed-up in building "B." In the arbitration decision, announced July 9, 1949, arbiters ruled that employees could not be expected to make up for unforeseen production stoppages.

Other 1949 Struggles: From May to October, 10,000 members of the Electrical Workers (then CIO) at Singer Mfg. Co. (Elizabeth, N.J., and Bridgeport, Conn.) were out until the union yielded on the incentive pay form of speed-up which it had opposed. But the union obtained a small wage increase for those paid by the hour.

In June, 1949, other strikes involving 10,000 or more workers included: coal miners; construction workers (10,000 in Washington, D. C., and 20,000 in Minneapolis-St. Paul area), for wage increases; lumber workers (10,000 in Maryland, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania), defeating wage cuts; warehousemen in northern California, out more than three months; workers at Bell Aircraft Corp. plant (Buffalo, N.Y.), out from June to October for wage increases and other benefits, with settlement by a state board of inquiry.

Hawaii Strike: A 157-day strike of some 2,000 Hawaiian workers, organized in the militant Longshoremen (then CIO) was won on October 6, 1949. It brought the workers under Harry Bridges' leadership a 21-cents-an-hour pay increase and extension of contract to June 15, 1951, making it expire simultaneously with the mainland longshore agreement. It was the longest strike in the history of the ILWU and overcame court injunctions, hired strike-breakers, disruption by red-baiters, and scabbing by AFL unions as well as units of one CIO union. However, world labor support through the newly formed Maritime Federation of the World was an important factor in the victory.

Steel Strike: Some 500,000 steel workers, in 29 states, struck on October 1, 1949. The United Steelworkers of America (CIO) had demanded a wage increase and a social-insurance and pension plan. The wage increase was opposed by the special Presidential emergency board. This board recommended that company-financed pension and social-insurance plans should be adopted, but these were opposed by the companies and the strike followed. On October 31, however, Bethlehem Steel Corp. signed a contract accepting the company-financed pension along with other social-insurance plans to which workers and company would both contribute. Most other companies followed suit, and operations had generally been resumed by the end of November.

Coal Miners in 1949-50: Bituminous miners struck on September 19, 1949, demanding a shorter work-week and a distribution of employment more fair to the miners in marginal operations. They also sought wage increases, reduction in hours, and increased payments by mine operators into the welfare fund. The UMWA voted that miners west of the Mississippi should return to work in October. But, except for a three-weeks truce in November, the 320,000 miners in eastern and southern fields remained on strike (with brief periods of work) until after President Truman proposed government seizure of the mines.

At the beginning of 1950 coal miners were working a three-day week

while negotiations for a new contract were under way. Former contract had expired in June, 1949. Contract talks were suspended early in January and miners struck at Pittsburgh Consolidation Coal Co. and H. C. Frick Coke Co. mines. Major bituminous mines in eight states were later closed and 370,000 miners were on strike. Basic issues were defense of their union and retention of bargaining rights.

The UMWA was charged with civil and criminal contempt in failure of members to obey a back-to-work order. Five companies operating in Ohio, including the giant Pittsburgh Consolidation Coal Co., filed suit for some \$8 million damages from the union and its president, John L. Lewis, under the Valentine Act, an Ohio law prohibiting restraint of Ohio commerce. But the strike spread, without explicit orders from UMWA officials. Unions and progressive organizations all over the country sent money and supplies for strike relief.

The miners through their solidarity defeated Taft-Hartley injunctions aimed at breaking the strike. UMWA statisticians compiled supporting data during the strike. These showed that yearly profits (before taxes) per miner employed had risen from \$34 in 1939 to \$577 in 1947 and \$733 in 1948.

In the new agreement signed March 5, 1950, to run until June, 1952 (with possible termination on 30-day notice after April 1, 1951), the basic day rate was raised from \$14.05 to \$14.75; royalty to the UMWA health and welfare fund (increased from the former 20¢ to 30¢ a ton) will be managed jointly, with a union majority. As of February 1, 1951, both bituminous and anthracite miners gained further increases of \$1.60 a day, bringing their average daily wage to \$16.35.

Strikes in 1950: During the year 1950 there were 4,700 strikes in the United States—a rise of about 30% above the previous year, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported. Fewer workers were involved but their demands were more vigorously resisted. The number of workers involved in 1950 strikes dropped to 2,330,000, compared with 3,030,000 in 1949. But the 1950 figure does not include some 340,000 miners out in early winter since this strike started in 1949.

The 38,500,000 man-days of strike "idleness" represented a drop of about 25% below the previous year. Pensions and other social insurance benefits were issues in about 60% of the 1950 strikes.

Chrysler Strike: Some 89,000 workers led by Automobile Workers (CIO) at Chrysler Corp. plant in Detroit struck January 25, 1950, after six months of negotiations had failed to bring any concessions on pen-

sion terms. Agreement reached May 4, with a three-year contract, included no change in wage rates, and several of the workers' demands were set aside. The company "security clause" remained, allowing the company to fire workers resisting speed-up by participating in a "wild-cat" strike. The union yielded also on its demand that promotions be based on seniority.

The company granted pensions of \$100 a month, including social security benefits, for workers retiring at 65 after 25 years of service. But company pensions are reduced by any increase in federal social security benefits, maintaining the workers' maximum pension at \$100 monthly.

The Chrysler pension plan (like that at Nash and Budd auto companies) is in some points better than the Ford Motor Co. plan: 25 years service (instead of 30 years) qualifies for a full pension; 1,700 hours work (instead of 1,800) is minimum basis of a year's pension credit; and fewer hours must be credited by months instead of by quarters.

Rayon Workers Attacked: Another major strike started March 28, 1950, when more than 700 CIO textile workers went out at the Morristown, Tenn., plant of the American Enka Corp. in which large Dutch interests are involved. (These have been charged with fronting for Nazi financiers.) Strikers' ranks remained solid despite attacks by police and by National Guardsmen sent in by Gov. Gordon Browning of Tennessee "to maintain order."

On June 8, the union local and six of its members filed a million-dollar damage suit against the American Enka Corp. and against the governor. On June 22, heavily-armed state police arrested 65 strikers. Union protests had meanwhile forced withdrawal of the troops and had brought a Senate subcommittee to investigate.

The strike ended August 18, when the workers who had stood firm against police brutality, AFL obstruction, and attacks of armed scabs voted to return to work without any improvement in conditions. Not all the strikers were taken back. More than a hundred cases against strikers were filed in the courts on charges of "criminal acts" during the strike, or "conspiracy to incite riot," or resisting arrest.

Newsmen's Strike: On June 13, 1950, some 540 editorial and business employees of The New York World-Telegram and Sun struck in support of the Newspaper Guild of N. Y. (CIO) demanding a 10% wage increase, with basic weekly minimums ranging from \$40 for office boys to \$120 for experienced newsmen; a requirement that nine out of ten

new employees join the Guild; and a night differential of one hour's pay for each shift. The Guild strike was supported also by the members of six AFL craft unions and one independent union that refused to cross picket lines. Mass picketing continued throughout the strike.

On August 23 the newspaper signed a two-year contract with the Guild, providing an increase in the minimum pay for workers in every category; a premium for night work; shortening of the standard week from 37½ to 35 hours; eight paid holidays instead of six; and a modified union shop.

General Motors Agreement: The Auto Workers' (CIO) five-year agreement with General Motors Corp., ratified in June, 1950, freezes working conditions with pensions, ties wages to the consumer's price index, and pledges the workers to five years of "uninterrupted" production. It provides for a modified union shop where old union workers must retain membership but old workers not in the union are not required to join. Newly hired workers must join but may withdraw at the end of the year.

The agreement promises an annual increase of 4¢ an hour in basic wage rates provided productivity is increased. Basic wage rates will be adjusted by the official cost-of-living index. If the index declines basic wage rates will also decline but not below the figures prevailing when the present agreement was signed. If cost-of-living index rises, wages will be increased by the same percentage. The agreement includes a hospital-medical plan, with the company paying half the cost of Blue Cross and Blue Shield protection for worker and family, and an insurance program with accident and sickness weekly benefits.

By the end of 1950, U. S. Commissioner of Labor Ewan Clague estimated that possibly 2,000,000 workers in the nation were either covered by contracts tied to the cost-of-living index, or were about to sign them. He said that after the Korean intervention, scores of companies and unions signed contracts similar to the General Motors agreement.

TAFT-HARTLEY ACT

Organized labor in the election campaign of 1948 announced it would try to secure the election of congressmen and senators who would vote for repeal of the obnoxious Taft-Hartley Act (Labor Management Relations Act of 1947), which crippled union activities and destroyed labor's rights. Nevertheless, the new Congress was organized with seven votes more than a majority in each house opposed to repeal.

Despite AFL and CIO convention resolutions in opposition to the Taft-Hartley Act, these two labor bodies actually did little or nothing toward its repeal. President Truman suggested its repeal but did not fight against this anti-union law.

Repeal was defeated by a combination of northern Republican stand-patters and reactionary southern Democrats known as the "Dixiegops." Three-year operation of the Act shows the accuracy of trade union predictions of its harmful effects.

Union Organizing Blocked: Encouraged by the anti-labor provisions of the Act, employers have become more open and more violent in their opposition to union organizing. They have been more successful in forming "citizens' committees" to beat up union organizers and to threaten prospective union members. Broader interpretation of "free speech" has permitted employers to call compulsory meetings of their workers, to whom they made anti-union talks, and to distribute leaflets implying discharge if a union were formed. By firing active union sympathizers they have deliberately provoked charges of unfair labor practices, which take precedence and thus delay elections for collective-bargaining representation and the negotiations which follow. As a result of such tactics, fewer elections were held—5,514 in the fiscal year 1948-49, as against 6,920 in 1946-47, the last year of the Wagner Act, and the number of workers covered dropped from 935,000 to 589,000. Furthermore, the proportion of elections which were won by unions as against "no union" dropped from 79% in the three years before Taft-Hartley to 71% in the next three. The percentage of workers voting "no union," however, went down slightly, from 23% to about 22½%.

The Act put a new anti-union weapon into employers' hands, namely the "decertification" procedure, by which a union which had been certified as collective bargaining agency could be deprived of that status. Decertification proceedings can ostensibly be started only on demand by the workers. But it is often easy for an employer to find or to stimulate a group to put in such a demand. In about two and a half years of the Act 306 decertification elections were held, of which the unions lost 194, or nearly two-thirds.

A "union shop," in which workers must join the union after 30 days and maintain membership while employed there, is permitted under the Act only when voted by a majority of the employees. In the three years of the Act about 36,500 elections of this kind were held. Those resulting in a union shop formed 94.2% in the first year, 93.9%

in the second, but only 89.6% in the third year. Obviously the pressure of the Act is against union victories. Yet the minorities voting against union varied from 6% to only 10%. These results thoroughly refute the assertion of anti-union propagandists that the vast majority of union members are so unwillingly.

Industrial Bitterness Increased: Unfair labor practice charges have steadily increased, showing increased bitterness in labor relations. In the year 1947-48, 2,553 unfair labor cases were filed against employers, and 749 against unions. In the next year 4,154 were filed against employers and 1,160 against unions. For the year 1949-50 the estimate was 4,500 and 1,300 respectively. Nearly 4 out of 5 charges against unions have never been brought to hearing, either because they were dropped or because there was no case. In the last year of the Wagner Act 4,114 workers were reinstated with back pay of \$1,105,000, following charges that employers had discriminated against them. In 1948-49, under Taft-Hartley, only 1,419 were reinstated, with back pay of \$598,000.

The Act has not prevented strikes, even the big strikes that were supposed to cause "national emergencies." Instead, it has led directly to strikes for union recognition and collective-bargaining rights, and to employers forcing strikes to take advantage of the strike-breaking provisions of the law.

In a brief on Taft-Hartleyism in Southern Textiles, the Textile Workers (CIO) charged in November, 1950, that the law had given government blessing to company terrorism, gunplay, injunction rule and vile stirrings of race hatred. The act has been responsible for a throwback to the 1920's in labor relations, the union brief said, because it puts collective bargaining and individual bargaining on an equal basis and the National Labor Relations Board is therefore forced to defend individual bargaining. All moral sanctions have been removed, the union spokesmen charged, and companies no longer pay any attention to being labeled a violator of the law.

This Textile Workers brief documented anti-union terrorism in the South which has increased since passage of the Taft-Hartley law. It gave the union's answer to Sen. Robert A. Taft who claimed that unionism in the area was weak because the workers did not want to join unions.

The Act has encouraged employers to chisel on established contract terms and to become un-cooperative in settling grievances. It has led

to the revival of company unionism, a growth of employer associations antagonistic to labor, and the increased employment of strikebreakers. It has stimulated red-baiting, union raiding and the splitting off of crafts from established industry-wide organizations. It has bogged the NLRB down with unnecessary votes on the question of the union shop, and doubled the time necessary for handling of unfair labor practice cases. It has substituted government dictation for free collective bargaining, and set up an official censorship over internal union affairs. It has brought more complexity and technicality into industrial relations, producing litigation and increased intervention of lawyers and courts. By declaring illegal the closed shop and preferential hiring it has forced unions and employers in many industries where such arrangements were working satisfactorily—as in the printing trades, the building trades, and the maritime industry—into operating in violation of the law or into finding subterfuges to get around it. It has revived the use of injunctions in labor disputes, and encouraged state legislatures to enact anti-labor measures of even more repressive nature.

Injunctions: In his first three years of activity under Taft-Hartley, Robert N. Denham, general counsel of the NLRB, started injunction proceedings against unions in 83 cases, and against employers in 2. Injunctions were issued in 46 of the anti-union cases, and in both of the cases against employers. All but four of the injunctions against unions were to prohibit secondary boycotts—that is, efforts to put pressure on employers not to use the products of, or do business with, an employer with whom a union had a dispute. For holding out on strike in 1948 in defiance of an injunction the United Mine Workers were fined \$1,400,000, and John L. Lewis, their president, \$20,000. Rising labor protest against Denham's policies, as well as increasing conflict between him and the Board, led to President Truman's forcing his resignation in September, 1950. He was succeeded by George J. Bott, of the Board's legal staff.

Non-Communist Oath: One of the bitterest-fought provisions of the law is that denying the services of the National Labor Relations Board to any union each of whose officers has not submitted an affidavit that he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member of or supports any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods. Even such anti-Communist leaders as Philip Mur-

ray and John L. Lewis refused for a long time to make such an affidavit. The oath was upheld by the U. S. Supreme Court, 5 to 1, on May 8, 1950, in a case brought by the United Steelworkers of America (Murray's union) and the American Communications Association (CIO); in a second case brought by Local 65 of the Wholesale and Warehouse Workers Union, New York, the court voted 4 to 4 on June 5, 1950, not to review a lower court decision.

In the first case the majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, asserted that the Constitution "permits the requirement of oaths by office holders to uphold the Constitution itself," and that the purpose of the clause was "to bring within the terms of the statute only those persons whose beliefs strongly indicate a will to engage in political strikes and other forms of direct action when, as officers, they direct union activities."

The main dissenting opinion, by Justice Hugo Black, held that: "Individual freedom and governmental thought-probing cannot live together. As the court admits even today, under the First Amendment, 'Beliefs are inviolate'. . ." The test oath "was one of the major devices used against the Huguenots in France, and against 'heretics' during the Spanish Inquisition. It helped English rulers identify and outlaw Catholics, Quakers, Baptists, and Congregationalists—groups considered dangerous for political as well as religious reasons. And wherever the test oath was in vogue, spies and informers found rewards far more tempting than truth. . . . Whether religious, political, or both, test oaths are implacable foes of free thought."

In spite of an NLRB ruling that the officers of the AFL and CIO did not need to sign the affidavits in order for their affiliated unions to participate in elections conducted by the Board, William Green signed in November, 1947. Philip Murray signed as head of the Steelworkers in 1949.

Finding themselves faced with raids by unions whose officers had signed, most of the organizations which opposed the oath eventually complied. However, at the close of 1950 the United Mine Workers and the International Typographical Union were still holding out.

Ben Gold of the Fur & Leather Workers and Max Perlow of the Furniture Workers, both CIO, while reasserting their Communist principles, resigned from the party in order to sign the affidavit to protect their unions. Other CIO union officials resigned their elected union positions in order that their unions might comply.

Other Supreme Court Decisions: The Taft-Hartley ban on the closed shop and preferential union hiring was upheld by the Supreme Court in cases brought in 1949 against the National Maritime Union (CIO).

In a test case the court in 1948 narrowed the interpretation of the Act's prohibition of political expenditures by unions so as to permit them to publish material for or against candidates for federal offices.

STATE ANTI-LABOR LEGISLATION

Repressive Measures Defeated: Active labor opposition secured the repeal or defeat in six states in 1949 of measures designed to cripple union activity. Delaware and Missouri repealed their "little Taft-Hartley Acts" of 1947. New Hampshire repealed a law restricting union security agreements. Maine by referendum rejected an anti-closed shop statute and defeated a proposed law which would have been even more repressive. New Mexico voters defeated a proposed amendment to the state constitution making it a crime for an employer to refuse to hire workers who had resigned or been expelled from or refused to join a union. Massachusetts voters rejected a proposal to prohibit the closed shop, another which would have required union elections by secret ballot yearly, and a third prohibiting strikes unless approved by a majority of the union's members.

The 1950 records shows the defeat in the Maryland legislature of a measure regulating strikes and lockouts in public utilities. In Mississippi three bills were defeated—one prohibiting all union security agreements, one prohibiting secondary strikes and boycotts, and one forbidding jurisdictional strikes and mass picketing. Massachusetts specified that peaceful persuasion is part of a lawful labor dispute and not liable to criminal proceedings; also that temporary injunctions may not be issued unless the workers are informed in time to appear in opposition. South Dakota set up Consumers' Power Districts, with the provision that employees have the right to organize, to join unions, and to bargain collectively.

Hostile Acts Continue: On the other hand, an Arizona referendum in 1949 approved a law which prohibits denial of employment because of nonmembership in a union, forbids compulsion to persuade a person to join a union or strike against his will, and makes it illegal to strike or to picket in force to obtain a closed shop agreement. The Nebraska legislature passed an act making mass picketing a misdemeanor. Virginia in 1950 brought unions under the state anti-monopoly law, and

set up a Fuel Commission to operate coal mines or coal marketing facilities seized by the governor during an emergency. The New Jersey law regulating labor disputes in public utilities, which would have expired in March, 1950, was extended indefinitely.

State Laws in the Courts: Suits to overthrow anti-union state laws have almost uniformly been decided against the unions in the state courts and on appeal to the U. S. Supreme Court. The anti-closed-shop statutes in Arizona, Nebraska, and North Carolina were upheld by the Supreme Court in 1949 on the ground that they did not deprive the unions or their members of any rights guaranteed by the federal constitution. In 1950 the court upheld a Washington state law making it illegal to picket to obtain a union-shop agreement. In two other cases arising in the same state the court held that it was unlawful to picket self-employed used-car dealers to compel them to join a union and live up to union standards.

Favorable decisions by the Supreme Court included a 1949 ruling that the "hot cargo" law of California, which banned secondary boycotts, was invalid under the state constitution. In 1950 the court declared unconstitutional a Michigan law which prohibited strikes in the absence of a majority vote by the employers.

VII. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

RECORD OF EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS

From the standpoint of the American people the 81st Congress, controlled by the Democratic Party did little better than the 80th Congress controlled by the Republicans. However, President Truman said he was well satisfied with its work.

The 81st Congress met January 3, 1949, and adjourned October 19, 1949; its second session commenced on January 3, 1950, and adjourned September 23, 1950, after passing the McCarran thought-control police state bill. The final session met November 27, 1950 and adjourned January 2, 1951.

Truman had campaigned in 1948 on a platform promising progressive legislation and specifically repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act, the raising of minimum wages, the curbing of the power of the monopolies, and the adoption of comprehensive housing, education, security and health programs. He was also pledged to a civil rights program embracing anti-poll tax, anti-lynching, and general fair employment practice legislation.

But practically all of this social program was smothered by the cold-war foreign policies of the Truman bi-partisan administration. Congress voted billions for armaments while killing all bills promising any domestic reforms. Congress went all out on war preparations and "aid" for those countries whose governments endorsed American foreign policy. It voted over \$42 billion for war funds.

A review of Congressional action on some of the basic issues shows how far it failed to carry out the promised policies.

Taft-Hartley repeal was turned down. It remained a talking issue for the Democrats. Actually a Labor-Management Relations Act of 1949 was passed by the Senate with features worse than those of the original Taft-Hartley Act. The House took no action.

Rent control was all but killed, being extended beyond December 31, 1950, only on a local-option basis. No curb was put on the food price speculation rampant especially after the Korean intervention.

Congress approved a long-range housing bill providing for federal

help in building homes—low-rent public housing units—numbering only 810,000 within the next six years. This measure provided also for some slum clearance and farm-home improvement. However, cooperative and so-called middle-income housing legislation was blocked in both Senate and House.

Health insurance fell by the wayside and never received a hearing. Nothing was done even to lay the groundwork of such a program.

Educational aid from the government was killed in the House, thanks to the efforts of the Catholic hierarchy, who were determined to obtain appropriations for their own schools, or to block completely all such legislation.

A bill was passed barring the Federal Power Commission from regulating rate charges by natural gas producers not owning their own pipe lines. The President later vetoed it.

TVAs for the Missouri, Columbia, St. Lawrence and other rivers were shoved aside by Congress.

In relation to the antitrust laws, Congress passed a bill to bar a company from acquiring the physical assets of another firm where the result would be to lessen competition "substantially." The measure became law in December, 1950.

Social security act was broadened in coverage and benefits increased partly as the result of employer pressure after private group pension plans had been hitched to social security in major union contracts. The Knowland amendment was passed crippling enforcement of federal standards in unemployment compensation. Congress refused larger unemployment compensation benefits and broader coverage.

All civil rights legislation failed to pass. Truman did not fight for this legislation although he has been taking credit for advocating it. Fair Employment Practice legislation was defeated when motion to invoke cloture in order to prevent a Dixiecrat filibuster was voted down. An anti-poll tax bill was passed in the House but died in the Senate. No anti-lynching legislation was passed.

The tax legislation passed was full of loopholes for the corporations and bore down most heavily on individual low-income taxpayers.

"Millions of Americans," commented the United Mine Workers Journal, Oct. 1, 1950, "are unable to follow Truman's praise of the 81st Congress. The fact is, the consensus of majority opinion as regards the domestic front is that it already has been or will be damned as the 'eighty-cursed' Congress. . . . Both the Senate and House foundered on

the wild oats of international relations and forgot all about domestic affairs."

It added: "They gave us war, higher taxes . . . definite, immediate inflation with more in the offing for the long pull."

SOME 1949 ELECTIONS

When U. S. Senator Robert F. Wagner, New York Democrat, resigned because of ill-health in June, 1949, Governor Dewey appointed Wall Street lawyer John Foster Dulles to fill the unexpired term until the special election in November. The Democrats selected former New York Governor Herbert H. Lehman to run against Dulles. Lehman was supported by the official AFL and CIO state organizations and the Liberal Party. The American Labor Party did not endorse him because of his general support to the Truman cold-war foreign policy.

Dulles, having no appreciable disagreement with Lehman on foreign issues, raised general domestic issues such as the dangers of the "welfare state," and accused Lehman of receiving covert aid from Communists. In a record vote in an off-year election Lehman won with 2,582,438 votes (including 426,677 on the Liberal Party line) against 2,384,381 for Dulles.

In the New York City election, Democratic Mayor William O'Dwyer defeated Newbold Morris endorsed by the Republican and Liberal Parties, while Congressman Vito Marcantonio was mayoralty candidate of the American Labor Party. Votes received: O'Dwyer, 1,264,600; Morris, 956,170; Marcantonio, 356,423. Morris received 372,281 of his votes on the Liberal Party line, giving it for the first time more votes than the American Labor Party. Most of organized labor supported O'Dwyer, with the exception of the Ladies Garment Workers Union, whose leaders backed Morris, and the left-wing unions who lined up for Marcantonio.

In the New York City councilmanic elections, no longer held under the proportional representation system (repealed to insure the defeat of the sole Communist Councilman, Benjamin J. Davis), the Democrats won 24 seats to one Republican, liberal Stanley Isaacs. One of the Democrats elected was Earl Brown whom the tri-partisan reactionary coalition of Democrats, Republicans, and Liberals selected to defeat Councilman Benjamin J. Davis, Communist Party candidate running for re-election with American Labor Party support. Davis received 21,962 votes and Brown 63,030.

In New Jersey Republican Governor Alfred E. Driscoll was re-elected over Democrat Elmer Wene. In this election former Mayor Frank Hague of Jersey City made such a poor showing in his Hudson County stronghold that he later resigned as State Democratic leader.

In Philadelphia municipal elections the Republican political machine for the first time in 70 years suffered a defeat in contests for four key city offices even though the Democratic reform candidates who won had been called "Communist stooges" for the Fair Deal. Democrats won also in Pittsburgh and Scranton. In Detroit the business-supported candidate for Mayor, Albert E. Cobo, backed also by the AFL, defeated the CIO-supported candidate George Edwards, former Auto Workers organizer. Progressive candidates in the Detroit city council election, Stanley Novak and Rev. Chester A. Hill, each polled over 100,000 votes but failed of election. In Cleveland, Ohio, Anthony Krchmarek, Communist state legislative director, received nearly 57,000 votes for the local board of elections.

THE 1950 ELECTIONS

In the elections of November 7, 1950, over 42 million persons voted out of some 97 million eligible and 70 million qualified. This was a record for a non-presidential election. The Democrats got about 19,700,000 or 48.95% of the votes cast, while Republicans polled 49.03%. Outside of the South the Democrats got about 44.5%.

In the minds of many people the Democrats were associated with war, and fears about the Korean conflict induced many to vote blindly for anti-Administration candidates. The war fears of the people were exploited by the Republicans, even by those who favored the MacArthur imperialist line in the Far East. The blame for the failures of the bi-partisan foreign policies was laid at the door of the party in power.

Competitive red-baiting by both parties blurred such minor differences as there were on domestic issues. The campaign in some districts became mainly a contest between candidates as to the most effective ways of beating back the mythical "Communist menace."

The Senate Race: Elections for the U. S. Senate brought the Democrats down from 54 to 49, while the Republican strength rose from 42 to 47. Some of the Democrats elected were more reactionary than those that had sat in the 81st Congress. For example, such "liberals" as Claude Pepper (Florida), Frank P. Graham (North Carolina), Elmer Thomas (Oklahoma) and Glen Taylor (Montana), were defeated in the primaries.

Biggest victory for a Republican in the November election was won by Robert A. Taft, author of the Taft-Hartley Act and Chairman of the Republican policy committee in the Senate. He had a plurality of 430,000 in Ohio over labor-backed Democratic state auditor, Joseph T. Ferguson, who campaigned mainly on the basis of support for Truman's war program. In 1944 Taft had squeezed in by a margin of only 12,000 votes.

Sen. Elbert D. Thomas (D., Utah), veteran chairman of the Senate labor committee, was defeated by Wallace F. Bennett, former president of the National Association of Manufacturers.

Scott W. Lucas (D., Ill.), Senate majority leader on a platform based on full support to the Truman foreign policy, was beaten by Republican Congressman, Everett M. Dirksen, a "near-isolationist" and favorite of the Chicago Tribune.

Francis J. Myers (D., Pa.) Senate Democratic whip, lost by 125,000 to James H. Duff, Pennsylvania governor.

Sen. Millard E. Tydings (D., Md.), who had headed the subcommittee that investigated and found groundless the charges of Sen. Joseph McCarthy (R., Wis.) of Communist influence in the State Department, was beaten by a Republican unknown, John M. Butler. Hysterical charges that Tydings had whitewashed the Reds featured this campaign. His defeat was aided by the fact that Negroes opposed him for his defense of segregation and labor opposed him because of his conservative position on social issues.

Rep. Helen Gahagan Douglas (D., Cal.) failed in her bid [in California] for the Senate and was beaten by Rep. Richard M. Nixon, one of the most notorious red-baiters of the House unAmerican committee. But Mrs. Douglas herself had used red-baiters to further her campaign.

In New York State, however, the Democrats held their one Senate seat, re-electing Sen. Herbert H. Lehman by 271,000 over Republican opponent, Lieut. Gov. Joe R. Hanley. In a letter from the latter to Rep. W. Kingsland Macy, which was publicized during the campaign, Hanley stated that he had been bought out of the governorship nomination to make way for Gov. Thomas E. Dewey. Hanley was persuaded instead to run for the Senate against Lehman. His letter stated that at a conference with Dewey "certain unalterable and unquestionably definite propositions were made to me. If I will consent to take the nomination to the U. S. Senate, I am definitely assured of being able to clean up my financial obligations within 90 days."

Gov. Dewey later appointed him Special Counsel to State Division of Veterans Affairs at \$16,000 a year.

The most important Democratic victory in the Senate race was in Missouri where Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., ousted labor-opposed Republican Forrest C. Donnell who had sponsored legislation to prohibit railroad strikes.

In Connecticut Brien McMahon and William Benton were re-elected to the Senate, the first Democrats elected Senators in mid-term elections in that state since 1934.

Changes in the House: In the House of Representatives the swing was also toward the Republicans who raised the number of their members from 172 in the 81st Congress to 199 in the 82nd. At the same time the Democrats fell from 262 to 234 or 28 seats. In addition, Rep. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., of New York is described as a Democrat-Liberal and Rep. Frazier Reams of Toledo, Ohio, is called an Independent. The nominal Democratic majority (including States' Rights Democrats or "Dixiecrats") was reduced to 35, making it still easier for a coalition of reactionaries—Southern Democrats and Northern Republicans—to control the House, and block all progressive and civil rights legislation while pushing through bills approved by the National Association of Manufacturers and other business groups.

Gubernatorial Choices: The Republicans also led in the number of state governors elected. Before the election the Democrats controlled 29 out of 48 states; after the election they were behind, controlling only 23. Outside the South only five Democrats were elected.

The following victories of Republicans over Democrats were of special interest: In New York Gov. Thomas E. Dewey over Rep. Walter A. Lynch; in California Gov. Earl Warren over James Roosevelt, son of the former President; in Connecticut John Davis Lodge over Gov. Chester Bowles who had won in 1948.

Democratic victories were scored by Gov. Frank J. Lausche in Ohio, as a result of deals with the Republican machine; by Gov. Paul A. Dever in Massachusetts; and Gov. G. Mennen Williams, in a close vote, in Michigan.

New York City "Independent": Mayor William O'Dwyer of New York City having resigned to become U. S. Ambassador to Mexico when scandals connected with corruption in the police department developed in 1950, the special election held to fill the vacancy saw the nomination of four candidates.

Much of the protest vote against corruption in both old political parties went to the Acting Mayor Vincent R. Impellitteri, who ran as an "independent" on the new Experience Party ticket when the regular Tammany machine refused to endorse him. He received 1,156,587 votes and was elected over the candidate of the Democratic and Liberal Parties, Judge Ferdinand Pecora, who received 937,060 votes (712,232 on the Democratic line and 224,828 on the Liberal line). Edward Corsi, Republican, ran third with 382,759 votes, and Paul L. Ross, on the American Labor Party ticket, received 149,182 votes.

Impellitteri was supported by James Farley, former chairman of the Democratic National Committee and a leader in the pro-Franco Catholic bloc, by Republican elements concerned with the reelection of Gov. Dewey, by certain underworld elements, former Tammany leader Frank J. Sampson, and the AFL Central Trades and Labor Council. Some local AFL unions, along with the New York City CIO Council, supported Pecora, the regular Tammany candidate. Following the election, Impellitteri appointed Frank J. Sampson as Administrative Assistant to the Mayor at \$15,000 a year. He was to be the Mayor's chief adviser on patronage.

Big Vote for California Communist: In a primary election June 6, 1950, for the non-partisan post of State Superintendent of Public Instruction in California, Bernadette Doyle, chairman of the Communist Party of San Diego County, received 605,393 votes or 26% of the total. The winner was Superintendent Roy E. Simpson, who was re-elected with 1,771,245 votes.

Not running on a party ticket, Miss Doyle received the highest number of votes ever recorded by a known Communist in any election in the United States. Her platform stressed the fight for peace with larger appropriations for schools instead of armaments, an end to the loyalty-oath hysteria, and free school lunches and free medical care for school children. "Educate for peace, not war" was her main slogan.

She obtained more than a third of the vote in San Francisco and Kern counties and 30% of the vote in Los Angeles County. In a post-election statement she said: "Despite the Truman-Acheson war drive and the hysteria against Communists, hundreds of thousands of Californians expressed through the ballot their resentment against the school program of war-minded big business, represented in California by Gov. Earl Warren, Rep. Richard Nixon, L. M. Giannini, president of the Bank of America, and their appointee, Roy E. Simpson."

ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE ELECTIONS

The organized labor movement, as represented nationally by the CIO's Political Action Committee, the AFL's Labor's League for Political Education, and the railroad brotherhoods, made the Truman foreign policy, rather than Taft-Hartley Act and similar domestic issues the primary basis for endorsement of candidates.

Partly because of this tie-up to the Democratic Party's war policy line, the labor officialdom fared badly in the elections. Returns on U. S. Senators indicated that of the 36 elected in 1950 only 16 were supported by official labor. The remaining 20 either were opposed by the unions or had no union backing. For the House of Representatives only about half of the candidates having labor support were elected. One union leader reported after the election that "we lost 25 Congressmen and 5 Senators."

Jack Kroll, director of CIO-PAC, admitted "heavy losses but no disaster" and blamed "a feeling of insecurity and uncertainty on the part of the American people." He said, "the Korean situation was the biggest factor in the whole thing," and admitted that Taft-Hartley was hardly an issue in the election, although the unions had the previous year emphasized their determination to defeat all those who voted for it. The New York Journal of Commerce had observed before the voting that "one of the significant features of the current election campaign is the absence of any concentrated attack on Taft-Hartley by the unions."

Director Joseph D. Keenan of Labor's League for Political Education also thought that what he called the "Korean thing" scared the voters and drove away many who blamed the Administration for getting the country into war in the Far East. Further, he complained of the money spent by the other side in contrast to the \$550,000 expended by his organization which had not been well supported by the AFL members.

The organ of 15 standard railway unions, Labor, admitted editorially, November 18, 1950 that "despite the many bright spots" (such as the election of various congressmen who had voted "right" on railroad issues) "we took a licking, but political history proves the tide will turn again." This national weekly in the same issue attacked several railroad companies that "have been deluging their employees with 'literature' designed to shape their political views along reactionary lines." It accused such roads as the Northern Pacific, Reading and Erie of distributing to employees the Readers' Digest pamphlet version of John T. Flynn's book, *The Road Ahead*, which "was obvious reactionary election campaign propaganda." It added, "It takes six pages in a House

Lobby Investigating Committee report just to list the pieces of political propaganda distributed by the Erie."

The Journal of the United Mine Workers (unaffiliated) pointed out: "The Democrat-Truman defeat is a reflection upon the party kite-tail part played by the majority of America's active political labor leaders in following and sponsoring—without question and without protest—the administration policies.

"Despite all labor politicians' claims to the contrary the average worker is intelligent enough to recognize—even with all the Truman utterances of his friendship for labor—that labor in fact has no direct voice in the Truman political cabinet or special agency administration."

PROGRESSIVE PARTY

At its national committee meeting in Chicago, September, 1950, the Progressive Party, in a policy statement prepared for the 1950 election campaign, emphasized the issue of peace and urged that every peaceful means be used for the settlement of the international crisis through conference, negotiation and mediation. (Its previous position on peace, at the outbreak of the Korean intervention, had been justified by later developments.) It urged that the United Nations restore its authority and effectiveness by admission of the People's Republic of China, and by calling for the cessation of hostilities in Korea and the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government for all Korea. It also urged that the U. S. withdraw its fleet from Chinese waters and end all intervention in the Chinese Civil War while, at the same time, recognizing the People's Republic of China.

It also urged a halt to the rearming, renazification and remilitarization of Western Germany and to all economic and military aid to fascist governments, along with the lifting of all bars to trade with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China. It proposed resumption of top-level negotiations with the Soviet Union for the settlement of outstanding differences and the negotiation of German and Japanese peace treaties.

On issues relating to civil rights the Party advocated defeat of all measures to put ideas behind bars and Americans in concentration camps. It urged the end of all political prosecutions, witchhunts, loyalty programs and deportation proceedings designed to intimidate or punish men and women for exercising their constitutional rights of free speech, opinion or association. It demanded the end of the terror against the Negro people. As first steps toward guaranteeing their right to equality

the party urged passage of the FEPC, anti-poll tax and anti-lynching bills, and of laws to assure Negroes equal access, without segregation, to all educational institutions and housing.

Other measures proposed by the Progressive Party included repeal of Taft-Hartley and defeat of all limitations of the right to strike whether made by White House edict or otherwise. It advocated freezing of prices at the lowest dollar and cents levels reached in 1950 and criminal proceedings for violators, the enactment of federal rent controls to apply to all areas of the country, and a ban against evictions. It also backed progressive tax laws and other measures calling for larger government spending for housing, schools, roads, hospitals and welfare needs.

At its national committee meeting in December, 1950, the Party adopted a statement urging repeal of the McCarran Act. It condemned the contempt cases brought against 56 witnesses who refused to answer questions before congressional committees. It renewed its call for world peace and for the seating of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations.

Elmer A. Benson is national chairman and C. B. Baldwin is national secretary.

AMERICAN LABOR PARTY

The platform of the American Labor Party of New York was similar to that of the Progressive Party nationally. It stressed peace, civil rights and social welfare.

John T. McManus, general manager of the National Guardian, running for governor of New York State on the ALP ticket polled 221,996 votes despite an almost complete blackout by the press. Running on the same ticket for U. S. senator, Dr. W. E. B. DuBois, distinguished Negro scholar, polled 205,729; and Dr. Clementina J. Paolone, running for lieutenant governor, received 220,898 votes; Michael Jimenez, of the Electrical Workers, received 209,845 votes for state controller.

Marcantonio Defeated: In the 18th congressional district of New York City, American Labor Party chairman, Rep. Vito Marcantonio, campaigning for an eighth term, was defeated by a gang-up of Republican, Democratic and Liberal Party bosses. Their joint candidate, James G. Donovan, anti-labor, anti-price and rent control, pro-Franco and entirely satisfactory to the most reactionary Republicans, was supported by Christian Front elements as well as all New York City's daily papers except the Daily Worker and the liberal Compass. He was aided by the

nationwide anti-Red hysteria and by the actions of local labor officials who supported the three-party gang-up on the ALP congressman whose record in Congress had been 100% pro-labor and anti-imperialist.

Despite this formidable opposition Marcantonio received 36,200 votes on the ALP line, or 42% of the total, as compared with 38% in 1948 when he was elected. Donovan received 49,409 votes, about half of them on the Democratic line. The passage of the Wilson-Pakula Act in the New York State legislature in 1947 had made it illegal for third party candidates to enter the primaries of the other parties without the express permission in writing of the party bosses. This had barred Marcantonio from winning the nomination of other parties in primary contests as he had in certain previous campaigns.

Wall Street Supports Donovan: The tri-partisan gang-up against Marcantonio was supported by the biggest financial interests of the country, including multi-millionaires from the Morgan, Rockefeller, Kuhn Loeb, Mellon and duPont interest groups. Vanderbilts, Guggenheims, Harrimans and Astors who had given to Republican and Democratic parties poured money into the anti-Marcantonio slush fund.

Officers and boards of directors of such concerns as the following were represented on the list: J. P. Morgan & Co., Morgan, Stanley & Co., Dillon, Read & Co., Lehman Brothers, J. Henry Schroeder Banking Corp., Kidder, Peabody & Co., Lee Higginson & Co., Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., and the Chase National Bank. Also Standard Oil, Phelps Dodge, Revere Copper & Brass, Climax Molybdenum, Crucible Steel, American Tobacco and International Telephone & Telegraph. In fact, many of the banking, industrial and real estate interests who would have been hit by the sort of legislation on housing and welfare introduced by Marcantonio, were among the main contributors to his defeat. (For a complete list, compiled from official sources, see *National Guardian*, Nov. 10, 1950.)

Some of the contributors to the Donovan campaign were men who had previously given substantially to Merwin K. Hart's fascist National Economic Council, such as Charles S. Payson, director of American Rolling Mill, and Rush H. Kress, vice-president of the S. H. Kress Co., leading variety store company.

OTHER LOCAL PARTIES

Liberal Party of New York State: This organization made a deal with Tammany in 1950 to support all Democratic candidates in New York

State in return for one nomination to the State Supreme Court. Their judicial candidate, Matthew M. Levy, was elected. The Liberals received 265,699 votes for Rep. Walter A. Lynch, running for governor against Dewey. Outside of New York City the Liberal Party received fewer votes than the American Labor Party, but its total vote for the state as a whole was higher.

California's IPP: The Independent Progressive Party piled up the biggest vote California had ever given to a third party candidate except when Robert M. Follette running for President in 1924 got 424,000 votes. George Walsh, a member of San Francisco Longshoremen's Local 10, the IPP candidate for secretary of state, polled 309,000 votes, well above the 192,000 received by Henry Wallace as presidential candidate in 1948. Candidates for other state offices ran only slightly behind Walsh. Chairman Reuben Borough who ran for state treasurer said of the results: "These 300,000 votes were the votes of citizens rejecting war and embracing the ideals of a progressive America at peace with the world."

Mrs. Alia Washington, Negro woman of Berkeley, obtained over 200,000 votes in the race for state controller. For a number of local offices the IPP candidates received 20% or more of the votes cast.

Ohio Votes: The Progressive Party vote for Hugh DeLacy for the state assembly from Cleveland was more than double the Wallace vote in that city in 1948—some 36,000 compared with 17,000 two years before. Two Negro Republican candidates, supported by the Progressive Party, won seats in the state assembly in Dayton and Cincinnati.

THE COMMUNIST POSITION

Analysis of the 1950 election in the main resolution of the Communist Party's 15th national convention placed the primary blame for the defeat suffered by labor on the shoulders of the official leaders of the labor movement. These men by their "lesser evil policies" had opened the way for the victory of reactionary politicians.

The resolution declared: "The victory of reaction was possible because the labor bureaucrats and Social Democrats disoriented and disintegrated the independent political strength of the working class by chaining it to the corrupt political machines and war policy of the Democratic Party. Because in most cases the workers were not presented by their leaders with any real alternative to Wall Street's drive toward war, many showed their discontent by shifting from the ins to the outs.

"Even where a genuine alternative was presented, as in the case of

the New York American Labor Party, the effect of the warmongering, Redbaiting, fear and confusion spread by the press and radio, as well as the clinging to the 'lesser evil' notion in regard to Lehman [Sen. Herbert H. Lehman, D., N.Y.], resulted in a decline of its vote."

The election results show that time is running out, the resolution continued: "This state of affairs is only temporary. The growing struggle against the increased war drive and militarization program and the onslaught on the living standards of the workers, farmers and lower middle classes, will unmask the liberal and welfare demagoguery of the Truman Administration."

It concluded also: "The working class and particularly the organized labor movement is the decisive force that will decide the issue of whether a political regrouping takes place and how swiftly it becomes a major force in the country."

In New York State the Communist Party supported the candidate of the American Labor Party although declaring that the Communist program is not the same as that of the ALP. Its support was based on the general Communist policy of helping to build in the electoral field a broad democratic people's coalition to block fascism and war.

COMMUNIST PARTY CONVENTION

The Communist Party of the U. S. held its 15th national convention in December, 1950 when more than two hundred delegates from all parts of the United States met for four days. One third of them were Negroes.

Discussion was focussed on two major problems: 1) the danger of the "inevitable war" conspiracy, with continuing intervention by the United States in opposition to the peoples' movements in Asia and in Central Europe, and 2) the trends toward fascism within our country. The discussion brought out that the second half of the 20th century starts with a titanic struggle for world peace and against fascism, a struggle in which the forces for peace will yet prove themselves stronger than the forces for war.

Internationally, the struggle of the Communists is focused on national independence for the colonial and semi-colonial peoples dominated by one or another of the big capitalist powers. They actively oppose the intervention in Korea which has brought armed aggression by American troops. And Communists see in the industrial federations of the countries participating in the Schuman Plan not only a revival of the

former European cartels but an economic basis for aggression against the Soviet Union.

Within the United States, the struggle concerns defense of the Bill of Rights and achievement of complete and genuine equality of rights and privileges for the Negro people. One primary objective is the repeal of the Smith and McCarran acts which were passed as part of the fascist effort, since 1946, to outlaw the Communist Party. (On the case against the eleven communist leaders, see page 78.) Individual Communists are also attacked under charges of 'sedition' whenever they actively oppose policies of the Truman administration. (For a full report of the Communist Party Convention, see the January and February, 1951, issues of Political Affairs.)

For a Working Class Party: Gus Hall, national secretary of the Communist Party, emphasized the importance of developing "a bold, broad approach" to the question of a mass party, "a third party whose main base is the working class, the poor farmers, the Negro people." America needs "a third party that champions the rights of these groups in the broadest sense—that fights for peace, democracy, and economic security. . . . The initiative must come from the broad ranks of the workers in the Right-led unions, from organizations like the NAACP, the Farmers Union, and other similar groups. . . .

"The Progressive Party has not developed into a mass third party. But that obvious fact must not give rise to any idea that it has outlived its usefulness. . . . Despite its small numerical size, it has a very important role to play in our country's political life. This is especially true in states like New York and California where it has substantial mass support."

Against Segregation in Armed Forces: Benjamin J. Davis, a member of the National Committee, declared that the struggle for peace and the struggle for freedom are indivisible. He cited the case of Lieutenant Gilbert sentenced to twenty-five years of hard labor for disobeying an order, "the mass frame-up of Negro soldiers in Korea, the wanton police lynching of John Derrick, Negro veteran, the brutal mistreatment of Negro inductees in the segregated jimcrow camps of the mainland" as "the most spectacular expression of the contradiction between Wall Street's war program and the struggle of the Negro people for freedom and dignity."

VIII. WORLD LABOR TRENDS

WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS

On its fifth anniversary in October, 1950, the World Federation of Trade Unions announced that its membership covered 78 million working men and women in 65 countries, united through affiliated national trade union centers. This number compared with 65 million members in 1945.

The WFTU is now the largest federation of organized workers in the world. It includes the great majority in France and Italy, the Soviet Union, and increased numbers in the New Democracies of Europe, in Eastern Germany and in China and other Asian countries.

Following the walk-out of U.S., British and right-wing Dutch representatives from the WFTU executive bureau meeting in January, 1949, James B. Carey as secretary-treasurer of the CIO engineered the formation of an anti-WFTU organization. This is the same Carey who declared at an American Legion-sponsored "All American" conference in New York under Hearst auspices on January 28, 1950: "In the last war we joined with the Communists to fight fascists; in another war we will join with the fascists to defeat the Communists." (N.Y. Herald Tribune, Jan. 29, 1950.)

Carey was answered by Pres. Giuseppe Di Vittorio of the WFTU in an open letter published in the Italian paper *L'Unita* in February, 1950. Even right-wing groups in Europe sharply protested Carey's embracing the fascists.

The WFTU has continued during the past two years to carry out its purpose to organize and unite within its ranks the trade unions of the world, "irrespective of considerations of race, nationality, religion, or political opinion." As stated in its constitution, it aims "to combat war and the causes of war, and to work for a stable and enduring peace."

Conference in Asia: Under the auspices of the WFTU, the Trade Union Conference of Asian & Australian Countries was held in Peking, China, in November, 1949. Unionists from Europe pledged their support to the colonial liberation movements against western imperialist countries. In a final resolution the conference declared:

"Under the leadership of their working class, the Chinese people created a united national front; and then, with the support of all strata of the population, in the first place with the support of the peasantry, waged a glorious struggle for their national liberation, finally routing the combined forces of domestic reaction and foreign imperialism."

Recommendations from this conference to all workers in Asia and Australia included: "To put an end to the system of colonies, protectorates and dependent territories as spheres of economic exploitation. To develop trade union organization in these countries free of any discrimination based on race, color, nationality or creed, and to establish labor legislation guaranteeing protection to the workers and their effective participation in the shaping and management of their countries' economic policy."

Struggle for Peace: The executive bureau meeting of the WFTU in Bucharest, Romania, December 7, 1950, issued a manifesto to the trade unions and workers of the world, calling on them "to take vigorous action to defend peace, to safeguard the lives of your children and to preserve the fruits of your creative labor."

Expressing its complete support for the program of the Second World Peace Congress, held in Warsaw, November 16-22, 1950, the WFTU manifesto stated that "If this program is carried out, peace will be assured." It called upon trade unionists of all countries to strengthen the activity of peace committees at their place of work, and to set up such committees where they do not exist, to bring the widest masses of the workers into the peace movement. It called upon working men and women to consolidate unity within their ranks in the fight for peace; to link up this fight with the struggle to win the immediate and essential demands and improvement of their economic and social conditions; and to strengthen joint action by the industrial and agricultural working class.

The WFTU published as a supplement to its fortnightly review of the World Trade Union Movement (Dec. 5, 1950) the documents of the Second World Peace Congress. On the World Peace Council elected by this congress are a number of WFTU labor leaders from unions in different countries. These include Louis Saillant, WFTU general secretary and president of the Committee of National Resistance in France; Liu Ning I, vice-president of the Chinese Trade Unions; Alain Le Leap, secretary-general of the CGT (General Confederation of Labor) in France; Fernando Santi, secretary of the CGIL (General Confederation

of Labor) in Italy; Vicente Lombardo Toledano, president of the CTAL (Confederation of Latin American Workers); and Ernest de Maio, president of district 11 of the Electrical Workers (UE) in the United States.

Appeal on Korea: An appeal against terrorism and atomic threats in Korea was sent August 16, 1950, by the WFTU to the United Nations. Signed by Pres. G. Di Vittorio and General Secretary Louis Saillant, the appeal stated:

"The World Federation of Trade Unions, together with all sincere peace-loving people, considers that the people of Korea have not committed any aggression against another people, have not invaded any foreign territory, and are fully entitled to settle their own affairs, that the bombing and devastation of Korean territory by a foreign army cannot contribute to the cause of peace, and that the American intervention has sharpened world tension to the extreme and cannot but aggravate it in the future."

Against Discrimination: The WFTU sent to the United Nations December 13, 1949, a 42-page report on Social and Economic Discrimination Against Workers for Reasons of Race or Color. Calling attention to the fact that the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights says that everyone is entitled to all rights and freedoms set forth in this declaration without distinctions of any kind such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, the report cites many violations which the UN, under its own charter, has the duty to abolish.

The report charges that in the United States Negroes, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Chinese and Japanese are not admitted to skilled work. Negroes are subject to special wage scales under which they receive a lower wage than that payable to white workers in the same category. The chief blame for such discrimination is placed on the trusts and monopolies which, the report charges, do everything in their power, in all parts of the world, to weaken the workers by dividing them.

The WFTU appeals for a complete prohibition of such racist practices and concludes that the UN cannot afford to fail in this matter. If the UN really wishes to succeed in fighting discrimination, it must appeal to the "best-organized, most coherent and important section of world public opinion—organized labor."

The WFTU has consultative status at the United Nations. In January, 1951, the French government, without warning or explanation, moved

to oust the WFTU from its headquarters in Paris. New headquarters were later established at Vienna.

Right-Wing Secedes: The so-called International Confederation of Free Trade Unions was started in London, in November, 1949, to support U.S. State Department policy and Marshall Plan aid to the U.S. satellite countries and to oppose the international labor unity of the WFTU. Its only substantial affiliates are the AFL and CIO in the United States and the Trades Union Congress in Great Britain. Its strength is reliably estimated at not over 25 million.

In opposing the WFTU, the ICFTU supported the Schuman plan, proposed early in 1950, for pooling the coal and steel resources of western Europe. British trade unionists and Labour Party spokesmen charged that the plan would develop into a cartel. But the ICFTU in May, 1950, "declared itself in agreement with the principle involved in the Schuman proposal."

From its headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, the ICFTU sent a five-man delegation from right-wing unions in the fall of 1950 on a 60-day tour of Southeast Asian and Far East countries. The delegation recommended an "emergency program" in an effort to combat "Communist influence" in the trade unions of Southeast Asia. It admitted that "certain industrial, business and plantation firms," representing countries that have large-scale investments in Asia pursue reactionary labor policies which tend to suppress the rights of trade union organization.

TRADE UNIONS IN LATIN AMERICA

CTAL: The Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL), founded in 1938, with headquarters in Mexico City, still remains the largest and most important trade union organization in Latin America. The total membership of its affiliates was last reported at around four million in 1944.

Vicente Lombardo Toledano, president of CTAL, reported at the second World Trade Union Congress of the WFTU (June-July, 1949) that union bodies in 15 countries were affiliated to CTAL, as follows: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Puerto Rico, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Since that report was made, the Committee for Trade Union Reorganization (CROS) of the Republic of El Salvador joined the CTAL. Before the new constitution was adopted September 14, 1950, trade unionism had been severely restricted in that country.

In the Republics of Haiti and Honduras the development of a free trade union movement has not been possible. The dictatorships under which the people have been living for many years have prevented union organization and collective bargaining.

In the Dominican Republic the trade unions are controlled by the government authorities. In Argentina, the General Confederation of Labor is also under government control.

CTAL's Program: Since its formation in 1938 the program of CTAL has remained basically the same. It calls for the economic and political emancipation of the Latin American countries through agrarian reform, industrialization, a genuine democratic government and the unification of the working class.

Its international program calls for friendship and alliance among the countries of Latin America, the strengthening of the United Nations, and an understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Attempts to Split CTAL: After a campaign aided by reactionary forces in Latin America, the American Federation of Labor called a congress in Lima (Peru), in January, 1948, to form the Inter-American Confederation of Labor (CIT). The CIT affiliates were small, dissident groups in a few Latin American countries.

Toledano said in July, 1949, that this organization was an "agency of the AFL and North American monopolies which has failed to prosper, in spite of the material resources at its disposal. . . ." It has since gone out of existence.

In January, 1951, another attempt was made to create a labor organization for the purpose of splitting the CTAL. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (formerly the right-wing of the WFTU) sponsored a conference in Mexico City. This conference organized the new Regional Inter-American Organization of Workers (ORIT), with headquarters in Havana, Cuba. It has been called "a carbon copy of the Inter-American Confederation of Labor (CIT)."

Nine Latin American countries, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, San Salvador, Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republic failed to send delegates but the conference claimed to represent the whole hemisphere. The Mexican delegation walked out of the meeting because its proposal to seat the Argentine delegation was outvoted. Thus Mexico and Argentina are not represented in ORIT, although a leader of Mexico's small Proletarian Confederation of Mexico (CPN) was elected to the executive committee.

CANADIAN LABOR DEVELOPMENTS

Latest government estimate of union membership in Canada, at the end of 1949, was 1,005,636, passing the million mark for the first time. This is much more than double the peak figures before World War II and represents about 27% of all wage and salary earners.

Despite increasing pressure of war economy on workers' living standards, union growth has been slowed down by cleavage in labor ranks with intensified redbaiting, raiding, and expulsions. In a two-year period, 1946-47 union membership rose by 201,000; in the next two years, by only 5,000.

Largest and oldest body, the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada (TLC), including locals of most AFL unions plus some purely Canadian unions, had 459,000 members at the end of 1949, a gain of 56,000 in the two years. Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL), including Canadian locals of most CIO unions, United Mine Workers of America, and some Canadian national and local unions, had 302,000 members. This marked a two-year loss of 27,000 since new organization did not compensate for expulsion of former affiliates, United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers and the Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers. A third major body, Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labor (CCCL) and associated circles (operating only in the Province of Quebec), had still about 90,000. Independent international railway brotherhoods (Engineers, Firemen, Conductors, and Trainmen) gained slightly, rising to 41,000. International unions not affiliated to main Canadian centres grew from 10,000 to 67,000, mainly as a result of CCL expulsions. Miscellaneous unaffiliated unions and locals remained at about 30,000. Two so-called "centres" (regarded by bona fide unions as fronts for company unionism) claimed an increase of 3,700 to a total of 7,300.

Major issue before the trade unions is still (as outlined in Labor Fact Book 9) to establish independence and unity of Canadian labor, and to carry on the fight for a labor movement free of U.S. union bureaucracy and also of company and government pressures. Issue has become increasingly sharp as reactionary union officialdom committed to increasing economic, political and military integration of Canada with U.S. policies, has resorted to more drastic measures to stifle rank and file opposition.

Trades and Labor Congress: At end of 1948 the Trades and Labor Congress was maintaining an independent position on major issues, but U.S. union bureaucrats moved in later to force acceptance of U.S. policies.

In 1949 and 1950 TLC conventions yielded to AFL pressures, expelling CIO unions and outdoing CCL in redbaiting and expulsions.

Most important was repudiation by TLC of the militant Canadian Seamen's Union. CSU resources had been stretched to the limit by two long and costly strikes on the Great Lakes in 1946 and 1948. Especially in 1948, it had to meet raiding by AFL Seafarers Union, unprecedented police violence, and many prison sentences both for leaders and rank and file.

Early in 1949, in the midst of negotiations with the CSU, the deep-sea companies (including one owned by the government) signed a back-door agreement with the Seafarers Union which had almost no members and no legal right to represent the seamen. This forced the CSU into its third major strike in three years. The strike was fully legal, clearly on economic issues, and on basic principles of right of free choice of bargaining agency. The CSU set up picket lines in many foreign ports and appealed to all port workers for support.

Canadian and U.S. governments unleashed a tremendous campaign against the CSU charging that its strike was "political" and part of a broad plot to disrupt the Marshall Plan and endanger defense. Reactionary AFL Seafarers and Longshoremen organized an international strike-breaking campaign.

TLC officers were already under pressure from the AFL executive council which had ordered a change in TLC method of convention voting and set up an "investigating committee" to probe into TLC operations (See Labor Fact Book 8). They yielded to the threat that a group of AFL unions would withdraw from TLC, and repudiated the Canadian Seamen's deep-sea strike.

At the TLC convention in Calgary, September, 1949, its executive capitulated completely. In an atmosphere of redbaiting and intimidation the convention adopted, 4 to 1, recommendations to expel the CSU (which had already voluntarily disaffiliated); to bar Communists from office in the Congress and its provincial federations and local councils; to require all nominees for office to take an oath disavowing association with any "subversive philosophy"; to change the basis of representation at conventions to cut down the voting power of the larger locals; to denounce the WFTU and approve establishment of a new world trade union centre. It rejected all resolutions calling for trade with China or the USSR or in any way criticizing Canadian government foreign policy.

National Railway Strike: Incipient revolt of rank and file membership, fanned by widespread unemployment in the winter of 1949-50 and sharply rising profits and prices with Canada's entry into Korean war, came to a head August 22, 1950, in a nine-day national strike of 125,000 railway workers (90,000 from TLC and 35,000 from CCL unions). This first national railway strike in Canadian labor history brought into action many previously passive members of conservative unions. The whole Canadian labor movement was united on a front even broader than in the big strike year 1946. But TLC and CCL leaders, fearing that the strike movement would get out of hand, and smarting under attacks on themselves as disloyal and saboteurs of the war effort, welcomed the move of the federal government (which owns and operates one of the two railway companies involved) to call a special session of Parliament. It passed a law requiring the railway strikers to go back to work with a 4½¢ wage increase, to negotiate their demands further and, if necessary, to submit them to arbitration. This is the first time that compulsory arbitration has been imposed on any group of Canadian workers.

Although the heads of the three main union centres (TLC, CCL, and CCCL) had jointly protested against compulsory arbitration, they stifled spontaneous local demands for a general strike. The railway strike leaders stated in advance that they would obey the law, and as soon as it was passed they ordered the workers back to their jobs. More than three months later the arbitrator granted the railway workers (who had had no wage increase since 1948 and had shared in few of the gains won by other unions since 1945) a total increase of 7¢ an hour (including the 4½¢ in the strike settlement), although other unions were negotiating 10¢ settlements. The workers were promised a 40-hour week from June 1, 1951, without reduction in weekly take-home pay. The decision completely ignored important demands on working conditions, and even excluded from this settlement some of the groups involved.

TLC Convention: Early in September, before the workers had rallied from the railway strike sellout, the 1950 TLC convention met in Montreal. The officers launched an offensive against all individuals and unions whose record suggested that they might protest. Twenty properly credentialled local delegates were not seated, under an arbitrary interpretation of the anti-Communist constitutional amendment of 1949. The convention applauded the Korean intervention and planned to oust every union and every member suspected of being a "red" or a "red sympathizer." Economic issues were kept off the floor and the railway strike

was not mentioned. The Labor Attaché to the American Embassy sat in the Convention and directed proceedings.

Efforts were being made also to oust the leadership of the Lumber & Sawmill Workers, the union of the Ontario loggers and bush workers. The top leaders had their credentials withdrawn by the union's parent body, the AFL Carpenters, and the companies used this excuse to refuse them entry to the lumber camps.

In December, 1950, employers and government again selected the CSU as their first victim in a campaign against existing legislation to protect collective bargaining rights. The federal Labor Relations Board (whose decisions are closely followed by all provincial boards) took away the certification of the CSU for the employees of one shipping company on the grounds that the CSU has engaged in other than trade union activities. The board used as its proof a White Paper issued by the British Government charging that the CSU instigated the London dockers' strike of 1949 and was, therefore, no longer a trade union. If sustained, this decision would mean that the Board has full power to decide through which union workers are to be allowed to bargain, and also to change at will any of its own decisions.

This was later challenged in the courts. A powerful movement was beginning to develop against this decision as other unions realized that it was aimed at all labor and not only against the CSU. Even the CCL Ontario Federation of Labor convention in February, 1951, passed a resolution against this decision, although CCL President Aaron Mosher, one of its signers, was present in person to defend his position.

Canadian Congress of Labour: In the Canadian Congress of Labour, where the employer-government-union alliance already had deep roots in 1948, the attack against all militant expression and action continued to take the form of redbaiting, expulsions of whole unions, and raiding in an attempt to take over or smash their organizations. Because the issues had been before the membership more clearly and for a longer time, the basic rank-and-file militancy was more evident and active than in the TLC.

The Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers, indefinitely suspended from the CCL in March, 1949, and formally expelled at the 1949 convention, operated thereafter as an independent union. The Steelworkers have persistently attempted to raid one of its basic locals at the International Nickel plant in Port Colborne, Ontario. But this local remained united with the larger local dealing with the same company at Sudbury, where

attempted Steelworkers raids met with no success. The union lost some less important plants, but it successfully defended its main positions and maintained its membership against a very powerful CCL-Steelworkers drive.

The UE was suspended from the CCL executive council in March, 1949, and had its officers suspended from any participation in the CCL that summer. But it had a strong plant delegation at the 1949 convention—participating effectively in the fight for basic union policy. Following the expulsion of the UE International from the CIO in November, 1949, the UE in Canada was faced with a raiding drive by the newly formed IUE, aided by the electrical companies and by the CCL. The raiding was beaten back, opening the way to important contract gains in late 1949 and 1950. Late in 1949 the CCL suspended the whole Canadian district of the UE and then expelled it at the September, 1950, convention. Since that time the UE, like Mine-Mill, has operated as an independent union.

Both UE and Mine-Mill, while officially outside the CCL, maintain contact with the CCL unions in the interests of labor unity in Canada. The annual convention of the Canadian UE in October, 1950, adopted a five-point program for increased wages, organization of the unorganized, labor unity and world peace. It has sent this program to all unions as a basis for united action. This program setting forth the basic needs of Canadian workers has met a ready response, and many unions and union locals are formulating policies of their own along similar lines.

Among the unions still affiliated to the CCL a strong rank-and-file movement for increased wages took shape, especially in the Auto Workers, Steelworkers, International Woodworkers on the West Coast and United Mine Workers on the East Coast. This movement opposes long-term contracts (especially in the Ford local of the Auto Workers), and demands reopening of the few long-term contracts that had been entered into. In some cases these rank-and-file demands forced a reluctant leadership to accept them as their own policy. In other cases they were pressed even against the opposition of the present union leaders.

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